
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
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THE APHORISMS

OF THE

SÁNKHYA PHILOSOPH

OF

KAPILA

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PREFACE.

The great body of Hindú Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the obscurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the uninstructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Bráhmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West.

These pages, now submitted to the criticism of the pandits who read English, are to be regarded as proof-sheets awaiting correction. They invite discussion.

J. R. B.

Benares College,
5th January, 1852.

THE

SANKHYA APHORISMS

OF

KAPILA

INTRODUCTION.

Salutation to the illustrious sage Kapila !*

b. Well, the great sage Kapila, desirous of raising the world [from the Slough of Despond in which he found it sunk], perceiving that the knowledge of the *excellence* of any fruit, through the desire [which this excites] for the fruit, is a cause of people's betaking themselves to the means adapted to the attainment of the fruit], declares, as follows, the excellence of the fruit [which he would urge our striving to obtain] †

अथ त्रिविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः ॥ १ ॥

The subject proposed. *Apho.* 1.—Well, the complete cessation of pain [which is] of three kinds is the complete end of man.

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* श्री कापिलमुनये नमः ॥

† अथ जगदुद्दिधीर्षुर्महामुनिः कपिलः फलसौन्दर्यज्ञानस्य फलेच्छाद्वारा साधनप्रवृत्तौ कारणत्वं पश्यन् फलसौन्दर्यमाह ॥

The word 'Well' serves as a benediction*[—the particle *atha* being regarded as an auspicious one].

b. By saying that the complete cessation of pain, which is of three kinds—viz. (1) due to one's self *(ádhyátmika)*, (2) due to products of the elements *(ádhibhautika)*, and (3) due to supernatural causes *(ádhidaivika)*—, is the *complete* end of man, he means to say that it is the *chief* end of man among the four human aims [—viz. merit, wealth, pleasure, and *liberation*,—see *Sáhitya Darpana* §2.—]† because the three are transitory, whereas liberation is *not* transitory :—such is the state of the case.

A question whether the end may not be attained by ordinary means.

c. But then, let it *be* that the above-mentioned cessation [of all the three kinds of pain] is the complete end of man, still, what reason is there for betaking oneself to a doctrinal system which is the cause of a knowledge of the truth in the shape of the knowledge of the difference between Nature and Soul, when there are *easy* remedies for bodily pains, viz. drugs, &c , and remedies for mental pains, viz. beautiful women and delicate food, &c., and remedies for pains due to products of the elements, viz. the residing in impregnable localities, &c., as is enjoined in the institutes of polity, and remedies for pains due to supernatural causes, viz. gems [such as possess marvellous prophylactic properties], and spells, and herbs of mighty power, &c.,—and when [on the other hand], since it is hard to get one to grapple with that very difficult knowledge of truth which can be perfected only by the toil

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* अथ शब्दो मङ्गलार्थः ॥

† त्रिविधस्य आध्यात्मिकाधिभौतिकाधिदैविकरूपस्य दुःखस्य अत्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः चतुर्षु पुरुषार्थेषु मध्ये श्रेष्ठः पुरुषार्थ इत्यर्थः । त्रयाणां क्षयित्वान्मोक्षस्याक्षयित्वादिति भावः ॥

of successive births, it must be still *more* hard to get one to betake himself to the doctrinal system [which treats of the knowledge in question]?—therefore [—i. e. seeing that this may be asked—] he declares as follows:—

न दृष्टात्तत्सिद्धिर्निवृत्तेरप्यनुवृत्तिदर्शनात् ॥ २ ॥

The end is not to be attained by ordinary means.

Aph. 2.—The effectuation of this [complete cessation of pain] is not [to be expected] by means of the visible [—such as wealth, &c.—], for we see [—on the loss of wealth, &c.—] the restoration [of the evil] after its cessation.

a. 'The visible'—in the shape of the drugs, &c., above-mentioned† [§ 1. *c*].

b. 'The effectuation of this'—i. e. the effectuation of the complete cessation of pain‡.

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† दृष्टादुक्तौषधादिरूपात् ॥

‡ तत्सिद्धिः दुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिसिद्धिः ॥

c. *Why* is it not [to be thus effected]? Because, after the cessation,—the cessation of *pain* is understood,—we see its restoration,—the springing up again of pain in general* [—from whichever of its three sources—§1 *b*].

d. The state of the matter is this:—not by the expedients abovementioned is there such a removal of pain that no pain arises thereafter; for when, by this or that expedient, this or that pain has been destroyed, we see other pains springing up. Therefore, though it be *not* easy [§1. *c.*], the knowledge of truth [as a complete remedy] *is* to be desired.†

e. But then,—Grant that *future* pain is not debarred by drugs, &c., [employed to remove *present* pain], still, by again and again obviating it [as often as it presents itself], there may be the cessation of *future* pain also:—this doubt he states as follows:‡

प्रार्थ्यहिकक्षुत्प्रतीकारवत्तत्प्रतीकारचेष्टनात्पुरुषार्थत्वम् ॥ ३ ॥

The question whether the end may not be attained by the recurrent use of ordinary means.

Aph. 3.—[Let us consider the doubt] that the soul's desire [the cessation of pain—may result] from exertions for

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* न भवति कुतः। निवृत्तेर्दुःखनिवृत्तेरनन्तरमिति शेषः अनुवृत्तिदर्शनात्। दुःखजातीयोत्पत्तिदर्शनात् ॥

† अयं भावः। नोक्तरूपाभ्यां दुःखानुत्पत्तिविशिष्टा दुःखनिवृत्तिर्भवति तत्तदुपायैस्तत्तद्दुःखेषु नष्टेष्वपि दुःखान्तरोत्पत्तिदर्शनात् तस्मादसुकरत्वेऽपि तत्त्वज्ञानमेषितव्यमिति ॥

‡ ननु मा भूदौषधादिभिर्भाविदुःखनिवृत्तिः तथापि पुनः पुनः प्रतीकारकरणे तु भाविदुःखनिवृत्तिरपि स्यादिति शङ्कते।

the obviation [of pain], as is the case with the obviation of daily hunger.

a. When pain shall arise, [let us suppose one to argue] then it is to be obviated; and thus there is the soul's desire, the cessation of pain, just as one should eat when there is hunger, and thus there is the soul's desire of the eater, viz. the cessation of hunger. In regard to this [doubt] he states the recognised decision.

सर्वासम्भवात्सम्भवे ऽपि सत्त्वासम्भवाद्धेयः प्रमाण-
कुशलैः ॥ ४ ॥

This suggestion negatived.

Aph. 4.—This [method of palliatives, §3], is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidence, because it is not everywhere possible [to employ it at all], and because, even if this *were* possible, there would be an impossibility as regards [ensuring] the perfect fitness [of the agents employed]:—

a. For there are not physicians, &c., in every place and at all times; and to rely on physicians &c., would not be advisable, even if there were the possibility, i. e. even if these *were* always at hand, since physicians are not *perfect* [in their art],—for pain cannot with certainty be got rid of by means of physicians, &c., with their drugs, &c.; moreover, when corporeal pain has departed, there may still be that which is *mental*, &c., so that there is not [under such circumstances] in every respect liberation from pain;—for these reasons *such* a soul's aim [as that which con-

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* यदा दुःखमुत्पत्स्यते तदा तत् प्रतिकर्त्तव्यं तथाच दुःखनिवृत्तिः पुरुषार्थः क्षुधा यदा क्षुत्तदा भोक्तव्यं भुञ्जानस्य क्षुन्निवृत्तिः पुरुषार्थ इति सिद्धान्तवत्॥

tents itself with temporary palliatives] is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidences* [—i. e. who are acquainted with authoritative treatises].

b. He mentions another proof† [of his assertion].

उत्कर्षादपि मोक्षस्य सर्वोत्कर्षश्रुतेः ॥ ५ ॥

Scriptural evidence in favour of this view.

Aph. 5.—Also [an inferior method ought not to be adopted] because of the pre-eminence of Liberation [as proved] by the text [of scripture declaratory] of its pre-eminence above all else,

a. One ought not to endeavour after the removal of this or that pain by these and those expedients [§1. *c.*], since Liberation (*moksha*), by being eternal, is transcendant as a remover of all pains. Moreover one ought to endeavour only after the knowledge of truth, which is the means thereof [—i. e. of Liberation—] because the Scripture tells its pre-eminence above all [other objects of endeavour] in the text "There is nothing beyond the gaining of Soul"—with the utter exclusion of pain.

* नहि सर्वस्मिन् देशे सर्वस्मिन् काले वैद्यादयस्सन्ति। सम्भवेऽपि सत्त्वेऽपि वैद्यादीनां सत्त्वाभावात्। नहि वैद्यादिभिरपि अवश्यभेषधादिना दुःखं हातुं शक्यते। किञ्च शारीरदुःखाप्रशमे मानसादेस्तस्य सम्भव इति न सर्वथा दुःखादिमोकः। तस्मात्प्रमाणकुशलैरीदृग्विधपुरुषार्थो हेय इति ॥

† युक्त्यन्तरमाह ॥

‡ न तैस्तैरुपायैस्तद्दुःखोच्छेदे यतितव्यं मोक्षस्य नित्य-

[But then, it may be suggested, when you say *liberation*, we understand you to mean from *bondage*; and is that bondage essential, or is it adventitious? In the former case, it is incapable of destruction; if it come under the latter head, it will perish of itself, like any other adventitious and therefore transitory thing]:—what have we to do with your 'knowledge of truth,' then? To this it is replied]—

अविशेषश्चोभयोः ॥ ६ ॥

An objection met.

Aph. 6.—And there is no difference between the two:—[no difference in

a. There is no difference in the applicability of liberation on either of the suppositions, that the bondage is essential or that it is adventitions,—supposing it were either;—see §19. a]. That is to say, we can tell both how the bondage takes place and how the liberation takes place.†

b. Now, with the view of demonstrating [the real nature of]

त्वेन सर्वदुःखोच्छेदरूपत्वेनोत्कर्षात्। आत्मलाभात्परं न विद्यत इति सर्वोत्कर्षश्रुतेरपि तत्साधने तत्त्वज्ञान एव यतितव्यम्॥

* ननु मोक्ष इत्युक्ते बन्धादिति प्रतीयते। स च बन्धः किं स्वाभाविक उतागन्तुकः। आद्ये नाशायोगः अन्त्ये चेत्स्वत एव नंक्ष्यति किं तत्त्वज्ञानेनेत्यत आह॥

† उभयोः बन्धस्य स्वाभाविकागन्तुकत्वयोर्मोक्षस्योपादेयत्वे अविशेषः। यथा बन्धस्योपपत्तिर्यथाच मोक्षस्य तथा वयं वक्तुं शक्नुम इत्यर्थः॥

Bondage and Liberation, he declares, exclusively, in the first place, the objections to Bondage's being *essential** [§5 *b*].

न स्वभावतो बद्धस्य मोक्षसाधनोपदेशविधिः ॥ ७ ॥

Liberation must be possible, else the means would not have been enjoined.

Aph. 7.—There would be no fitness in the enjoining of means for the liberation of him who is bound *essentially*.

a. Since Liberation has been stated [§1] to result from the complete cessation of pain, [it follows that] Bondage is the junction of pain:—and this is not *essential* in man; for, if that were the case, then there would be no rule—i. e. no fitness—in the scriptural or legal injunction of means for liberation;—such is what must be supplied [to complete the aphorism],—because—to explain our meaning [—by an illustration],—*fire* cannot be liberated from its *heat* which is essential to it,—since that which is *essential* exists as long as the substance exists.†

b. And it has been declared in the Divine Song [the *Íswara Gítá*,], "If the soul were essentially foul, or impure, or changeable,

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* अस्य बन्धमोक्षयोरुपपत्त्यर्थं आदौ तावत्स्वाभाविकत्वे बन्धस्य दूषणान्याह ॥

† दुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तेर्मोक्षत्वाद्बन्धो दुःखयोगः। स च पुरुषे न स्वाभाविकः तथा सति मोक्षाय साधनोपदेशस्य श्रौतस्य स्मार्त्तस्य च विधिरनुष्ठानं न घटत इति शेषः। नह्यग्नेः स्वाभाविकादौष्ण्यान्मोक्षसम्भवति स्वाभाविकस्य यावद्द्रव्यभावित्वादिति भावः ॥

then its liberation could not take place even through hundreds of successive births."*

c. [Since some one may be disposed to say] "*Grant* that there is no fitness [in the scriptural and legal injunctions—§7. *a.*],—what have we to do with *that?*"—therefore he declares as follows:—†

स्वभावस्यानपायित्वादननुष्ठानलक्षणमप्रामाण्यम् ॥ ८ ॥

Scripture would be nugatory if pain were inevitable.

Aph. 8.—Since an essential nature is imperishable, unauthoritativeness, betokened by inappropriateness, [would be chargeable against the scripture, if pain were essential to humanity].

a. That is to say,—since the essential nature of any thing is imperishable,—i. e. endures as long as the thing itself,—it would follow [—on the supposition that pain is essential to humanity—] that, since Liberation is *impossible*, the Scripture which enjoins the means for its attainment is a false authority, inasmuch as it is inappropriate‡ [in its injunctions. And this is out of the question,—Scripture being assumed here, as in all the others of the six systems, to be an exact measure of truth].

b. But then, [some one may say]—let it *be* an injunction [to use means for the attainment of an unattainable object] on the

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* उक्तञ्चेश्वरगीतायां । यद्यात्मा मलिनो ऽस्वच्छो विकारी स्यात्स्वभावतः । नहि तस्य भवेन्मुक्तिर्जन्मान्तरशतैरपीति ॥

† भवत्वननुष्ठानं किमेतावतेत्यत आह ॥

‡ स्वभावस्यानपायित्वाद्यावद्द्रव्यभावित्वात्तोच्छासम्भवेन तत्साधनोपदेशश्रुतेरननुष्ठानलक्षणमप्रामाण्यं स्यादित्यर्थः ॥

mere strength of Scripture :* [—and, since Scripture is an unquestionable authority, we may be excused from asking or answering the question *why* the injunction is given :—] to this he replies as follows :—

नाशक्योपदेशविधिरुपदिष्टेऽप्यनुपदेशः ॥ ९ ॥

An impracticable injunction is no rule.

Aph. 9.—There is no rule where something impossible is enjoined; though it *be* enjoined, it is no injunction:—[but

a. There can be no fitness or propriety in an injunction with a view to an impossible fruit, seeing that, though something be enjoined, or ordered, [to be effected] by means that are impracticable, this is no injunction at all, but only the *semblance* of an injunction;—because it stands to reason that not even the *Veda* can make one see sense in an absurdity]† such is the meaning.

b. Here he comes upon a doubt.‡

शुक्लपटवद्बीजवच्चेत् ॥ १० ॥

A doubt whether the essential be not removeable.

Aph. 10.—If [some one says]—as in the case of white cloth, or of a seed, [—something essential may be not irremoveable; then he will find his answer in the next aphorism] — for

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* ननु श्रुतिबलादेवानुष्ठानं स्यात्तत्राह ॥

† अशक्याय फलायोपदेशस्य विधिरनुष्ठानं न सम्भवति यत उपदिष्टे विहिते ऽपि अशक्योपायेन उपदेश एव न भवति किन्तूपदेशाभास एव। बाधितमर्थं वेदो ऽपि न बोधयतीति न्यायादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ अत्र शङ्कते ।

a. But then [the doubter is supposed to argue]—the destruction even of what is essential [in spite of what is stated under § 9] *is* seen; as for example, the essential whiteness of white cloth is removed by dyeing, and the essential power of germination in a seed is removed by fire. Therefore, according to the analogy of the white cloth and the seed, it is possible that there should be the removal of the bondage of the soul even though it *were* essential. So too there may be [without any impropriety] the enjoinment of the means thereof. Well—*if* any one argues thus, such is the meaning* [of the aphorism, to which he proceeds to reply.]

b. He declares† [the real state of the case with reference to the doubt just raised].

शक्त्युद्भवानुद्भवाभ्यां नाशक्योपदेशः ॥ ११ ॥

Decision that an essential property may be hidden but not removed.

Aph. 11.—Since both perceptibleness and [subsequent] non-perceptibleness may belong to some power [which is indestructible], it is not something *impracticable* that is enjoined [when one is directed to render some indestructible power imperceptible]. *a.* In regard even to the two examples abovementioned [§ 10] people do not give an injunction for [the positive destruction of]

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* ननु स्वाभाविकस्याप्यपायो दृश्यते यथा शुक्लपटस्य स्वाभाविकं शौक्ल्यं रागेणापनीयते यथाच बीजस्य स्वाभाविकयङ्कुरशक्तिरग्निनापनीयते। अतश्शुक्लपटवद्बीजवच्च स्वाभाविकस्यापि बन्धस्यापायः पुरुषे सम्भवतीति तद्वदेव तत्साधनोपदेशः स्यादिति चेदित्यर्थः ॥

† समाधत्ते ॥

something essential, which is indestructible [§ 8]. Why [do we say this]? Because in these two instances of the perceptibleness and non-perceptibleness of a power [—the powers, namely, of appearing white, and of germinating—see § 10. *a.*—] there are merely the manifestation and [afterwards] the *hiding* of the whiteness, &c., but not the *removal* of the whiteness or of the power of germination;—because—that is to say—the whiteness of the dyed cloth and the germinating power of the roasted seed can again be brought out by the processes of the bleacher, &c., [in the case of the dyed cloth,] and by the will of the Yogí, [the possessor of supernatural powers,—in the case of the roasted seed—]

a. Having thus disproved the notion that Bondage is *essential* [to man], wishing to disprove also the notion that it is the result of some [adherent] *cause,* he rejects the [various supposable] causes, viz., Time &c.

न कालयोगतो व्यापिनो नित्यस्य सर्वसम्बन्धात् ॥ १२ ॥

Time, which applies to all, cannot be the cause of the bondage of a part.

Aph. 12.—Not from connection with *time* [does bondage befall the soul], because this, all-pervading and eternal, is eternally associated [with *all,* and not with those alone who are in bondage].

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† उक्तदृष्टान्तयोरपि अशक्याय स्वाभाविकायोपदेशो लोकानां न भवति। कुतः। शक्त्युद्भवानुद्भवाभ्यां दृष्टान्तद्वये शुक्लत्वादेराविर्भावतिरोभावावेव भवतः नतु शौक्ल्यस्याङ्कुरशक्तेश्चापायः। रजकादिव्यापारैर्योगिसङ्कल्पादिभिश्च रक्तपटभृष्टबीजयोः पुनश्शौक्ल्यस्याङ्कुरशक्तेश्चाविर्भावादिति भावः॥

† एवं बन्धस्य स्वाभाविकत्वं निराकृत्य नैमित्तिकत्वमपि निराकरिष्यन्निमित्तानि कालादीनि निराकरोति॥

a. The bondage of man is not caused by *time*, because [if that were the case] there could be no such separation as that of the *liberated* and *un-liberated*, because time, which applies to everything and is eternal, is at all times associated with all men* [—and must therefore bring *all* into bondage if any].

न देशयोगतो ऽप्यस्मात् ॥ १३ ॥

Place, for the same reason, cannot be the cause.

Aph. 13.—Nor [does bondage arise] from connection with *place* either, for the same reason [as in the preceding aphorism].

a. That is to say, bondage does not arise from connection with *place*. Why? 'For the same reason,'—i. e. for that stated in the preceding aphorism—viz. that, since it [viz. place] is connected with *all* men, whether liberated or not liberated, bondage would [in *that* case] befal the *liberated* also.†

नावस्थातो देहधर्मत्वात्तस्याः ॥ १४ ॥

The soul is not kept in bondage by its being hampered among circumstances.

Aph. 14. Nor [does the bondage of the soul arise] from its being conditioned [by its standing among circumstances that clog it by surrounding it], because *that* is the habit [not of the soul but] of the *body*.

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* न कालनिमित्तकः पुरुषस्य बन्धः व्यापिनो नित्यस्य कालस्य सर्वैः पुरुषैस्सर्वकालावच्छेदेन सम्बन्धात् मुक्तामुक्तव्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः ॥

† देशयोगतो ऽपि न बन्धः । कुतः । अस्मात् । पूर्वसूत्रोक्तात् । मुक्तामुक्तसर्वपुरुषसम्बन्धात् मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापत्तेरित्यर्थः ॥

a. By 'condition' we mean the being in the shape of a sort of association. The bondage [of the soul] does not arise from *that*, because *that* is the property of the *body* [and not of the soul];—because—that is to say—bondage might befal even the liberated [—which is impossible—] if that which is the habit of another could occasion the bondage of one quite different.*

b. But then [some one might say,] *let* this conditioned state belong to the soul. On this point [to prevent mistakes] he declares—

असङ्गोऽयम्पुरुष इति ॥ १५ ॥

The soul is altogether solitary and unshaked.

Aph. 15. [It is not so] because this soul is unassociated [with any conditions or circumstances that could serve as its bonds].

a. The word *iti* here shows that it [i. e. the assertion conveyed in the aphorism] is a *reason*,—the construction, with the preceding aphorism, being this, that, *since* the soul is unassociated, it belongs only to the body to be [hampered] among circumstances.†

न कर्मणान्यधर्मत्वादतिप्रसङ्गः ॥ १६ ॥

The fruit of works belongs not to the soul.

Aph. 16.—Nor [does the bondage of soul arise] from any work, because these

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* अवस्था। संघातविशेषरूपता। ततो न बन्धः। तस्याः देहधर्मत्वात्। अन्यधर्मस्य साक्षादन्यबन्धकत्वे मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापत्तेरिति भावः ॥

† ननु पुरुषस्यैवावस्था स्यात्तत्राह ॥

‡ इतिर्हेतौ। पुरुषस्यासङ्गत्वादवस्थाया देहमात्रधर्मत्वमिति पूर्वसूत्रेणान्वयः ॥

are the property of another, and because it would be eternal [if the case were as you imagine].

a. That is to say,—moreover the bondage of the soul does not arise from any work, whether enjoined or forbidden, because works are the property of another, i. e. not the property of the soul [but of the mind]; and if through a property of another, the bondage of one quite distinct could take place, then bondage might befal even the liberated [through some acts of some one else].

b. But then [some one may say], this objection does not apply if we hold that bondage may arise from the acts of the *associate* [—viz. the mental organ];—so, with allusion to this, he states another reason,—'and because it would be eternal'—i. e. because bondage, in the shape of connection with pain, would occur, where it does not, even on such occasions as the universal dissolution of the phenomenal universe, including the mental organ but *not* the soul.

I doubt whether the bondage also belongs not to something else than the soul.

But then [some one may say], if that be the case then let the bondage too, in the shape of connection with pain, belong not to the *soul* but to the *mind* alone, in accordance with the principle that it have the same locus as the works to which

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* न विहितनिषिद्धकर्मणापि पुरुषस्य बन्धः कर्मणोऽन्यधर्मत्वादनात्मधर्मत्वादित्यर्थः। अन्यधर्मेण सत्त्वादन्यस्य बन्धेच मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापत्तेः॥

† ननु स्वोपाधिकर्मणा बन्धाङ्गीकारे नायं दोष इत्याशयेन हेत्वन्तरमाहातिप्रसक्तेश्चेति। प्रलयादावपि दुःखयोगरूपबन्धापत्तेश्चेत्यर्थः॥

it is due*; and, since it is an established point that pain is an affection of the *mind,* why is bondage, i. e. connection with pain, assumed of the *soul* also? With reference to this doubt he declares as follows†—

विचित्रभोगानुपपत्तिरन्यधर्मत्वे ॥ १७ ॥

Why it is to the soul that the bondage must belong.

Aph. 17.—If it were the property of any other, then there could not be diverse experience.

If bondage, in the shape of connection with pain, were the property of another, i. e. a property of the *mind;* there could be no such thing as diverse experience,—there could be no such different experience as one man's experiencing pain and another man's not (—for, it must be remembered, it is not in point of *mind* but of *soul* that men are held by Kapila to be numerically different—); therefore it must be admitted that pain is connected with the soul also. And this pain that belongs to the soul is in the shape merely of a *reflection* of the pain that attaches to its attendant organism, and this reflection is of its *own* attendant organism only, so that there is no undue result [deducible from our theory.] not of others.

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* नन्वेवं दुःखयोगरूपोऽपि बन्धः कर्मसामानाधिकरण्यानुरोधेन चित्तस्यैवास्तु दुःखस्य चित्तधर्मतायास्सिद्धत्वाच्च किमर्थं पुरुषस्यापि कल्प्यते बन्ध इत्याशङ्कायामाह ॥

† दुःखयोगरूपबन्धस्य अन्यधर्मत्वे चित्तधर्मत्वे विचित्रभोगानुपपत्तिः कश्चिदेव दुःखभोक्ता कश्चिन्नेति विचित्रभोगानुपपत्तिः। अतः पुरुषेऽपि दुःखयोगः स्वीकार्यः। स च दुःखप्रतिबिम्बरूप एव प्रतिबिम्बश्च स्वोपाधेरेव भवतीति नातिप्रसङ्ग इति ॥

b. He rejects also the notion that Nature *(prakriti)* is *directly* the cause of bondage.*

प्रकृतिनिबन्धनाचेन्न तस्यापि पारतन्त्र्यम्॥ १८ ॥

Nature is not the immediate cause of the soul's bondage.

Aph. 18.—If [you say that the soul's bondage arises] from Nature as its cause, [then I say] no,—[because] that also is a dependant thing, [or =

a. But then [some one may say] let bondage result from *Nature* as its cause;—if you say so, I say no,—because that also, i. e. Nature also, is dependant on the *conjunction* which is to be mentioned in the next aphorism,—because if it [Nature] were to occasion bondage even *without* that [conjunction which is next to be mentioned], then bondage would occur even in such cases as the universal dissolution [when soul is altogether disconnected from the phenomenal].

b. If the reading [in the aphorism] be *nibandhaná* [in the 1st case and not in the 5th], then the construction will be as follows—"If [you say that] the bondage is caused by Nature," &c.†

c. Therefore, since Nature can be the cause of bondage only <

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* साक्षात्प्रकृतिनिमित्तकत्वमपि बन्धस्यापाकरोति॥

† ननु प्रकृतिनिमित्ताद्बन्धो भवत्विति चेन्न यतस्तस्यापि प्रकृतेरपि उत्तरसूत्रे वक्ष्यमाणसंयोगपारतन्त्र्यं तेन विनापि बन्धकत्वे प्रलयादावपि बन्धप्रसङ्गात्॥

‡ निबन्धना चेदिति पाठे प्रकृतिनिबन्धना बद्धता चेदिति योज्यं॥

as depending on something else [—i. e. on the conjunction to be mentioned in the next aphorism], through this very sort of conjunction [it follows that] the bondage is *reflectional*,—like the heat of water due to the conjunction of fire,* [—water being held to be essentially cold, and only to *seem* hot while the heat continues in conjunction with it].

d. He establishes his own tenet, while engaged on this point, in the very middle† [of his criticisms on erroneous notions in regard to the matter,—for there are more to come].

न नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावस्य तद्योगस्तद्योगादृते तु ॥ १९ ॥

What really is the relation of its bondage to the soul.

Aph. 19.—But not without the conjunction thereof [i. e. of Nature] is there the connection of that [i. e. of pain] with that [viz. the soul] which is ever essentially a pure and free intelligence.

a. Therefore, without the conjunction thereof,—i. e. without the conjunction of Nature,—there is not to the soul any connection with that,—i. e. any connection with bondage:—but, moreover, just through that [connection with Nature] does bondage take place.‡

b. In order to suggest the fact that the bondage [of the soul] is reflectional [—and not inherent in it either essentially or ad-

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* अतो यत्परतन्त्रा प्रकृतिर्बन्धकारणमेति तस्मादेव संयोगविशेषादौपाधिको बन्धो ऽग्निसंयोगाज्जलोष्णवदिति ॥

† स्वसिद्धान्तममुनैव प्रसङ्गेनान्तराल एवावधारयति ॥

‡ तद्योगादृते प्रकृतिसंयोगं विना न पुरुषस्य तद्योगो बन्धसम्पर्को ऽस्ति। अपितु तत एव बन्धः ॥

ventitiously—] he makes use of the indirect expression with a double negative [—"not without"]. For if bondage were produced by the conjunction [of the soul] with Nature, as colour is produced by heating [—in the case of a jar of black clay which becomes red in the baking—], then, just like that, it would continue even after disjunction therefrom [—as the red colour remains in the jar after the fire of the brick-kiln has been extinguished,—whereas the red colour occasioned in a crystal vase by a China-rose, while it occurs *not without* the China-rose, ceases on the removal thereof]. Hence, as bondage ceases on the disjunction [of the soul] from Nature, the bondage is merely reflectional, and neither essential [§5. *b*.] nor adventitious* [§11. *b*].

c. In order that there may not be such an error as that of the Vaiśeshikas—viz. [the opinion that there is] an absolutely real conjunction [of the soul] with pain, he says 'which is ever,' &c. [§19]. That is to say,—as the connection of *colour* with essentially pure crystal does not take place without the conjunction of the China-rose [—the hue of which, seen athwart the crystal, seems to belong to the crystal—], just so the connection of *pain* with the soul, essentially pure, &c., could not take place without the conjunction of some accidental associate. That is to say, pain, &c., cannot arise *spontaneously*† [—any more than a red colour can arise spontaneously in the crystal which is essentially pure].

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* बन्धस्यौपाधिकत्वलाभाय नञ्द्वयेन वक्रोक्तिः। यदि हि बन्धः पाकजरूपवत्प्रकृतिसंयोगजन्यः स्यात्तदा तद्वदेव तद्वियोगे ऽप्यनुवर्त्तेत। अतः प्रकृतिवियोगे बन्धाभावादौपाधिक एव बन्धो नतु स्वाभाविको नैमित्तिको वेति॥

† वैशेषिकाणामिव पारमार्थिको दुःखयोग इति भ्रमो मा भूदित्येतदर्थं नित्येत्यादि। यथा स्वभावशुद्धस्फटिकस्य

d. This has been declared in the *Saura* as follows:—"As the pure crystal is regarded by people as red in consequence of the proximity of something [as a China-rose] that lends its colour, in like manner the supreme soul* [is regarded as being affected by pain]."

e. In that [aphorism 19] the perpetual purity means the being ever devoid of merit and demerit; the perpetual intelligence means the consisting of uninterrupted thought; and the perpetual liberatedness means the being ever dissociated from *real* pain:—that is to say, the connection with pain in the shape of a *reflection* is not a real bondage† [any more than the reflection of the China-rose is a real stain in the crystal].

f. And so the maker of the aphorism means that the cause of its bondage is just a particular *conjunction* [§19. *c.*],—and now enough as to that point.‡

रागो न जवायोगं विना घटते तथैव नित्यशुद्धादिस्वभावस्य पुरुषस्योपाधिसंयोगं विना दुःखसंयोगो न घटते। स्वतो दुःखाद्यसम्भवादित्यर्थः॥

* तदुक्तं सौरे। यथाहिं केवलो रक्तः स्फटिको लक्ष्यते जनैः। रञ्जकाद्युपधानेन तद्वत्परमपूरुष इति॥

† तत्र नित्यशुद्धत्वं सदा पुण्यपापशून्यत्वं। नित्यबुद्धत्वं अलुप्तचिद्रूपत्वं। नित्यमुक्तत्वं सदा पारमार्थिकदुःखायुक्तत्वं। प्रतिबिम्बरूपदुःखयोगस्त्वपारमार्थिको बन्ध इति भावः॥

‡ तथाच संयोगविशेष एवात्र बन्धहेतुतया सूत्रकृदभिप्रेत इत्यलम्॥

g. Now he rejects [§18. *d.*], certain causes of [the soul's] bondage preferred by others.*

नाविद्यातोऽप्यवस्तुना बन्धयोगात् ॥ २० ॥

The Vedantic tenet on this point disputed.

☞ *Aph.* 20.—Not from Ignorance, too, [does the soul's bondage arise], because that which is not a reality is not adapted to binding.

a. The word 'too' is used with reference to the previously mentioned 'Time,' &c.,† [—§12—which had been rejected, as causes of the bondage, antecedently to the statement, in §19, of the received cause].

b. Neither, too, does [the soul's] union with bondage result directly from 'Ignorance,' as is the opinion of those who assert non-duality [or the existence of no reality save one,—see *Vedánta-Sára* §20. *b*], because, since their 'Ignorance' is not a real thing, it is not fit to bind;—because, that is to say—the binding of any one with a rope merely *dreamt* of was never witnessed.‡

c. But if 'Ignorance' *be* a reality [as some assert], then he declares as follows.§

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* इदानीमन्याभिप्रेतान् बन्धहेतून् निरस्यति ॥

† अपिशब्दः पूर्वोक्तकालाद्यपेक्षया ॥

‡ अविद्यातोऽपि न साक्षाद्बन्धयोगोऽद्वैतवादिनां तेषामविद्याया अप्यवस्तुत्वेन तया बन्धानौचित्यात्। नहि स्वप्नरज्ज्वा बन्धनं दृष्टमित्यर्थः ॥

§ अविद्याया वस्तुत्वे त्वाह ॥

वस्तुत्वे सिद्धान्तहानिः ॥ २१ ॥

The Vedánti cannot evade the objection without stultifying himself.

Aph. 21. If it ['Ignorance'] *be* [asserted by you to be] a reality, then there is an abandonment of the [Vedántic] tenet [by you who profess to follow the Vedánta].

a. That is to say;—and if you agree that 'Ignorance' *is* a reality, then you abandon your own implied dogma [see Nyáya Aphorisms §31—] of the un-reality of 'Ignorance',* [—and so you stultify yourself].

b. He states another objection.†

विजातीयद्वैतापत्तिश्च ॥ २२ ॥

The Vedánti cannot evade the objection without conceding a duality.

Aph. 22. And [if you assume 'Ignorance' to be a reality, then] there would be a *duality* through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul,—which you asserters of *non-duality* cannot contemplate allowing].

a. That is to say,—if 'Ignorance' is real and without a beginning, then it is eternal and coordinate with Soul:—if [therefore] it be *not* soul, then there is a duality through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul; and this the Vedántís cannot intend to establish] because these followers of the *Vedánta*, asserting *non-duality*, hold that there is neither a duality through

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* यदिचाविद्याया वस्तुत्वं स्वोक्रियते तदा स्वाभ्युपगतस्याविद्यानृतत्वस्य हानिरित्यर्थः ॥

† दूषणान्तरमाह ॥

there being something of the same kind [with soul] nor through there being something of a different kind.*

b. He ponders a doubt.†

विरुद्धोभयरूपा चेत् ॥ २३ ॥

The Vedántí must not allege that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal.

Aph. 23. If [the Vedántí alleges, regarding 'Ignorance,' that] it is in the shape of both these opposites, [—then we shall say Nay, for the reason to be assigned in the next aphorism].

a. The meaning is,—if [the Vedántí says that] 'Ignorance' is not *real,* else there would be a duality through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul,—which a follower of the Vedánta cannot allow]; and moreover it is not *unreal,* because we experience its effects; but it is in the shape of something at once real and unreal‡ [like Plato's ὀν και μη ὀν—see *Vedánta-sára* §21].

न तादृक्पदार्थाप्रतीतेः ॥ २४ ॥

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* यद्यविद्या वस्तुभूता अनादिस्तदा नित्या आत्मतुल्या। अनात्मत्वे विजातीयद्वैतंवं। तेहि वेदान्तिनो ऽद्वैतवादिन-स्सजातीयविजातीयद्वैताभावं मन्यन्त इति ॥

† शङ्कते ॥

‡ अविद्या न सतो येन विजातीयद्वैतापत्तिः। नाप्यसतो कार्योपलम्भात्। किन्तु सदसद्रूपा चेदित्यर्थः ॥

There is no such thing as a thing at once real and unreal.

Aph. 24. [To the suggestion that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal, we say] no,—because no such thing is known [as is at once real and unreal.]

a. That is to say,—it is not right to say that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal. The reason of this he states in the words 'because no such thing' &c.,—because any such thing as is at once real and unreal is not known. For, in the case of a dispute, it is necessary that there should be an *example* of the thing [—i. e.—see Nyáya Aphorisms §25—a case in which all parties are agreed that the property in dispute is really present—], and, as regards *your* opinion, such is not to be found [—for, where is there any thing in regard to which both parties are agreed that it is at once real and unreal, as they are agreed that fire is to be met with on the culinary hearth?]—such is the import.*

b. Again he ponders a doubt.†

न वयं षट्पदार्थवादिनो वैशेषिकादिवत् ॥ २५ ॥

A question whether the Vedánti is bound to avoid self-contradiction.

Aph. 25. [Possibly the Vedántí may remonstrate—] "*We* are not asserters of any Six Categories like the *Vaiśeshikas* and others."

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* सदसद्रूपा अविद्येति न युक्तमित्यर्थः। तत्र हेतुमाह तादृगिति। सदसद्रूपस्य कस्यचिदपि पदार्थस्याप्रतीतेः। विवादास्पदे हि वस्तुनि दृष्टान्त आवश्यकः सच भवन्मते ऽप्रसिद्ध इति भावः॥

† पुनः शङ्कते॥

a. "We are not asserters of a definite set of categories [—like the *Vaiśeshikas* who arrange all things under six heads, and the *Naiyáyikas* who arrange them under sixteen—]; therefore we hold that there *is* such a thing—unknown though it be [to people in general]—as 'Ignorance' which is at once real and unreal, or [if you prefer it] which differs at once from the real and the unreal [—see *Vedánta-sára* §21—], because this is established by proofs,* [scriptural or otherwise, which are satisfactory to *us*, although they may not comply with all the technical requisitions of Gautama's scheme of argumentative exposition,"—see Nyáya Aphorisms §35].

b. By the expression [in the aphorism] 'and others,' are meant the *Naiyáyikas*, for the *Naiyáyika* is an asserter of sixteen categories,† [—see Nyáya Aphorisms §1].

c. He confutes this‡ [pretence of evading the objection by disallowing the categories of the Nyáya].

अनियतत्वेऽपि नायौक्तिकस्य संग्रहेऽन्यथा बालोन्मत्तादिसमत्वम् ॥ २६ ॥

The self-contradictory is altogether inadmissible.

Aph. 26. Even although this be not fixed [that the categories are six or sixteen], there is no acceptance of the inconsistent, else we come to the level of children and madmen and the like.

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* न वयं नियतपदार्थवादिनः। अतोऽप्रतीतोऽपि सदसदात्मकः सदसद्विलक्षणो वा अविद्यापदार्थ इत्यङ्गीकुर्मः मानसिद्धत्वात् ॥

† आदिपदान्नैयायिकः सहि षोडशपदार्थवादीति ॥

‡ परिहरति ॥

a. Let there be [accepted] no system of categories [such as that of the Nyáya—§25], still, since *being* and *not-being* are contradictory, it is impossible for any disciples to admit, merely on your worship's assertion, a thing at once real and unreal, which is inconsistent,—contrary to all fitness; otherwise we might as well accept also the self-contradictory assertions of children and the like;—such is the meaning.*

b. Certain heretics [—deniers of the authority of the Vedas—] assert that there exist external objects, of momentary duration [individually, each being, however, replaced by its fac-simile the next instant, so that the uninterrupted series of productions becomes something equivalent to continuous duration], and that by the influence of these the bondage of the soul is occasioned. This he objects to as follows:†—

नानादिविषयोपरागनिमित्तको ऽप्यस्य ॥ २७ ॥

The heretical theory of a succession of objects from all eternity, as causing the soul's bondage, rejected.

Aph. 27. [The bondage] thereof, moreover, is not caused by any influence of objects from all eternity.

a. 'Thereof,'—i. e. of the soul. An eternal influence of objects,—an influence of objects the effect of which, in the shape

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* पदार्थनियमो मास्तु तथापि भावाभावविरोधेन अयौक्तिकस्य युक्तिविरुद्धस्य सदसदात्मकपदार्थस्य संग्रहो भवद्वचनमात्राच्छिष्याणां न सम्भवति अन्यथा बालकाद्युक्तस्याप्ययौक्तिकस्य संग्रहः स्यादित्यर्थः ॥

† केचिन्नास्तिका आहुः सन्ति बाह्यविषयाः क्षणिकाः तेषां वासनया जीवस्य बन्ध इति तद्दूषयति ॥

of a continued stream, has had no commencement,—not by *this* either is it possible that the bondage [of the soul] has been occasioned;—such is the meaning.*

b. He states the reason of this† [impossibility].

न बाह्यान्तरयोरुपरज्योपरञ्जकभावोऽपि देशव्यवधानात् स्रुघ्नस्थपाटलिपुत्रस्थयोरिव ॥ २८ ॥

A thing cannot act where it is not.

Aph. 28. Also [in my opinion as well as in yours apparently] between the external and the internal there is not the relation of the influenced and the influencer, because there is a local separation, as there is between him that stays at Srughna and him that stays at Pâṭaliputra.

a. In the opinion of these [persons whose theory we are at present objecting to], the soul is circumscribed, residing entirely within the body; and that which is thus *within* cannot stand in the relation of the influenced and the influencer as regards an *external* object. Why? Because they are separated in regard to place, like two persons the one of whom remains in Srughna and the other in Pâṭaliputra;—such is the meaning. Because the affection which we call 'influence' (*vásaná*) is seen only when there is conjunction,—such as that of madder and the cloth [—to which it gives its colour—], or that of flowers and the flower-basket‡ [—to which they impart their odour.]

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* अस्यात्मनः। अनादिविषयोपरागः प्रवाहरूपेणानादिकार्य्या विषयवासना तन्निमित्तको ऽपि बन्धो न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

† अत्र हेतुमाह ॥

‡ तन्मते परिच्छिन्नो देहान्तरस्थ एवात्मा तस्याभ्यन्तरस्य

b. By the word 'Also,' the absence of conjunction [between the soul and objects—see §15—], &c., which he himself holds, is connected* [with the matter of the present aphorism].

c. Srughna and Pâṭaliputra [—Palibothra, or Patna—] are two several places far apart.†

d. But then, [these heretics may reply] "The influence of objects [on the soul] may be asserted because there *is* a contact with the object, inasmuch as the soul, according to *us*, goes to the place of the object, just as the senses according to your worship." Therefore he declares as follows :‡

द्वयोरेकदेशस्थोपरागान्न व्यवस्था ॥ २९ ॥

On the heretical view the free soul would be equally liable to bondage.

Aph. 29. [It is impossible that the soul's bondage should arise] from an influence received in the same place [where the object is, because, in that case,] there would be no distinction between the two [—the bond and the free].

न बाह्यविषयेण सहोपरज्योपरञ्जकभावोऽपि सम्भवति। कुतः। स्रुघ्नस्थपाटलिपुत्रस्थयोरिव देशव्यवधानादित्यर्थः। संयोगे सत्येव हि वासनाख्य उपरागो दृष्टः। यथा मञ्जिष्ठावस्त्रयोर्यथा वा पुष्पपुटकयोरिति ॥

* अपिशब्देन स्वमते संयोगाभावादिस्समुच्चीयते ॥

† स्रुघ्नपाटलिपुत्रौ विप्रकृष्टदेशविशेषौ ॥

‡ ननु भवतामिन्द्रियाणामिवास्माकमात्मनो विषयदेशगमनाद्विषयसंयोगेन विषयोपरागो वक्तव्यस्तत्राह ॥

a. To complete the sense we must supply as follows :—'It is impossible that the bondage should arise from an influence received in one and the same place with the object.' Why? Because there would be no distinction between the two, the soul bound and the soul free, because bondage would [in that case] befal the liberated soul also [the free soul, according to this hypothesis, being just as liable to come across objects as any other—], such is the meaning.*

b. Here he ponders a doubt.†

अदृष्टवशाच्चेत् ॥ ३० ॥

The heretic's attempted defence.

Aph. 30. If [the heretic, wishing to save his theory, suggests that a difference between the two cases—see §29—*does* exist] in virtue of the *unseen* [—i. e. of merit and demerit,—then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].

a. That is to say [—the heretic may argue—] "But then, granting that they [the free soul and the bound] are alike in respect of their coming into contact with objects, when they become conjoined with them in one and the same locality, yet the *reception of the influence* may result merely from the force of the *unseen* [—i. e. from the merit or demerit of this or that soul,—the soul that is liberated alike from merit and demerit being able to encounter with impunity the object that would en-

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* एकस्मिन्विषयदेशे लब्धादुपरागाद्भोगो न सम्भवतीति शेषः। कुतः। यस्मात् द्वयोर्बद्धमुक्तात्मनोर्न व्यवस्था मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापत्तेरित्यर्थः॥

† अत्र शङ्कते॥

chain one differently circumstanced,]"—if* [*this* be urged, then we look forward].

a. This he disputes, as follows:†

न द्वयोरेककालायोगादुपकार्योपकारकभावः ॥ ३१ ॥

Each back must bear its own burden.

Aph. 31. They cannot stand in the relation of deserver and bestower, since the two do not belong to one and the same time.

a. Since in thy opinion, the agent and the patient are distinct, and do not belong to the same time [—believing, as thou heretically dost, not only that *objects*—see §26. *b.*—momentarily perish and are replaced, but that the duration of *souls* also is of a like description—], there is positively no such relation [between the soul at one time and its successor at another] as that of deserver and bestower [or transmitter of its merits or demerits]; because it is impossible that there should be an influence of objects [§27] taking effect on a patient [—say the soul of today—] occasioned by the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] belonging to an agent [—say the soul of yesterday—which, on the hypothesis in question, is a numerically different individual—];—such is the meaning.‡

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* नन्वेकदेशसम्बन्धेन विषयसंयोगसाम्ये ऽपि अदृष्टवशादेवोपरागलाभ इति चेदित्यर्थः ॥

† परिहरति ॥

‡ तव मते कर्तृभोक्तृभेदात् एककालासम्बन्धाच्च नैवोपकार्योपकारकभावः। नहि कर्तृनिष्ठादृष्टेन भोक्तृनिष्ठो विषयोपरागः सम्भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

b. He ponders a doubt.*

पुत्रकर्म्मवदिति चेत्॥ ३२ ॥

Whether merit may or may not be imputed.

Aph. 32. If [the heretic suggests that] the case is like that of the ceremonies in regard to a son, [—then he will find his reply by looking forward].

a. But then [the heretic—admitting the principle that the merit or demerit of an act belongs entirely to the agent—may urge that] as the son is benefited by ceremonies in regard to a son,—such as that [ceremony—see Colebrooke's Hindú Law, vol. 3. p. 104—celebrated] in anticipation of conception,—which [no doubt] belongs to the *father* [who performs the ceremonies to propitiate the gods],—in like manner there may be an influence of objects on the experiencer [—say the soul of to-day—] through the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] that belongs even to a different subject [—say the soul of yesterday—]: such is the meaning† [of the heretic].

b. He refutes this by showing that the illustration is not a fact.‡

नास्ति हि तत्र स्थिर एक आत्मा यो गर्भाधानादिना संस्क्रियेत॥ ३३ ॥

This will not help the heretic's argument.

Aph. 33. [Your illustration proves nothing,] for, in that case, there is no one per-

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* शङ्कते॥

† ननु यथा पित्रनिष्ठेन गर्भाधानादिना पुत्रकर्मणा पुत्रस्योपकारो भवति तद्वत् व्यधिकरणेनैवादृष्टेन भोक्तुर्विषयोपरागः स्यादित्यर्थः॥

‡ दृष्टान्तासिद्धा परिहरति॥

manent soul which could be consecrated by the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c.

a. 'In that case'—i. e. on thy theory too the benefit of the son, by means of the performance of the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c., could not take place,—'for,' i. e. because, on that theory there is not one [self-identical] soul, continuing from the [time of] conception to the birth, which could be consecrated [by the ceremonies in question] so as to be a fit subject for the duties that pertain to the time subsequent to birth [—such as the investiture with the sacred thread, for which the young bráhman would not be a fit subject if the ceremonies in anticipation of his conception had been omitted—]; and thus your illustration is not a real one* [on your *own* theory;—it is not a thing that you can assert as a fact].

b. And according to *my* theory also your illustration is not a fact, seeing that it *is* possible that the benefit to the son should arise from the 'unseen' [merit] deposited in the son by means of the ceremony regarding the son, for it is an implied tenet [of my school] that it [the soul] is permanent [in its self-identity], and there is the injunction† [of Manu— ch. 2. v. 26.—, with regard to the ceremonies in question, which proceeds on the same grounds].

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* तत्र त्वन्मते गर्भाधानादिकर्मणापि पुत्रस्योपकारो न घटते। हि। यस्मात्। तत्र गर्भाधानमारभ्य जन्मपर्यन्तस्थायी एक आत्मा नास्ति यो जन्मोत्तरकालीनकर्माधिकारार्थं संस्क्रियेतेति। तथाच दृष्टान्तासिद्धिः॥

† अस्मन्मते ऽपि स्थैर्याभ्युपगमाद्वचनाच्च पुत्रकर्मणा पुत्रनिष्ठादृष्टोत्पत्तेः पुत्रोपकारसम्भवात् दृष्टान्तस्यासिद्धिरित्यर्थः॥

c. Some other heretic may encounter us on the strength of [the argument here next stated, viz.] "But then, since *bondage* also [like every thing else] is momentary, let this bondage have nothing determinate for its cause, or *nothing at all* for its cause*"—[which view of matters is propounded in the next aphorism].

स्थिरकार्यासिद्धेः क्षणिकत्वम् ॥ ३४ ॥

"Whether bondage may not be momentary and so require no cause.

Aph. 34. Since there is no such thing as a permanent result [—on the heretical view],—the momentariness [of bondage also is to be admitted].

a. 'Of bondage'—this must be supplied [to complete the aphorism].†

b. And thus the point relied on is that it [i. e. bondage] have no cause at all. And so this is the application [of the argument—viz.—]:

(1) Bondage, &c., is momentary:—

(2) Because it exists:—

(3) [Every thing that exists is momentary] as the apex of the lamp-flame, or the like.‡

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* ननु बन्धस्यापि क्षणिकत्वादनियतकारणको ऽभावकारणको वा बन्धो ऽस्त्वित्याशयेनापरो नास्तिकः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते ॥

† बन्धस्येति शेषः ॥

‡ तथाचाकारणक एवास्त्वित्याशयः। तथाचायं प्रयोगः। बन्धादिकं क्षणिकं। सत्त्वात्। दीपशिखादिवदिति ॥

c. And [—continues the heretic—] this [reason—viz. 'existence'—] does not extend *unduly* [—as you may object—] to the case of a jar or the like, because *that* also [in my opinion] is like the subject in dispute [in being momentary]. This [in fact] is precisely what is asserted in the expression 'Since there is *no such thing* as a permanent result:'—* [§34].

d. He objects to† [this heretical view].

न प्रत्यभिज्ञाबाधात् ॥ ३५ ॥

The fact of recognition proves that things are not momentary.

Aph. 35. Nay—[things are *not* momentary in their duration], for the absurdity of this is proved by *recognition*.

a. That is to say;—nothing is momentary, because the absurdity of its being momentary follows from the opposite argument [to that under §34. *b.*], taken from such facts of recognition as "What I saw,—that same do I touch,"—[an argument which may be stated as follows]—viz.

(1) Bondage, &c., is permanent:—

(2) Because it exists:—

(3) [Every thing that exists is permanent]—as a jar, or the like.‡

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* नच घटादौ व्यभिचारः तस्यापि पक्षसमत्वात्। एतदेवोक्तं स्थिरकार्यासिद्धेरित्यनेन ॥

† दूषयति ॥

‡ न कस्यापि क्षणिकत्वं यदद्राक्षं तदेवाहं स्पृशामीत्यादिप्रत्यभिज्ञानगृहीतेन बह्वाधिकं स्थिरं सत्त्वात् घटादिवदिति प्रत्यनुमानेन क्षणिकत्वस्य बाधादित्यर्थः ॥

श्रुतिन्यायविरोधाच्च ॥ ३६ ॥

That things are momentary is contradicted by Scripture and reasoning.

Aph. 36. And [things are not momentary] because this is contradicted by Scripture and by reasoning.

a. That is to say,—nothing is momentary, because the general principle that the whole world, consisting of effects and causes, is momentary, is contradicted by such texts as this—viz. "All this, O ingenuous one, was antecedently existing,"—and by such scriptural and other arguments as this, viz. "How should what exists proceed from the non-existent?"*

दृष्टान्तासिद्धेश्च ॥ ३७ ॥

The heretic's illustration is not a truth.

Aph. 37. And [we reject the argument of this heretic] because his instance is not a fact.

a. That is to say,—the general principle of the momentariness [of all things] is denied, because this momentary character does not in fact belong to the apex of the lamp-flame, &c., the instances [on which thou, heretic, dost ground thy generalization,—§34. *b.*]:—moreover thou quite errest in regard to momentariness in that instance from not taking account of the minute and numerous instants [really included in a duration which seems to thee momentary]:—such is the import.†

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* सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीदित्यादिश्रुतिभिः कथमसतस्सज्जायेतेत्यादिश्रौतादियुक्तिभिश्च कार्यकारणात्मकाखिलप्रपञ्चे क्षणिकत्वानुमानस्य विरोधान्न क्षणिकत्वं कस्यापीत्यर्थः ॥

† दृष्टान्ते दीपशिखादौ क्षणिकत्वस्यासिद्धेः न क्षणिक-

If things were momentary there could be no relation of cause and effect‡

b. Moreover, if the momentary duration [of things] be asserted, then there can be no such thing as the relation of cause and effect in the case of the earth and the jar, and the like. And you must not say that there *is* no such thing as that [relation of cause and effect], because it is proved to be a reality by the fact that otherwise there would be no such thing as the efforts of him who desires an effect [—and who therefore sets in operation the causes adapted to its production]. With reference to this he declares as follows :*

युगपज्ज्ञायमानयोर्न कार्यकारणभावः ॥ ३८ ॥

The causal relation is not between things that arise simultaneously.

Aph. 38. It is not between two things coming simultaneously into existence that the relation of cause and effect exists.

a. Let us ask,—does the relation of product and [material] cause exist between the earth and the jar as *simultaneously* coming into [their supposed momentary] existence, or as successive? Not the first,—because there is nothing to lead to such an inference, and because we should not [in that case] find the man who wants a jar operating with earth, &c., [with a view to the jar's *subsequent* production]. Neither is it the last,—in regard to which he declares as follows :†

त्वानुमानमित्यर्थः। किञ्च सूक्ष्मानेकक्षणानाकलनेन क्षणिकत्वभ्रम एव तत्र तवेति भावः ॥

* किञ्च क्षणिकत्ववादे मृद्घटादिस्थले कार्यकारणभावो नोपपद्यते। नच नास्त्येव स इति वाच्यं कार्यार्थिनः प्रवृत्त्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या तत्सिद्धेरित्यभिप्रेत्याह ॥

‡ किं मृद्घटयोर्युगपज्ज्ञायमानयोः कार्यकारणभावः किं

पूर्वापाये उत्तरायोगात् ॥ ३९ ॥

A product cannot survive its substantial cause.

Aph. 39. Because when the antecedent departs, the consequent is unfit [to arise and survive it].

a. The relation of cause and effect is further inconsistent with the theory of the momentary duration of things,—because, at the time when the antecedent, i. e. the cause, departs,—the consequent, i. e. the product, is 'unfit,' i. e. is not competent to arise;—because, that is to say, a product is cognized only by its inhering in [and being substantially identical with, however formally different from] its substantial cause,* [and is incapable therefore, of surviving it].

b. With reference to this same topic—viz. the substantial cause, he mentions another [the converse] objection† [to the theory of the momentary duration of things].

तद्भावे तदयोगादुभयव्यभिचारादपि न ॥ ४० ॥

The co-existence of substance and product is impossible if things be momentary.

Aph. 40. Moreover not, [on the theory of the momentary duration of things, can there be such a relation as that of cause and effect,] because while the one [the antecedent] exists, the other [the consequent] is incompatible, because the two keep always asunder.

वा क्रमिकयोः। नाद्यः विनिगमकाभावात् घटार्थिनो मृदादिप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेश्च। नान्त्य इत्याह ॥

* पूर्वस्य कारणस्यापायकाले उत्तरस्य कार्यस्यायोगादुत्पत्त्यनौचित्यादपि न क्षणिकत्ववादे सम्भवति कार्यकारणभावः। उपादानकारणानुगततयैव कार्यानुभवादित्यर्थः ॥

† उपादानकारणमधिकृत्यैव दूषणान्तरमाह ॥

a. To complete the aphorism we must say,—'moreover, [on the theory objected to] there can be no such relation as that of cause and effect, because at the time when the antecedent exists, the consequent cannot co-exist with it, the two being mutually exclusive.' The two suggesters of the relation of cause and effect are (1) this concomitancy of affirmatives—that while the product exists, the substance thereof exists, and (2) this concomitancy of negatives—that when the substance no longer exists, the product no longer exist:—and these two [conditions—on *your* theory—] cannot be, because, since things [in your opinion] are momentary in their duration, the two [—viz., the substance and the product—], inasmuch as they are antecedent and consequent, belong to opposite times* [—and cannot therefore co-exist,—for the product—according to you—does not come into existence until its substance has perished, which is contrary to the nature of the causal relation just defined].

b. But then [the heretic may say—do not let the *co-existence* of substance and product be insisted upon as indispensable to the causal relation between the two—but] let the nature of a cause belong to the substantial cause, as it belongs to the *instrumental* cause, in respect merely of its *antecedence.* To this he replies.†

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* पूर्वस्य भावकाले उत्तरस्यासम्बन्धादुभयव्यभिचारादपि न कार्यकारणभाव इति शेषः। यद्दोपादेयं तद्दोपादानं यद्दोपादानाभावस्तद्दोपादेयाभाव इत्यन्वयव्यतिरेकौ उपादेयोपादानयोः कार्यकारणभावग्राहकौ तौच क्षणिकत्वेन क्रमिकयोस्तयोर्विरुद्धकालत्वान्न सम्भवतः॥

† ननु निमित्तकारणस्येवोपादानस्यापि पूर्वभावमात्रेणैव कारणतास्त्विति तत्राह॥

पूर्वभावमात्रे न नियमः ॥ ४१ ॥

Antecedence to the product does not distinguish the Matter from the Instrument.

Aph. 41. If there were merely *antecedence*, then there would be no determination [of a substantial or material cause as distinguished from an instrumental cause].

a. And it could not be determined that this was the *substance* [of this or that product] on the granting of nothing more than its *antecedence* [to the product], because antecedence constitutes no distinction between it and the *instrumental* causes;—for [—as we need scarcely remind you—], that there *is* a distinction between substantial and instrumental causes, the whole world is agreed:—such is the meaning.*

The question whether any thing exists besides Thoughts.

b. Other heretics say—"Since no thing [really] exists except *Thought*, neither does *Bondage*, just as the things of a dream [have no real existence]. Therefore it has *no* cause, for it is absolutely *false*." He rejects the opinion of these† [heretics]:

न विज्ञानमात्रं बाह्यप्रतीतेः ॥ ४२ ॥

We have the evidence of Intuition for the External as well as the Internal.

Aph. 42. Not Thought alone exists, because there is the intuition of the external.

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* पूर्वभावमात्रास्युपगमेच इदमेवोपादानमिति नियमो न स्यात् निमित्तकारणानामपि पूर्वभावाविशेषात्। ईदृगेव हि निमित्तोपादानयोर्विभागो सर्वलोकसिद्ध इत्यर्थः॥

† अपरे नास्तिका आहुः। विज्ञानातिरिक्तावस्त्वभावेन बन्धोऽपि स्वप्नपदार्थवत् अतोऽत्यन्तं मिथ्यात्वेन न तत्र कारणमस्तीति तन्मतमपाकरोति॥

a. That is to say—the *reality* is not *Thought* alone, because external objects also are proved to exist, just as Thought is, by intuition.*

b. But then [these heretics may rejoin]—"From the example of intuitive perception in *dreams* [see Butler's Analogy, Part I. ch. I.], we find this [—your supposed evidence of objective reality—] to exist even in the *absence* of objects!" To this he replies:—†

तदभावे तदभावाच्छून्यं तर्हि ॥ ४३ ॥

The denial of the external amounts to Nihilism.

Aph. 43. Then, since, if the one does not exist, the other does not exist, there is a void [—i. e. nothing exists at all].

a. That is to say;—if external things do not exist, then a mere *void* offers itself. Why? Because if the external does not exist, then *thought* does not exist. For it is *intuition* that proves the objective, and if the intuition of the external did not establish the objective, then the intuition of *thought* also would not establish [the existence of] thought.‡

b. "Then *let* the reality be a mere void;—and therefore the searching for the cause of Bondage is unfitting, just *because a*

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* न विज्ञानमात्रं तत्त्वं बाह्यार्थानामपि विज्ञानवत् प्रतीतिसिद्धत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

† ननु स्वप्नप्रतीतिदृष्टान्तेन विषयाभावे ऽपि तदुपपत्तिरिति तत्राह ॥

‡ तर्हि बाह्याभावे शून्यं प्रसज्येत। कुतः। बाह्याभावे विज्ञानाभावात्। प्रतीतिर्हि विषयसाधिका बाह्यप्रतीतिश्चेन्न विषयं साधयेद्विज्ञानप्रतीतिरपि न विज्ञानं साधयेदिति भावः ॥

void is all:"—with such a proposal [as recorded in the next aphorism] does [some one who may claim the title of] the very crest-gem of the heretics rise up in opposition.*

शून्यं तत्त्वं भावो विनश्यति वस्तुधर्मत्वाद्विना-
शस्य ॥ ४४ ॥

The heretic goes the length of asserting sheer Nihilism.

Aph. 44. The reality is a void; what is, perishes,—because to perish is the habit of things.

a. The void alone [—says this prince of heretics,—or the fact that nothing exists at all—] is the reality [—or the only truth—]. Since every thing that exists perishes, and that which is perishable is false, as is a dream, therefore as of all things the beginings and endings are merely nonentities, Bondage, &c., in the midst [of any beginning and ending], has merely a momentary existence,—is phenomenal and not real. Therefore *who* can be bound by *what?*—this [question] is what we rest upon. The reason assigned for the perishableness of whatever exists is 'because to perish is the habit of things,'—because to perish is the *very nature* of things. But nothing continues after quitting its own *nature* [—so that nothing could continue if it *ceased* to perish],—such is the meaning.†

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* अस्तु तर्हि शून्यमेव तत्त्वमतश्च बन्धकारणान्वेषणमयुक्तं तुच्छत्वादिति नास्तिकशिरोमणिः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते ॥

† शून्यमेव तत्त्वं। यतस्सर्वोऽपि भावो विनश्यति यच्च विनाशी स मिथ्या स्वप्नवत्। अतस्सर्ववस्तूनामाद्यन्तयोरभावमात्रत्वात् मध्ये क्षणिकसत्त्वं सांवित्तिकं न पारमार्थिकं बन्धादि। ततः किं केन बध्येत इत्याशयः। भावानां

b. He rejects* [this heretical view].

अपवादमात्रमबुद्धानाम् ॥ ४५ ॥

Aph. 45. This is a mere counter-assertion of unintelligent persons.

The indiscerptible is indestructible.

a. 'Of unintelligent persons'—i. e. of blockheads, this is 'a mere counter-assertion,'—i. e. a mere *idle* counter-assertion, that a thing must needs be perishable *because it exists;* [and such an assertion is idle] because things that are not made up of parts, since there is no cause of the destruction of such things, cannot perish.†

b. But what need of many words? It is not the fact that even *products* perish, for, just as by the cognition that 'the jar is old' [we mean that it has passed from the condition of new to that of old], so too by such a cognition as this that 'the jar has passed away,' it is only settled that the jar, or the like, *is in the condition* of having passed away.‡

विनाशित्वे हेतुर्वस्तुधर्मत्वाद्विनाश्येति विनाशस्य वस्तुस्वभावत्वात्। स्वभावन्तु विहाय न पदार्थस्तिष्ठतीत्यर्थः॥

* परिहरति॥

† अबुद्धानां मूढानां अपवादमात्रं भावत्वाद्विनाशित्वमिति मिथ्यापवाद एव नाशकारणाभावेन निरवयवद्रव्यानां नाशासम्भवात्॥

‡ किं बहुना। कार्याणामपि न विनाशसिद्धिः। घटो जीर्ण इति प्रत्ययेनैव घटोऽतीत इत्यादिप्रत्ययेनापि घटादेरतीताख्याया अवस्थाया एव सिद्धेः॥

c. He states another objection* [to the heretical view].

उभयपक्षसमानदोषत्वादयमपि ॥ ४६ ॥

Nihilism is open to the same objections as both the Momentary and the Ideal theories.

Aph. 46. Moreover this [nihilistic theory is not a right one] because it has the same fortune as both the views [which were confuted just before].

a. This view moreover [§44] is not a good one, because it has the same fortune as—i. e. is open to similar reasons for rejection as the theory that external things are momentary [§26 *b.*], and as the theory that nothing exists besides Thought [§41. *b*]. The reason for the rejection of the theory that things are momentary in their duration, viz. [—as stated at §35—] the fact of *recognition*, &c., [—which is at least as little consistent with Nihilism as it is with the momentary duration of things], and the reason for the rejection of the theory that nothing exists besides Thought, viz. [—as stated at §12—] the intuition of the external, &c., apply equally here [in the case of Nihilism]:—such is the import†.

b. Moreover, as for the opinion which is accepted by these [heretics]—viz. "*Let the mere void* [of absolute nonentity] be the soul's aim [and summum bonum], since herein consist at once the cessation of pain [—which cannot continue when there is absolutely *nothing*]—and also the means thereof [—since there

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* दूषणान्तरमाह ॥

† क्षणिकबाह्यपक्षेण विज्ञानमात्रपक्षेण सह समानदोषत्वात् तुल्यनिरसनहेतुकत्वादयमपि पक्षो न समीचीनः। क्षणिकपक्षनिरासहेतुः प्रत्यभिज्ञादिः। विज्ञानपक्षनिरासहेतुर्बाह्यप्रतीत्यादिश्चात्रापि समान इति भावः ॥

can be no further means required for the removal of any thing if it be settled that the thing positively does not exist],"—this too can hardly be,—so he declares as follows :*

अपुरुषार्थत्वमुभयथा ॥ ४७ ॥

The soul's aim is not annihilation.

Aph. 47. In neither way [—whether as a means or as an end—] is this [annihilation] the soul's aim.

a. "Let the void [of mere nonentity] be the soul's aim, whether as consisting in the cessation of pain, or as presenting the means for the cessation of pain"—[says the heretic] :—and this cannot be, because the whole world agrees that the aim of the soul consists in the joys, &c., that shall abide *in it*,—that is to say, because [*they* hold, while] *you* do not hold that there is a *permanent* soul [—see §33—in respect of which the liberation or beatification should be possible or even predicable].†

b. Now certain other things also entertained as causes of [the soul's] bondage by [imperfectly instructed] believers, remaining over and above those [proposed by unbelievers and] already rejected, are to be set aside.‡

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* यद्यपि दुःखनिवृत्तिरूपतया तत्साधनतयाच शून्यस्यैवास्तु पुरुषार्थत्वमिति तैर्मन्यते तदपि दुर्घटमित्याह ॥

† दुःखनिवृत्तिरूपतया दुःखनिवृत्तिसाधनतया वा शून्यस्य पुरुषार्थत्वं स्यात्। तच्च न घटते। स्थिरस्य सुखादीनां लोके पुरुषार्थत्वावगमात्। स्थिरस्य पुरुषस्यानङ्गीकारादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ इदानीं पूर्वनिरस्तावशिष्टान्यास्तिकसम्भाव्यान्यप्यन्यानि बन्धकारणानि निरस्यन्ते ॥

न गतिविशेषात् ॥ ४८ ॥

It is by no movement that the soul gets into bondage.

Aph 48. Not from any kind of motion —[such as its entrance into a body—does the soul's bondage result.].

a. 'Bondage' [—required to complete the aphorism—] is understood from the topic* [of discussion].

b. The meaning is,—that the soul's bondage, moreover, does not result from any sort of *motion*—in the shape, for instance, of its entrance into a body.†

c. He states a reason for this.‡

निष्क्रियस्य तदसम्भवात् ॥ ४९ ॥

What is all-pervading does not change place.

Aph. 49. Because this is impossible for what is inactive [—or, in other words, without motion].

a. That is to say,—because this is impossible—i. e. *motion* is impossible—in the case of the soul which is inactive [because] all-pervading [—and therefore incapable of changing its place].§

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* प्रकरणाद्बन्धो लभ्यते ॥

† गतिविशेषात् शरीरप्रवेशादिरूपादपि पुरुषस्य न बन्ध इत्यर्थः ॥

‡ अत्र हेतुमाह ॥

§ निष्क्रियस्य विभोः पुरुषस्य तदसम्भवात् गत्यसम्भवादित्यर्थः ॥

b. But then [—the objector may say]—"Since, in the books of scripture and of law, we hear of its *going* and *coming* into this world and the other world, let soul be [—not all-pervading, as you allege—but] merely limited [in its extent]; and to this effect also is the text 'Of the size of the thumb is the soul, the inner spirit', and the like":—but this conjecture he repels*.

मूर्त्तत्वात् घटादिवदसमानधर्मापत्तावपसिद्धान्तः ॥ ५० ॥

Were the soul limited it might be perishable.

Aph. 50. [We cannot admit that the soul is other than all-pervading, because] by its being limited, since it would come under the same conditions as jars, &c., there would be a contradiction to our tenet [of its imperishableness].

a. That is to say,—and if the soul were admitted to be, like a jar, or the like, limited, i. e., circumscribed [in dimension], then, since it would resemble a jar or the like, in being made up of parts, and [hence] in being perishable, &c., this would be contrary to our settled principle † [—that the soul is imperishable].

b. He now justifies the text [see §49. *b*] referring to the *motion*‡ [of the soul,—by showing that the motion is not really of the soul but of an accessary].

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* ननु श्रुतिस्मृत्योरिहलोकपरलोकगमनागमनश्रवणात्पुरुषस्य परिच्छिन्नत्वमेवास्तु तथाच श्रुतिरपि अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषोऽन्तरात्मेत्यादिरित्याशङ्कामपाकरोति ॥

† यदिच घटादिवत् पुमान्मूर्त्तः परिच्छिन्नः स्वीक्रियते तदा सावयवत्वविनाशित्वादिना घटादिसमानधर्मापत्तावपसिद्धान्तः स्यादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ गतिश्रुतिमुपपादयति ॥

गतिश्रुतिरप्युपाधियोगादाकाशवत् ॥ ५२ ॥

Soul moves not, any more than Space.

Aph. 51.—The text regarding the *motion* [of the soul], moreover, is [applicable only] because of the junction of an *attendant*, as in the case of the Ether [or *Space*, which moves not, though we talk of the space enclosed in a jar, as moving with the jar].

a. Since there are such proofs of the soul's unlimitedness as the declaration that 'It is eternal, omnipresent, permanent', the text regarding its *motion* is to be explained as having reference to a movement pertaining [not to the soul but] to an attendant;—for there is the text—'As the Ether [or space] included in a jar, when the jar is removed,—[in this case] the *jar* may be removed, but not the space,—and in like manner is the soul which is like the sky [incapable of being moved]';—and because we may conclude that the motion [erroneously supposed to belong to the soul—49. *b.*—] belongs to *Nature* [—see Vedánta Aphorisms, Part I, §4. *l.*—], from such maxims as this that '*Nature* does the works the fruits of which are blissful or baneful, and it is wilful *Nature* that in the three worlds reaps these';—such is the import.*

b. It has already been denied [§16] that the bondage [of the soul] is occasioned by works—in the shape either of enjoined or

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* नित्यसर्वगतस्थाणुरित्यादिना प्रमाणेनात्मनोऽपरिच्छिन्नत्वे गतिश्रुतिरौपाधिकगतिपरा व्याख्येया। घटसंवृतमाकाशं नीयमाने घटे यथा। घटो नीयेत नाकाशं तद्वज्जीवो नभोपम इति श्रुतेः। प्रकृतिः कुरुते कर्म शुभाशुभफलात्मकं प्रकृतिश्च तदश्नाति त्रिषु लोकेषु कामगेत्यादिस्मृत्या गतेः प्रकृतिनिष्ठत्वावगमाच्चेति भावः ॥

of forbidden actions. Now he declares that the bondage moreover does not arise from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] resulting therefrom.*

न कर्मणाप्यतद्धर्मत्वात् ॥ ५२ ॥

Aph. 52. Nor moreover [does the bondage of the soul result from the merit or demerit arising] from works, because these belong not thereto.

[The bondage of the soul is no result of any merit or demerit.]

a. That is to say—the bondage of the soul does not arise directly from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] occasioned by works. Why? Because this is no property thereof,—i. e. because this [merit or demerit—see §16. *a.*—] is no property of the soul.†

b. But then [some one may say]—"*Let* it be that the bondage resulting from the 'unseen' i. e., the merit [or demerit] even of another should attach to a different person,";—whereupon he declares as follows.‡

अतिप्रसक्तिरन्यधर्मत्वे ॥ ५३ ॥

Else bondage might cling even to the emancipated.

Aph. 53.—If the case were otherwise [than as I say], then it [the bondage of the soul] might extend unduly [even to the emancipated].

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* पूर्वं विहितनिषिद्धव्यापाररूपेण कर्मणा बन्धो निराकृतः। इदानीं तज्जन्यादृष्टेनापि न बन्ध इत्याह ॥

† कर्मणा अदृष्टेनापि साक्षान्न पुरुषस्य बन्धः। कुतः। अतद्धर्मत्वात् पुरुषधर्मत्वाभावादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ नन्वन्यधर्मेणाप्यदृष्टेनान्यस्य बन्धः स्यात्तत्राह ॥

a. That is to say,—if the case were otherwise—if bondage and its cause were under other conditions [than we have declared them to be]—, then there might be an undue extension,—bondage would befal even the emancipated* [—for the same reasons as those stated under §16. *a*].

b. What need of so much [prolixity]? He states a general objection why the bondage of soul cannot result from any one or other [of these causes]—beginning with its essence [—see §6. *b*—] and ending with its [supposed] works [—see §16—], inasmuch as it is contrary to scripture† [that any one of these should be the cause].

निगणादिश्रुतिविरोधश्चेति ॥ ५४ ॥

A single text of scripture upsets equally all the heretical notions of the soul's relation to bondage.

Aph. 54.—And this [opinion that the bondage of the soul arises from any of these causes alleged by the heretics] is contrary to such texts as the one that declares it [the soul] to be without qualities ;—and so much for that point.

a. And if the bondage of the soul arose from any one or other of those [supposed causes already treated of] among which its essential character [§6. *b.*] is the first, this would be contradic-

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* अन्यधर्मत्वे। बन्धतत्कारणयोरन्यधर्मत्वे। अतिप्रसक्तिर्मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापत्तिरित्यर्थः ॥

† किं बहुना। स्वभावादिकर्मान्तैरन्येन वा केनापि पुरुषस्य बन्धोत्पत्तिर्न घटते श्रुतिविरोधादिति साधारणं बाधकमाह ॥

tory to such texts as "Witness, intelligent, alone, and without the [three] 'qualities' [is the soul];"—such is the meaning.*

b. The expression 'and so much for that point' means that the investigation of the cause of the bondage [of the soul] here closes.†

c. The case then stands thus,—since all other theories are overthrown by the declaratory aphorisms "There would be no fitness in the enjoining" [see §7], &c., it is ascertained that the immediate cause of the bondage [of the soul] is just the conjunction of Nature and of the soul.‡

d. But then, in that case, [some one may say],—this conjunction of Nature and of the soul [§54. *c.*], whether it be essential or adventitiously caused by Time or something else [§5. *b.*], must occasion the bondage even of the *emancipated.* Having pondered this doubt, he disposes of it as follows:§

तद्योगोऽप्यविवेकान्न स्मानत्वम्॥ ५५ ॥

How the true cause of bondage affects not the emancipated.

Aph. 55.—Moreover the conjunction thereof does not, through non-discrimination, take place [in the case of the emancipated],

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* स्वभावाद्यन्यतमेन पुरुषस्य बन्धोत्पत्तौ साक्षी चेताः केवलो निर्गुणश्चेत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधश्चेत्यर्थः॥

† इतिशब्दो बन्धहेतुपरीक्षासमाप्तौ॥

‡ तदेवं न स्वभावतो बन्धस्येत्यादिना प्रदर्शकेनेतरप्रतिषेधतः प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोग एव साक्षाद्बन्धहेतुरवधारितः॥

§ ननु तत्र प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगोऽपि स्वाभाविकत्वे काला-

nor is there a parity [in this respect between the emancipated and the unemancipated].

a. 'The conjunction thereof'—i. e. the conjunction of Nature and of the soul;—this conjunction moreover does not take place again 'through non-discrimination'—i. e. through the want of a discrimination [between Nature and soul] in the emancipated [who *do* discriminate, and who thus avoid the conjunction which others, failing to discriminate, incur, and thus fall into bondage]; such is the meaning:—and thus the the emancipated and the bound are *not* on a level [—under the circumstances stated at §54. *c.*],—such is the import.*

विपर्य्ययाद्बन्धः ॥ ५६ ॥

The true cause of bondage, in other words non-discrimination.

Aph. 56.—Bondage arises from the error [of not discriminating between Nature and soul].

a. Having thus declared the cause of that [bondage] which is to be got rid of, he declares the means of getting rid of it.†

नियतकारणात्तदुच्छित्तिर्ध्वान्तवत् ॥ ५७ ॥

दिनिमित्तकत्वे वा मुक्तस्यापि बन्धापादक इत्याशंक्य समाधत्ते ॥

* तद्योगः प्रकृतिपुरुषसंयोगोऽपि अविवेकात् मुक्ते अविवेकाभावात् न पुनस्संयोगो भवतीत्यर्थः। तथाच न मुक्तबद्धसाम्यमित्याशयः ॥

† एवं हेयहेतुं प्रतिपाद्य हानोपायं प्रतिपादयति ॥

Non-discrimation is removeable by discrimination alone.

Aph. 57.—Its removal is to be effected by the regular [and appropriate] means, just like darkness.

a. The regular means, established throughout the world, in such cases as 'shell-silver' [i. e. a pearl-oyster-shell mistaken for silver], viz. the *immediacy* of discrimination,—by *this* alone is 'its removal'—i. e. the removal of the non-discrimination [between Nature and soul] to be effected, and not by *works* or the like;—such is the meaning:—just as darkness—the dark—is removed by light alone* [and by no other means].

b. "But then [some one may say]—if merely the non-discrimination of Nature and soul be, through the conjunction [of the two, consequent on the want of discrimination,] the cause of bondage, and if merely the discrimination of the two be the cause of liberation, then there would be liberation even while there remained the conceit of [one's possessing] a body &c.; and this is contrary to scripture, to the institutes of law, and to sound reasoning." To this he replies.†

प्रधानाविवेकादन्याविवेकस्य तद्वानं ह्यानम्॥ ५८ ॥

The discrimination of Nature, as other than soul, involves all discrimination.

Aph. 58.—Since the non-discrimination of other things [from soul] results from the non-discrimina-

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* शुक्तिरजतादिस्थले लोकसिद्धं यन्नियतं कारणं विवेकसाक्षात्कारस्तत एव तदुच्छित्तिरविवेकोच्छित्तिः न कर्मादिभिरित्यर्थः। यथा ध्वान्तमन्धकारः प्रकाशेनैव नश्यति॥

† ननु प्रकृतिपुरुषाविवेक एव चेत्संयोगद्वारा बन्धहेतुस्तयोर्विवेक एव मोक्षहेतुस्तर्हि देहाद्यभिमानसत्त्वेऽपि मोक्षः स्यात् तच्च श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायविरुद्धमिति तत्राह॥

tion of *Nature* [from soul], the cessation of this will take place on the cessation of that [from which it results].

a. By reason of the non-discrimination of *Nature* from the soul, what non discrimination of *other* things there *is*—such as the non-discrimination of the *understanding* [as something other than the soul],—*this* necessarily ceases on the cessation of the non-discrimination of Nature; because, when the non-discrimination of the understanding, for example, [as something other than soul] does occur, it is *based* on the non-discrimination [from soul] of that cause to which there is none antecedent [viz. Nature], since the non-discrimination of an *effect* [—and the 'understanding' is an effect or product of Nature] is itself an effect* [and will of course cease with the cessation of its cause].

b. The state of the case is this;—as, when the soul has been discriminated from *body*, it is impossible but that it should be discriminated from the *colour* and other properties—the effects of the body [which is the substantial cause of its own properties],—so, by parity of reasoning,—from the departure of the cause—when soul, in its character of *unalterableness* &c., has been discriminated from *Nature*, it is impossible that there should remain a conceit of [the soul's being any of] the *products* thereof [i. e. of Nature], such as the 'understanding' and the like, which have the character of being *modifications*† [of primal Nature, while the soul, on the other hand, is a thing unalterable].

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* पुरुषे प्रधानाविवेकात्कारणात् यो ऽन्याविवेको बुद्ध्याद्यविवेको बुद्ध्याद्यविवेके जाते कार्यावित्रेकस्य कार्यतया अनादिकारणाविवेकमूलकत्वात्तस्य प्रधानाविवेकहाने सत्यवश्यं हानमित्यर्थः ॥

† यथा शरीरादात्मनि विविक्ते शरीरकार्येषु रूपादिष्व-

c. But then [some one may say]—"What proof is there that there is a conceit [entertained by people in general] of a *Nature* [or primal principle] different from the conceit of an 'understanding' &c. [which you tell us are products of this supposed first principle] ?—for all the various conceits [that the soul falls into], such as 'I am ignorant' and so on, can be accounted for on the ground simply of an 'understanding' &c. [without postulating a primal Nature which is to assume the shape of an 'understanding' &c.]:"—well, if any one says this, I reply, No, —because, without there were such a thing as Nature, we could not account for such conceits as the following,—viz.—"Having died, having died, again when there is a creation let me be a denizen of Paradise and not of hell;"—because no *products*, such as the 'understanding,' when they have perished, can be created anew* [—any more than a gold bracelet, melted down, can be reproduced, though another like it may be produced from the materials].

The soul's confounding itself with Nature is logically antecedent to its confounding itself with anything else.

d. Moreover it is inadmissible to say that men's conceit of [the identity of themselves with their] 'understanding' &c., is [the *primary* cause of the soul's bondage, and is] not preceded by any thing,—because 'understanding' and the rest [—as you will not deny—] are

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विवेको न सम्भवति तथा कूटस्थत्वादिधर्मैः प्रधानात्पुरुषे विविक्ते तत्कार्येषु परिणामादिधर्मकेषु बुद्ध्यादिष्वभिमानो न स्थातुमुत्सहते तुल्यन्यायात्कारणनाशाच्चेति भावः ॥

* ननु बुद्ध्याद्यभिमानातिरिक्ते प्रधानाभिमाने किं प्रमाणमहमज्ञ इत्याद्यखिलाभिमानानां बुद्ध्यादिविषयत्वेनैवोपपत्तेरिति चेन्न मृत्वा मृत्वा पुनः सृष्टौ स्वर्गी स्यां माच

effects. Now while it is to be expected that there should be some predetermining agency to establish a conceit of [ownership in, or of one's identity with] any *effects*, it is clear that it is a conceit of [ownership, &c.,] in respect of the *cause*, and nothing else, that must be the predetermining agency;—for we see this in ordinary life, and our theories are bound to conform [deferentially] to experience. For [—to explain—] we see, in ordinary life, that the conceit of [the ownership of] the grain, &c., produced by a field, results from the conceit of [the ownership of] the field,—and from the conceit of [the ownership of] gold the conceit of [the ownership of] the bracelets or other things formed of that gold. And by the removal of these [i. e. the removal of the logically antecedent conceits that the field or the gold is one's property], there is the removal of those* [i. e. the removal of the conceits that the grain &c., and that the bracelets &c., the corresponding products or effects of the field and of the gold, are one's property:—and so the soul will cease to confound itself with the 'understanding' when it ceases to confound itself with Nature, of which the 'understanding' is held to be a product].

नारकोत्पाद्यभिमानानां प्रधानविषयत्वं विनानुपपत्तेः अतो-तानां बुद्ध्याद्यखिलकार्याणां पुनः सृष्यभावात्॥

* किञ्च बुद्ध्यादिषु पुरुषाणामभिमानो ऽनादिर्वक्तुं न शक्यते बुद्ध्यादीनां कार्यत्वात्। कार्येष्वभिमानव्यवस्थार्थं नियामकाकाङ्क्षायां कारणाभिमान एव नियामकतया सिद्ध्-ति लोके दृष्टत्वात्कल्पनायाश्च दृष्टानुसारित्वात्। दृष्टो हि लोके क्षेत्राभिमानात्क्षेत्रजन्यधान्यादिष्वभिमानः सुवर्णाभि-मानात्तज्जन्यकटकादिष्वभिमानः तयोर्निवृत्त्याच्च तयोर्निवृ-त्तिरिति॥

e [And if it be supposed that we thus lay ourselves open to the charge of a *regressus in infinitum*, seeing that, whatever we may assign as the *first* cause, we may, on our own principles, be asked what was the 'predetermining agency' in regard to *it*,—or if it be supposed that we are chargeable with reasoning in a circle when we hold that the soul's confounding itself with Nature is the cause of its *continuing* so to confound itself, and its continuing so to confound itself is reciprocally the cause why it con founds itself,—we reply that] there is no occasion to look for any other 'predetermining agency' in the case of the conceit of [the identity of the soul with] Nature, or in the case of the self-continuance thereof [i. e. of that error of confounding one's self with Nature], because these two are [alike] without antecedent—like seed and sprout*—[of which it is needless to ask which is the first,—the old puzzle "which was first—the acorn or the oak?"—being a frivolous question].

f. But then [some one may say]—if we admit the soul's bondage [at one time] and its freedom [at another], and its discrimination [at one time] and its non-discrimination [at another], then this is in contradiction to the assertion [in §19] that it is "ever essentialy a pure and free intelligence:"—and it is in contradiction to such texts as this—viz.,—"The absolute truth is this, that neither is there destruction [of the soul], nor production [of it], nor is it bound, nor is it an effecter [of any work], nor is it desirous of liberation, nor is it indeed *liberated* [—seeing that that cannot desire or obtain liberation which was never *bound*]." This [charge of inconsistency] he repels.†

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* प्रधानाभिमानतद्वासनयोश्च बीजाङ्कुरवदनादित्वान्न तदभिमाने नियामकान्तरापेक्षेति ॥

† ननु पुरुषस्य चेद्बन्धमोक्षौ विवेकाविवेकौच स्वीकृतौ तर्हि नित्यशुद्धबद्धमुक्तत्वोक्तिविरोधः। तथा न निरोधो

वाङ्मात्रं नतु तत्त्वं चित्तस्थितेः ॥ ५९ ॥

The bondage of the soul is merely verbal.

Aph. 59.—It is merely verbal, and not a reality, [this so-called bondage of the soul,] since it [the bondage] resides in the *mind* [and not in the soul].

a. That is to say,—since bondage &c. all reside only in the *mind* [and not in the soul], all this, as regards the soul, is merely verbal—i. e. it is 'vox et praeterea nihil,'—because it is merely a *reflection,* like the redness of [pellucid] crystal [when a China-rose is near it]; but not a reality, with no false imputation, like the redness of the China-rose itself. Hence there is *no* contradiction to what had been said before [—as the objector under §58. *f.* insinuates—], such is the state of the case.*

Whether Testimony or Inference, without Perception, might not avail to dissipate the soul's bondage.

b. But then, if bondage &c., as regards the soul, be merely verbal, then let it be set aside by *hearing* [that it is merely verbal], or by argument [establishing that it is so]:—why, in the Scripture and the Law, is there enjoined, as the cause of liberation, a discriminative know-

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नचोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो नच साधकः। न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थतेत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधश्चेति तां परिहरति ॥

* बन्धादीनां सर्वेषां चित्त एवावस्थानात्तत्सर्वमपुरुषे वाङ्मात्रं शब्दमात्रं स्फटिकलौहित्यवत्प्रतिबिम्बमात्रत्वात् नतु तत्त्वं अनारोपितं जवालौहित्यवदित्यर्थः। अतो नोक्तविरोध इति भावः ॥

ledge [of Soul as distinguished from Not-soul] going the length of *immediate cognition?*—To this he replies.*

युक्तितो ऽपि न बाध्यते दिङ्मूढवदपरोक्षादृते ॥ ६० ॥

The truth must be directly discerned, and not merely accepted on the ground of Testimony or of Inference

Aph. 60.—Moreover it is not to be removed by argument, as that of the person perplexed about the points of the compass [is not to be removed] without immediate cognition.

a. By 'argument' we mean thinking. The word 'moreover' is intended to aggregate [or take in—along with 'argument'—] 'testimony'† [—or verbal authority—which, no more than 'argument,' or inference, can remove the evil, which can be removed by nothing short of direct intuitive *perception* of the real state of the case].

b. That is to say—the bondage, &c., [of the soul], is not to be removed by merely hearing, or inferring, without *perceiving;*—just as the contrariety in regard to the proper direction, in the case of a person who is mistaken as to the points of the compass [and hence as to his own bearings], is not removed by testimony or inference without immediate cognition, i. e. without his directly perceiving‡ [how the points of the compass really lie,—to

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* ननु बन्धादिकं चेत्पुरुषे वाङ्मात्रं तर्हि श्रवणेन युक्त्या वा तस्य बाधो भवतु। किमर्थं श्रुतिस्मृत्योः साक्षात्कारपर्यन्तं विवेकज्ञानमुपदिश्यते मोक्षहेतुतया। तत्राह ॥

† यत्किर्मननं। अपिशब्दः श्रवणसमुच्चयार्थः ॥]

‡ वाङ्मात्रमपि पुरुषस्य बन्धादिकं श्रवणमननमात्रेण न बाध्यते अपरोक्षादृते साक्षात्कारं विना यथा दिङ्मूढ-

which immediate perception 'testimony' or 'inference' may conduce, but the necessity of which these *media* or instruments of knowledge cannot supersede].

c. Or it [—*Aph.* 60—] may be explained as follows:—viz.—But then [seeing that] it is declared by the assertion [in *Aph.* 57] viz. that "Its removal must be through the appropriate means," that knowledge in the shape of discrimination [between soul and Nature] is the remover of *non*-discrimination [in regard to the matter in question],—tell us—is that knowledge of a like nature with the hearing [of Testimony], &c., or is it something peculiar? A reply to this being looked for, he enounces the aphorism [§60] "Moreover it is not to be removed by argument," &c. That is to say,—non-discrimination is not excluded, is not cut off, by argument or by testimony, without there be discrimination as an immediate perception,—just as is the case with one who is bewildered in regard to his direction;—because the only thing to remove an *immediate* error is an immediate individual perception* [of the truth. For example, a man with the jaundice

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जनस्य वाङ्मात्रमपि दिग्वैपरीत्यं श्रवणयुक्तिभ्यां न बाध्यते साक्षात्कारं विनेत्यर्थः ॥

* अथवेत्थं व्याख्येयं। ननु नियतकारणात्तदुच्छित्तिरित्यनेन विवेकज्ञानमविवेकोच्छेदकमुक्तं तत् ज्ञानं किं श्रवणादिसाधारणमुतास्ति कश्चिद्विशेष इत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह युक्तितोऽपीत्यादि सूत्रम्। अविवेको युक्तितः श्रवणतश्च न बाध्यते नोच्छिद्यते विवेकापरोक्षं विना दिङ्मोहवदित्यर्थः। साक्षात्कारिभ्रमे साक्षात्कारिविशेषदर्शनस्यैव विरोधित्वादिति ॥

perceives *white* objects as if they were *yellow*. He may *infer* that the piece of chalk which he looks at is really white; or he may believe the *testimony* of a friend that it *is* white; but still nothing will remove his erroneous *perception* of yellowness in the chalk except a direct perception of its whiteness].

d. Having thus, then, set forth the fact that Liberation results from the immediate discrimination [of soul from Nature], the next thing to be set forth is the 'discrimination,'* [here referred to].

e. This being the topic, in the first place since, only if soul and Nature exist, liberation can result from the discrimination of the one from the other, therefore—that 'instrument of right knowledge' *(pramáṇa)* which establishes the existence of these [two *imperceptible* realities] is [first] to be set forth.†

अचाक्षुषाणामनुमानेन बोधो धूमादिभिरिव वह्नेः ॥ ९१ ॥

The evidence for things imperceptible.

Aph. 61.—The knowledge of things imperceptible is by means of Inference, as that of fire [when not directly perceptible] is by means of smoke, &c.

a. That is to say—'Of things imperceptible,'—i. e. of things not cognizable by the senses,—e. g. Nature and the Soul,—'the knowledge'—i. e. the fruit lodged in the soul,—is brought about by means of that instrument of knowledge [which may be call-

* तदेवं विवेकसाक्षात्कारान्मोक्षं प्रतिपाद्यातः परं विवेकः प्रतिपादनीयः ॥

† तत्रादौ प्रकृतिपुरुषसिद्धौ हि तद्विवेकान्मोक्षः स्यादतस्तत्सिद्धौ प्रमाणमुपन्यस्यते ॥

ed] 'Inference' *(anumána)* [—but which—see Nyáya Aphorisms —§5—is more correctly 'the recognition of a Sign'], as [the knowledge that there is] fire [in such and such a locality where we cannot directly perceive it,] is brought about by the 'recognition of a Sign' occasioned by smoke, &c.*

b. Moreover, it is to be understood that that which is [true, but yet is] not established by 'Inference,' is established by Revelation;—but since 'Inference' is the chief [among the instruments of knowledge] in this [the Sánkhya] System, 'Inference' only is laid down [in the aphorism] as the *chief* thing,—but Revelation is not disregarded† [in the Sánkhya system—see §89—].

c. He next exhibits the order of creation of those things among which Nature is the first, and the relation of cause and effect [among these severally], which subserves the argument that will be [afterwards] stated.‡

सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः प्रकृतेर्महान् महतोऽहङ्कारोऽहङ्कारात्पञ्च तन्मात्राणि उभयमिन्द्रियं

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* अचाक्षुषाणां अप्रत्यक्षाणां प्रकृतिपुरुषादीनां अनुमानेन प्रमाणेन बोधः पुरुषनिष्ठं फलं सिद्धं भवति यथा धूमादिभिर्जनितेनानुमानेन वह्नेः सिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥

† अनुमानासिद्धमपि आगमात्सिद्ध्यतीत्यपि बोध्यं अस्य शास्त्रस्य अनुमानप्राधान्यात्तु केवलानुमानस्य मुख्यतयैवोपन्यासः नत्वागमस्यानपेक्षेति ॥

‡ प्रकृत्यादीनां सृष्टिक्रमं वक्ष्यमाणानुमानोपयोगिकार्यकारणभावञ्च दर्शयति ॥

तन्मात्रेभ्यः स्थूलभूतानि पुरुष इति पञ्चविंशतिगणः ॥ ६२ ॥

The twenty-five realities enumerated.

Aph. 62.—Nature *(prakriti)* is the state of equipoise of Goodness *(sattwa)* Passion *(rajas)* and Darkness *(tamas)*; from Nature [proceeds] Mind *(mahat)*, from Mind Self-consciousness *(ahankára)*, from Self-consciousness the five Subtile Elements *(tanmátra)*, and both sets [external and internal] of Organs *(indriya)*, and from the Subtile Elements the Gross Elements *(sthúla-bhúta)*. [Then there is] Soul *(purusha)*:—such is the class of twenty-five.

a. 'The state of equipoise' of the [three] things called 'Goodness' &c., i. e. their being neither less nor more [—one than another—], that is to say the state of *not* being [developed into] an *effect*:—and thus 'Nature' is the triad of 'Qualities' *(guṇa)* distinct from the products [to which this triad gives rise];—such is the complete meaning.*

b. These things, viz. 'Goodness' &c., [though spoken of as the three *Qualities*], are not 'Qualities' *(guṇa)* in the *Vaiśeshika* sense of the word, because [the 'Qualities' of the *Vaiśeshika* system have themselves *no* qualities,—see Kaṇáda's 16th Aph.—while] *these* have the qualities of Conjunction, Disjunction, Lightness, Force, Weight, &c. In this [Sánkhya] system, and in Scripture, the word 'Quality' *(guṇa)* is employed [as the name of the three things in question] because they are subservient to Soul [and therefore hold a secondary rank in the scale of being],

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* सत्त्वादिद्रव्याणां या साम्यावस्था अन्यूनानतिरिक्तावस्था अकार्यावस्थेत्यर्थः। एवञ्च कार्यभिन्नं गुणत्रयं प्रकृतिरिति पर्यवसितोऽर्थः ॥

and because they form the *cords* [—which the word *guṇa* also signifies—], viz. 'Understanding' &c., which consist of the three [so called] 'Qualities,' and which *bind* the brute-beast [—so to speak—] the Soul.*

c. Of this [Nature] the principle called 'the great one' *(mahat)*, viz. the principle of 'Understanding' *(buddhi)*, is the product. 'Self-consciousness' is a conceit [of separate personality]. Of this there are two products, (1) the 'Subtile Elements' and (2) the two sets of 'Organs'. The 'Subtile Elements' are [those of] Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste, and Smell. The two sets of 'Organs,' through their division into the external and the internal, are of eleven kinds. The products of the 'Subtile Elements' are the five 'Gross Elements'. But 'Soul' is something distinct from either product or cause. Such is the class of twenty-five,—the aggregate of things:—that is to say, besides these there is nothing.†

d. He next, in several aphorisms, declares the order of the in-

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* सत्त्वादीनि द्रव्याणि न वैशेषिका गुणाः संयोगविभागवत्त्वाल्लघुत्वबलवत्त्वगुरुत्वादिधर्मकत्वाच्च तेष्वत्र शास्त्रश्रुत्यादौच गुणशब्दः पुरुषोपकरणत्वात्पुरुषपशुबन्धकत्रिगुणात्मकमहदादिरज्जुनिर्माणत्वाच्च प्रयुज्यते ॥

† तस्याः कार्यं महत्तत्त्वं बुद्धितत्त्वं। अहङ्कारोऽभिमानः। तस्य कार्यद्वयं तन्मात्राणि उभयमिन्द्रियञ्च। तन्मात्राणि शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धाः। उभयमिन्द्रियं बाह्याभ्यन्तरभेदैरेकादशविधं। तन्मात्राणां कार्याणि पञ्च स्थूलभूतानि। पुरुषस्तु कार्यकारणविलक्षण इति। इत्येवं पञ्चविंशतिगणः पदार्थव्यूहः एतदतिरिक्तः पदार्थो नास्तीत्यर्थः ॥

ferring* [the existence of these principles—the one from the other];

स्थूलात्पञ्चतन्मात्रस्य ॥ ६३ ॥

The existence of the 'Subtile Elements' is inferred from that of the 'Gross'.

Aph. 63—[The knowledge of the existence] of the 'Subtile Elements' is [by inference] from the 'Gross Elements.'

a. 'The knowledge—by inference'—so much is supplied,† [to complete the aphorism, from Aph. 61].

b. Earth, &c., the 'Gross Elements,' are proved to exist by Perception; and thereby [—i. e. from that Perception,—for Perception must precede Inference, as stated in Gautama's 5th Aphorism—] are the 'Subtile Elements' inferred—[the στοιχεῖα στοιχείων of Empedocles] ;—and so the application [of the process of inference to the case] is as follows :—

(1). The Gross Elements, or those which have not reached the absolute limit [of the atomic], consist of things [—Subtile Elements, or Atoms,—] which have distinct qualities, [—the earthy element having the distinctive quality of Odour, and so of the others] :

(2). Because they are gross :—

(3). [Everything that is gross is formed of something less gross, or in other words more subtile,] as jars, webs, &c.,‡ [—the gross web being formed of the less gross threads, and so of the others].

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* अनुमानक्रममाह सूत्रैः ॥

† अनुमानेन बोध इत्यनुवर्त्तते ॥

‡ स्थूलं पृथिव्यादि प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं। तेन तन्मात्राणामनुमानं। तथाच अप्रकर्षकाष्ठापन्नानि स्थूलभूतानि सविशेषगुणवद्द्रव्योपादानकानि स्थूलत्वात् घटपटादिवदिति प्रयोगः ॥

बाह्याभ्यन्ताभ्यां तैश्चाहङ्कारस्य ॥ ६४ ॥

And thence that of self-consciousness.

Aph. 64—[The knowledge of the existence] of Self-consciousness is [by inference] from the external and internal [organs] and these ['Subtile Elements'—§63].

a. By inference from [the existence of] the external and internal organs, and from [that of] these 'Subtile Elements,' there is the knowledge of [the existence of such a principle as] Self-consciousness.*

b. The application [of the process of inference to the case] is in the following [somewhat circular] manner:—

(1) The Subtile Elements and the Organs are made up of things consisting of Self-consciousness:—

(2) Because they are products of Self-consciousness:—

(3) Whatever is not so [—i. e. whatever is *not* made out of Self-consciousness—] is not thus [—i. e. is not a *product* of Self-consciousness]—as the Soul [—which, not being made up thereof, is not a product of it].†

c. But then if it be thus [i. e. if it be, as the Sánkhyas declare, that all objects, such as jars, are made up of Self-consciousness, while Self-consciousness depends on 'Intellect'],

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* बाह्याभ्यन्ताभ्यामिन्द्रियाभ्यां तैस्तन्मात्रैश्चाहङ्कारस्यानुमानेन बोधः ॥

† तन्मात्रेन्द्रियाण्यभिमानवद्द्रव्योपादानकानि अभिमानकार्यद्रव्यत्वात् यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा पुरुष इति प्रयोगः ॥

then [some one may object, that,] since it would be the case that the Self-consciousness of the potter is the material of the jar, the jar made by him would disappear on the beatification of the potter whose 'Intellect' then surceases; and this [—the objector may go on to say—] is not the case, because *another* man [*after* the beatification of the potter] recognizes that 'This is that same jar* [which you may remember was fabricated by our deceased acquaintance].'

d. [In reply to this we say] it is *not* thus,—because, on one's beatification, there is an end of only those modifications of his internal organ [—'intellect', or 'inner man'—] which could be causes [as the *jar* no longer can be] of the emancipated soul's *experiencing* [either good or ill], but not an end of the modifications of his intellect in general, nor [an end] of that intellect in its essence:†—[so that we might spare ourselves the trouble of further argument so far as concerns the objection grounded on the assumption that the intellect of the potter *surceases* on his beatification:—but we may go further and admit, for the sake of argument, the surcease of the 'intellect' of the beatified potter, without conceding any necessity for the surcease of his pottery. This alternative theory of the case may be stated as follows] :—

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* नन्वेवं कुलालाहङ्कारस्यापि घटोपादानत्वापत्त्या कुलालमुक्तौ तदन्तःकरणनाशे तन्निर्मितघटनाशः स्यात्। नचैतत् युक्तं पुरुषान्तरेण स एवायं घट इति प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वादिति॥

† नैवं मुक्तपुरुषभोगहेतुपरिणामस्यैव तदन्तःकरणे मोचोत्तरमुच्छेदात् नतु परिणामसामान्यस्यान्तःकरणस्वरूपस्य वोच्छेदः॥

e. Or [—as Berkeley suggests in his Principles of Human knowledge, ch. vi.] let the Self-consciousness of the *Deity* be the cause why jars and the like continue to exist, and not the Self-consciousness of the potter &c.* [—who may lose their Self-consciousness,—whereas the Deity—the sum of all life—*Hiraṇya-garbha*—see *Vedánta-śara* §62—never loses *His* Self-consciousness while aught living continues].

तेनान्तःकरणस्य ॥ ६५ ॥

And thence that of Intellect.

Aph. 65.—[The knowledge of the existence] of Intellect is [by inference] from that [Self-consciousness—§64].

a. That is to say,—by inference from [the existence of] 'that' —viz. Self-consciousness—which is a product, there comes the knowledge of 'Intellect' *(buddhi)*—the *great* 'inner organ' *(antaḥkaraṇa)* and hence called 'the great one' *(mahat)*,—[the existence of which is recognised] under the character of the *cause* of this† [product—viz. Self-consciousness].

b. And so the application [—again rather circular—of the process of inference to the case] is as follows :—

(1) The thing called Self-consciousness is made out of the things that consist of the mood of [mental] assurance :—

(2) Because it is a thing which is a product of [mental] assurance :—

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* अथवा घटादिष्वपि हिरण्यगर्भाहङ्कार एव कारणमस्तु न कुलालाद्यहङ्कारः ॥

† तेनाहङ्कारेण कार्येण तत्कारणतया मुख्यस्यान्तःकरणस्य महदाख्यस्य बुद्धेरनुमानेन बोध इत्यर्थः ॥

(3) Whatever is not so [—i. e. whatever is *not* made out of mental assurance—], is not thus [—i. e. is not a product of mental assurance—] as the Soul [which is not made out of anything antecedent], &c *

c. Here the following reasoning is to be understood. Every one, having first determined any thing under a concept [i. e. under such a form of thought as is expressed by a general term,—for example, that this, which presents itself, is a jar, or a human body, or a possible action of one kind or other—], after that makes the judgment "This is I,"—or "This ought to be done by me,"—and so forth:—so much is quite settled [—and there is no dispute that the fact is as here stated]. Now, having in the present instance, to look for some *cause* of the thing called 'Self-consciousness' [which manifests itself in the various judgments just referred to], since the relation of cause and effect subsists between the two functions [—the occasional conception and the subsequent occasional judgment which is a function of Self-consciousness—], it is assumed, for simplicity, merely that the relation of cause and effect exists between the two substrata to which the [two sets of] functions belong,—[and this is sufficient] because it follows as a matter of course that the occurrence of a *function* of the effect must result from the occurrence of a *function* of the cause† [—nothing, according to the Sánkhya, being in any product except so far and in suchwise as it pre-existed in the cause of that product].

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* तथाचायं प्रयोगः अहङ्कारद्रव्यं निश्चयवृत्तिमद्द्रव्योपादानकं निश्चयकार्यद्रव्यत्वात् यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा पुरुषादिरिति ॥

† अत्रायं तर्को बोध्यः। सर्वोऽपि लोकः पदार्थमादौ स्वरूपतो निश्चित्य पश्चादभिमन्यते अयमहं मयेदं कर्त्तव्यमि-

ततः प्रकृतेः ॥ ६६ ॥

And thence that of Nature.

Aph. 66.—[The knowledge of the existence] of Nature is [by inference] from that ['Intellect'—§65].

a. By inference from [the existence of] 'that'—viz. the principle [of Intellect] termed 'the Great one'—which is a *product*, —there comes the knowledge of [the existence of] Nature, as its cause.*

b. The application [of the process of inference to the case] is as follows:—

(1) Intellect, the affections whereof are Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness, is produced from something which has these affections,—of Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness:—

(2) Because, whilst it is a *product* [and must therefore have arisen from something consisting of that which it itself now consists of], it consists of Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness:—

(3) [Every *product* that has the affections of, or that occasions, Pleasure, Pain, or Dulness, takes its rise in something which consists of these,] as lovely women, &c.†

त्यादिरूपेणेति तावत्सिद्धमेव। तत्राहङ्कारद्रव्यकारणाकाङ्क्षायां वृत्त्योः कार्यकारणभावेन तदाश्रययोरेव कार्यकारणभावो लाघवात्कल्प्यते कारणस्य वृत्तिलाभेन कार्यवृत्तिलाभस्यौत्सर्गिकत्वादिति ॥

* ततो महत्तत्त्वात् कार्यात् कारणतया प्रकृतेरनुमानेन बोधः ॥

† अयं प्रयोगः। सुखदुःखमोहधर्मिणी बुद्धिः सुखदुःख-

c. For, an agreeable woman gives pleasure to her husband, and therefore [is known to be mainly made up of or] partakes of the quality of 'Goodness;' the indiscreet one gives pain to him, and therefore partakes of the quality of 'Foulness;' and she who is separated [and perhaps forgotten], occasions indifference, and so partakes of the quality of 'Darkness.'*

d. And the appropriate refutation [of any objection] in this case is [the principle] that it is fitting that the qualities of the effect should be [in every case] in conformity with the qualities of the cause.†

e. Now he states how, in a different way, we have the evidence of inference for [the existence of] Soul, which is void of the relation of cause and effect that has been mentioned,‡ [in the four preceding aphorisms, as existing between Nature and its various products].

संहतपरार्थत्वात्पुरुषस्य ॥ ६७ ॥

The argument for the existence of Soul.

Aph. 67.—[The existence] of Soul [is inferred] from the fact that

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मोहधर्मकद्रव्यजन्या कार्यत्वे सति सुखदुःखमोहात्मकत्वात् कान्तादिवदिति ॥

* कान्ता हि भर्तुः सुखदेति सात्त्विकी। अविनया दुःखदेति राजसी। विरहान्मोहदेति तामसी भवति ॥

† कारणानुसारेणैव कार्यगुणौचित्यञ्चात्रानुकूलस्तर्कः ॥

‡ अथ यथोक्तकार्यकारणभावशून्यस्य पुरुषस्य प्रकारान्तरेणानुमानमाह ॥

the combination [of the principles of Nature into their various effects], is for the sake of another [than unintelligent Nature or any of its similarly unintelligent products].

a. 'Combination'—i. e. conjunction which is the cause [of all products,—these resulting from the conjunction of their constituent parts]:—since whatever has this quality—as Nature, Mind, and so on, [unlike Soul which is *not* made up of parts]—is for the sake of some other,—for this reason it is understood that Soul exists:—such is the remainder* [—required to complete the aphorism].

b. But the application [of the argument in this particular case is as follows]:—

(1) The thing in question—viz. Nature, the 'Great one,' and the rest [of the aggregate of the unintelligent],—has, as its fruit [or end], the [mundane] experiences and the [eventual] Liberation of some other than itself;—

(2) Because it is a combination [or *compages*];—

(3) [Every combination,] as a couch or a seat, or the like, [is for another's, use, not for its own, and its several component parts render no mutual service].†

c. Now, in order to establish that it is the cause of all [products], he establishes the *eternity* of Nature *(prakriti)*.‡

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* संहतः कारणीभूतसंयोगस्तद्वतोऽव्यक्तमहदादेः परार्थत्वाद्धेतोः पुरुषस्य बोध इति शेषः ॥

† प्रयोगस्तु विवादास्पदं प्रकृतिमहदादिकं स्वेतरस्य भोगापवर्गफलकं संहतत्वाच्छय्यासनादिवदिति ॥

‡ इदानीं सर्वकारणत्वोपपत्तये प्रकृतेर्नित्यत्वमुपपादयति ॥

मूले मूलाभावादमूलं मूलम्॥ ६८॥

Argument for the eternity of Nature.

Aph. 68.—Since the root has no root, the root [of all] is root-less.

a. Since 'the root' *(múla)*,—i. e. the cause of the twenty-three principles [—which, with Soul and the root itself make up the twenty-five realities recognized in the Sánkhya,]—'has no root'—i. e. has no cause;—the 'root'—viz. Nature *(pradhána)*—is 'rootless'—i. e. devoid of root:—that is to say, there is no other cause of Nature, because there would be a *regressus in infinitum** [if we were to suppose another cause, which, by parity of reasoning, would require another cause, and so on without end].

b. He states the argument [just mentioned] in regard to this, as follows.†

पारम्पर्येऽप्येकत्र परिनिष्ठेति संज्ञामात्रम्॥ ६९॥

The employment of the term Primal Agency, or Nature, is merely to debar the regressus in infinitum.

Aph. 69—Even if there be a succession, there is a halt at some *one* point, and so it is merely a name, [that we give to the point in question, when we speak of the *root* of things under the name of 'Nature'].

a. Since there would be the fault of *regressus in infinitum* if there were a succession of causes—another cause of Nature, and

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* मूले त्रयोविंशति तत्त्वानां कारणे मूलाभावात्कारणाभावान्मूलं प्रधानममूलं मूलशून्यं अनवस्थापत्त्या प्रधानस्य न कारणान्तरमस्तीत्यर्थः॥

† अत्र युक्तिमाह॥

another cause of that one again,—there must be at last a halt, or conclusion, at some one point, somewhere or other, at some one uncaused, eternal thing;—therefore, that at which we stop is the *Primal Agency (pra-kriti)*,—for this word *prakriti* [usually, and conveniently, rendered by the term *Nature*,] is nothing more than a sign to denote the cause which is the *root*.*

b. But then [some Vedántí may object,—according to this view of matters]—the position, that there are just twenty-five realities, is not made out; for, in addition to the 'Indiscrete' [or primal Nature] which [according to you] is the cause of Mind, *another* unintelligent principle, named 'Ignorance' [see *Vedánta-sára*—§21—] presents itself. Having pondered this doubt, he declares as follows:†

समानः प्रकृतेर्द्वयोः ॥ ७० ॥

He meets a Vedantic objection.

Aph. 70.—Alike [is the opinion] of both [of us] in respect of Nature.

a. In the discussion of the Primal Agent [Nature]—the cause which is the root [of all products]—the same side is taken by us both, the asserter [of the Sánkhya doctrine] and the opponent [Vedántí]. This may be thus stated:—As there is mention in

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* प्रकृतेरन्यत्कारणं तस्याप्यन्यदिति कारणपारम्पर्ये ऽप्यनवस्थादोषादन्ततो ऽकारणे एकत्र एकस्मिन्यत्रकुत्रचिन्नित्ये परिनिष्ठा पर्यवसानं भविष्यतीत्यतो यत्र पर्यवसानं सैव प्रकृतिरिति हि मूलकारणस्य संज्ञामात्रमित्यर्थः ॥

† ननु पञ्चविंशति तत्त्वानीति नोपपद्यते। महत्तत्त्वकारणाव्यक्तापेक्षया ऽविद्याख्यजडतत्त्वान्तरापत्तेरित्याशंक्याह ॥

scripture of the *production* of Nature, so too is there of that of *Ignorance* in such texts as this—viz.—"This Ignorance, which has five divisions, was produced from the great Spirit." Hence it must needs be that a figurative production is intended to be asserted in respect of *one* of these [—and not the *literal* production of both, else we should have no root at all—], and of the two, it is with *Nature* only that a figurative production, in the shape of a manifestation through conjunction with Soul, &c., is congruous. A production [such as that metaphorical one here spoken of], the characteristic of which is conjunction, *is* mentioned, for there is mention of such a figurative origination of Soul and Nature in a passage of the *Kaurma Puráṇa* beginning "Of action [or the Primal Agency] and knowledge [or Soul]," and so on. And as there is no mention in scripture of the origin of *Ignorance* as figurative, *it* is *not* from eternity. And Ignorance, which consists of false knowledge, has been declared in an aphorism of the *Yoga* to be [not a separate entity but] an affection of the mind. Hence there is no increase to the [list of the twenty-five] Realities* [in the shape of a twenty-sixth principle to be styled 'Ignorance'].

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* प्रकृतेर्मूलकारणविचारे द्वयोर्वादिप्रतिवादिनोरावयोः समानः पक्षः एतदुक्तम्भवति यथा प्रकृतेरुत्पत्तिः श्रूयते एवमविद्याया अपि अविद्या पञ्चपर्वैषा प्रादुर्भूता महात्मन इत्यादिवाक्ये अत एकस्या अवश्यं गौण्युत्पत्तिर्वक्तव्या तत्र च प्रकृतेरेव पुरुषसंयोगादिभिरभिव्यक्तिरूपा गौण्युत्पत्तिर्यक्ता। संयोगलक्षणोत्पत्तिः कथ्यते कर्म्मज्ञानयोरिति कौर्मवाक्ये प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्गौण्युत्पत्तिस्मरणात्। अविद्यायास्त्व क्वापि गौण्युत्पत्त्यश्रवणात्तस्या अनादिता। अविद्याच मिथ्याज्ञानरूपा बुद्धिधर्म इति योगे स्वचित्तमतो न तत्त्वाधिक्यम्॥

b. Or [according to another and more probable interpretation of the aphorism] the meaning is this, that the argument is the same in support of both, i. e. of both Soul and Nature.*

c. But then, there being [as has been shown] a mode of arriving by inference at [a knowledge of the saving truth in regard to] Nature, Soul, &c., whence is it that reflection, in the shape of discrimination [between Soul and Nature], does not take place in the case of *all* men? In regard to this point he states as follows:—†

अधिकारित्रैविध्यान्न नियमः ॥ ७१ ॥

It is only the best kind of people that are fully amenable to reason.

Aph. 71.—There is no rule [or necessity that *all* should arrive at the truth—] because those who are privileged [to engage in the enquiry] are of three descriptions.

a. For those privileged [to engage in the enquiry] are of three descriptions through their distinction into those who, in reflecting, are dull, mediocre, and best. Of these—by the dull, the [Sánkhya] arguments are frustrated [and altogether set aside] by means of the sophisms that have been uttered by the *Bauddhas*, &c. By the mediocre, they [are brought into doubt, or, in other words,] are made to appear as if there were equally strong arguments on the other side, by means of arguments which really prove the

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* अथवा द्वयोः प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः समान एव न्याय इत्यर्थः ॥

† ननु प्रकृतिपुरुषाद्यनुमानप्रकारसत्त्वे सर्वेषां विवेकमननं कुतो न जायते तत्राह ॥

reverse [of what these persons employ them to prove], or by arguments which are not true; [—see the section on Fallacies in the *Tarka-sangraha*]. But it is only the *best* of those privileged that reflect in the manner that has been set forth [in our exposition of the process of reflection which leads to the discriminating of Soul from Nature];—such is the import. But there is no rule that *all* must needs reflect in the manner so set forth;—such is the literal meaning.*

b. He now, through two aphorisms, defines 'the Great one' and 'Self-consciousness'† [—the reader being presumed to remember that Nature consists of the three 'Qualities' in equipoise, and to be familiar with the other principles, such as the 'Subtile elements:'—see §62].

महदाख्यमाद्यं कार्यं तन्मनः ॥ ७२ ॥

By 'the Great one' is meant Mind.

Aph. 72.—That first product [of the Primal Agent, Nature,] which is called 'the Great one,' is Mind.

a. 'Mind' *(manas)*. Mind is so called because its function is 'thinking' *(manana)*. By 'thinking' is here meant 'judging' *(niśchaya)*:—that of which this is the function is 'intellect'

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* मनने हि मन्दमध्यमोत्तमभेदेन त्रिविधा अधिकारिणस्तत्र मन्दैर्बाह्वाद्युक्ताकृतर्कैरनुमानानि बाध्यन्ते। मध्यमैर्विरुद्धासङ्गिभिः सत्प्रतिपक्षितानि क्रियन्ते। उत्तमाधिकारिणामेव तूक्तरीत्या मननमिति भावः। सर्वेषामेव तूक्तरीत्या मननं नियमेनेत्यक्षरार्थः॥

† महदहङ्कारयोः स्वरूपमाह सूत्राभ्याम्॥

(buddhi);—and *that* is the first product—that called 'the Great one' *(mahat)*:—such is the meaning.*

चरमो ऽहङ्कारः ॥ ७३ ॥

The relation of Self-consciousness to Mind.

Aph. 73.—'Self-consciousness,' is that which is subsequent [to Mind.]

a. 'Self-consciousness,' the function of which is a conceit ["*I* exist"—"*I* do this that and the other thing"—], is that which is subsequent;—that is to say 'Self-consciousness' is the next after 'the Great one'† [§72].

b. Since 'Self-consciousness' is that whose function is a conceit [which brings out the *Ego* in every case of cognition, the matter of which cognition would else have lain dormant in the bosom of Nature—the formless Objective]—it therefore follows that the others [among the phenomena of mundane existence] are effects of this [Self-consciousness];—and so he declares as follows:‡—

तत्कार्यत्वमुत्तरेषाम् ॥ ७४ ॥

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* मन इति। मननवृत्तिकं मनः। मननमत्र निश्चय-स्वरूपवृत्तिका बुद्धिस्तन्महदाख्यमाद्यं कार्यमित्यर्थः ॥

† अहङ्कारो ऽभिमानवृत्तिकः पदार्थश्चरमो महतो ऽनन्तरो ऽहङ्कार इत्यर्थः।

‡ यतो ऽभिमानवृत्तिको ऽहङ्कारो ऽतस्तत्कार्यत्वमुत्तरेषा-मुपपन्नमित्याह ॥

All products, save Mind, result from Self-consciousness.

Aph. 74.—To the others it belongs to be the products thereof [—i. e. of Self-consciousness].

a. 'To be products thereof,' i. e. to be products of Self-consciousness;—that is to say, the fact of being products thereof belongs to the others, the eleven 'Organs' *(indriya)*, the five 'Subtile elements,' and, mediately, to the [gross] Elements also —the products of the Subtile elements.*

b. But then, if it be thus, [some one may say],—you relinquish your dogma that *Nature* is the cause of the whole world. Therefore he declares as follows:†

आद्यहेतुता तद्द्वारा पारम्पर्ये ऽप्यणुवत्॥ ७५॥

Nature, immediately the cause of Mind, is mediately the cause of all other products.

Aph. 75.—Moreover, mediately, through that [i. e. the 'great one' §72—], the first [cause—viz. Nature—] is the cause [of all products], as is the case with the Atoms [—the causes—though not the immediate causes—of jars &c].

a. 'Moreover, mediately'—i. e. moreover not in the character of the immediate cause;—'the first'—i. e. Nature—*is* the cause, of 'Self-consciousness' and the rest, [mediately] through 'the

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* तत्कार्यत्वमहङ्कारकार्यत्वमन्येषामेकादशेन्द्रियाणां पञ्चतन्मात्राणां पारम्पर्येण तन्मात्रकार्याणामपि भूतानां तत्कार्यत्वमित्यर्थः॥

† ननु यद्येवं तर्हि प्रधानं सर्वजगत्कारणमिति सिद्धान्तहानिरत आह॥

Great one,' and the rest;—as, in the theory of the Vaiseshikas, the Atoms are the cause of the jar or the like, only [mediately] through combinations of two atoms, and so on;—such is the meaning.*

b. But then, since both Nature and Soul too are eternal, which of them is [really] the cause of the creation's commencing? In regard to this he declares as follows:†—

पूर्वभावित्वे द्वयोरेकतरस्य हाने ऽन्यतरयोगः ॥ ७६ ॥

Why Nature is the sole cause.

Aph. 76.—While both [Soul and Nature] are antecedent [to all products], since the one [viz. Soul] is devoid of this [character of being a cause], it is applicable to the other of the two [—viz. Nature].

a. That is to say—'while both'—viz. Soul and Nature—are pre-existent to every product,—still, 'since the one'—viz. Soul—from the fact of its never being modified [into anything else—as clay is modified into a jar—] must be 'devoid of,' or lack, the nature of a cause,—'it is applicable'—i. e. the nature of a cause must belong to the *other* of the two.‡

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* पारम्पर्येऽपि साक्षादहेतुत्वेऽपि आद्यायाः प्रकृतेर्हेतुता अहङ्कारादिषु महदादिद्वारास्ति यथा वैशेषिकमते ऽणूनां घटादिहेतुता द्व्यणुकादिद्वारैवेत्यर्थः ॥

† ननु प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्द्वयोरपि नित्यत्वात्सृष्यादौ कस्य कारणत्वमित्यत आह ॥

‡ द्वयोरेव पुम्प्रकृत्योरखिलकार्यपूर्वभावित्वे ऽप्येकतरस्य पुरुषस्यापरिणामित्वेन हाने कारणताहान्यामन्यतरस्य योगः कारणतासम्भव इत्यर्थः ॥

b. But then [some one may say]—let *Atoms* alone be causes, since there is no dispute [that *these* are causal]. In reply to this he says:—*

परिच्छिन्नं न सर्वोपादानम् ॥ ७७ ॥

Why the theory of a plastic Nature is preferable to that of Atoms.

Aph. 77.—What is limited cannot be the substance of all things.

a. That which is limited cannot be the substance of all things, as yarn cannot be the [material] cause of a jar;—therefore it would [on the theory suggested] be necessary to mention separate causes of all things severally, and it is simpler to assume a single cause; therefore Nature alone is the cause,—such is the meaning.†

b. He alleges scripture in support of this.‡

तदुत्पत्तिश्रुतेश्च ॥ ७८ ॥

Scripture declares in favour of the theory.

Aph. 78.—And [the proposition that Nature is the cause of all is proved] from the text of scripture that the origin [of the world] is therefrom,[—i. e. from Nature].

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* नन्वविवादात्परमाणूनामेव कारणत्वमस्त्वित्यत आह ॥

† यत्परिच्छिन्नं न तत्सर्वोपादानं यथा न तन्तुर्घटस्य कारणं तस्मात्पदार्थानां पृथक् पृथक् कारणं वक्तव्यमेककारणत्वे च लाघवं तस्मात्प्रधानस्यैव कारणत्वमित्यर्थः ॥

‡ अत्र श्रुतिं दर्शयति ॥

a. An argument, in the first instance, has been set forth [in §77—for, till argument fails him, no one falls back upon authority]. Scripture, moreover, declares that Nature is the cause of the world, in such terms as "From Nature the world arises" &c.*

b. But then [some one may say],—a jar, which antecedently did not exist, is seen to come into existence;—let, then, *antecedent non-existence* be the cause [of each product], since this is an invariable antecedent,—[and hence a cause—"the invariable antecedent being denominated a cause," if Dr. Brown, in his 6th lecture, is to be trusted]. To this he replies:†—

नावस्तुनो वस्तुसिद्धिः ॥ ७९ ॥

Ex nihilo nihil fit.

Aph. 79.—A thing is not made out of nothing.

a. That is to say,—it is not possible that out of nothing—i. e. out of a nonentity—a thing should be made—i. e. an entity should arise. If an entity were to arise out of a nonentity, then, since the character of a cause is visible in its product, the *world* also would be unreal;—such is the meaning.‡

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* युक्तिस्तावत्प्रोक्ता श्रुतिरपि प्रधानस्य जगत्कारणतामाह प्रधानाज्जगज्जायत इति ॥

† ननु प्रागसतो घटस्य भवनं दृश्यते। नियतपूर्वभावित्वात्प्रागभावः कारणमस्त्वित्यत आह ॥

‡ अवस्तुनोऽभावाद्वस्तुसिद्धिः भावोत्पत्तिर्न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः। यद्यभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिः तर्हि कारणरूपं कार्ये दृश्यत इति जगतोऽप्यवस्तुत्वं स्यादित्यर्थः॥

b. Let the world too *be* unreal,—what harm is that to *us*? [—if any ask—] he therefore declares as follows :*—

अबाधादुष्टकारणजन्यत्वाच्च नावस्तुत्वम् ॥ ८० ॥

Reasons why the world is not to be supposed unreal.

Aph. 80.—It [the world] is not unreal, because there is no fact contradictory [to its reality], and because it is not the [false] result of depraved causes [—leading to a belief in what ought not to be believed].

a. When there is the notion, in regard to a shell [of a pearl-oyster, which sometimes glitters like silver], that it is silver, its being silver is contradicted by the [subsequent and more correct] cognition that this is *not* silver. But, in the case in question [—that of the world regarded as a reality—], no one ever has the cognition 'This world is *not* in the shape of an entity,'—by which [cognition—if any one ever really had such—] its being an entity might be opposed.†

b. And it is inferred that that is false which is the result of a *depraved* cause,—e. g. some one's cognition of a [white] conch-shell as *yellow*, through such a fault as the jaundice [which depraves his eye-sight]. But, in the case in question [—that of the world regarded as a reality—], there is no such [temporary or occasional] depravation [of the senses], because all, at all times,

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* भवतु जगदप्यवस्तु का नो हानिरित्यत आह ॥

† शुक्तौ रजतमितिज्ञाने नेदं रजतमितिज्ञानाद्रजत-बाधः । नचात्र नेदं भावरूपं जगदिति कस्यापि ज्ञानं येन भावरूपबाधः स्यात ॥

cognize the world as a reality; therefore the world is *not* an unreality.*

c. But then [some one may suggest]—*let* a nonentity be the cause of the world, still the world will not [necessarily therefore] be unreal. In regard to this he declares as follows :†

भावे तद्योगेन तस्सिद्धिरभावे तदभावात्कुतस्तरान्तस्सिद्धिः ॥ ८१ ॥

The product of something is something, and of nothing nothing.

Aph. 81.—If it [—the substantial cause—] be an entity, then this would be the case [that the product should be an entity], from its union [or identity] therewith :—but if [the cause be] a nonentity, then how could it possibly be the case [that the product should be real] since *it* is a nonentity [like the cause with which it is united in the relation of identity] ?

a. If an *entity* were the substantial cause [of the world], then, since [it is a maxim that] the qualities of the cause present themselves in the product,—'this would be the case'—i. e. it would be the case that the product is real,—'because of union therewith'—i. e. because of the union [of the product] with the reality [which is its substratum] :—But since [by parity of reasoning], if a *nonentity* [were the substantial cause], the world would be a nonentity, then, by reason of its being a nonentity—i. e. by reason of the world's being [on that supposition] necessa-

* दुष्टकारणजन्यत्वाच्च मिथ्येत्यवगम्यते यथा कामलादिदोषात् पीतशंखेक्षानं कस्यचित् । अत्रच जगज्ज्ञानस्य सर्वेषां सर्वदा सत्त्वान्न दोषो ऽस्ति तस्मान्नावस्तु जगदिति ॥

† नन्वभावः कारणमस्तु तथाप्यभावत्वं न जगतो भविष्यतीति तत्राह ॥

rily a nonentity [like its supposed cause],—how could this be the case* [that it should be *real*] ?

b. But then [some one may say], since [it would appear that] nonentity can take no shape but that of nonentity, let *works* alone be the cause of the world;—what need have we of the hypothesis of 'Nature'? To this he replies.†

न कर्मणऽउपादानयोगात् ॥ ८२ ॥

Action cannot serve as a substratum.

Aph. 82.—Nay,—for *works* are not adapted to be the *substantial* cause [of any product].

a. Granting that 'the unseen' [merit or demerit arising from actions] may be an *instrumental* cause [in bringing about the mundane condition of the agent], yet we never see merit or demerit in the character of the *substantial* cause [of any product], and our theories ought to show deference to our experience. 'Nature' is to be accepted, because Liberation arises [—see §57. *a.* and §84—] from discerning the distinction between Nature and the Soul.‡

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* भावे उपादानकारणे। कारणगुणाः कार्य इति तद्योगेन भावयोगेन तत्सिद्धिः कार्यस्य वस्तुत्वसिद्धिः अभावे जगतोऽभावत्वे तदभावाज्जगदभावस्यावश्यम्भावात् कुतस्तत्सिद्धिरिति ॥

† नन्वभावस्याभावरूपत्वात् कर्मैव जगत्कारणमस्तु किं प्रधानकल्पनयेत्यत आह ॥

‡ निमित्ते कारणमदृष्टमस्तु धर्माधर्मयोस्तु उपादानकारणत्वं न क्वचिद्दृष्टं। कल्पना हि दृष्टानुसारेणैव भवति। प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकदर्शनान्मुक्तिरिति प्रकृतिस्वीकारः ॥

b. But then [some one may say]—since Liberation can be attained by undertaking the things directed by the Veda, what occasion is there for [our troubling ourselves about] *Nature*? To this he replies.*

नानुश्रविकादपि तत्सिद्धिः साध्यत्वेनावृत्तियोगादपुरुषार्थत्वम् ॥ ८३ ॥

Salvation is not to be obtained by ritual observances.

Aph. 83.—The accomplishment thereof [i. e. of Liberation] is not, moreover, through scriptural means:—the chief end of man does not consist in this [that is gained through such means], because, since this consists of what is accomplished through *means*, [and is therefore not *eternal*], there is [still left impending over the ritualist] the liability to repetition of births.

a. 'Scriptural means'—such as sacrifices—are so called because they are heard [from the mouth of the instructor in scripture]; —not thereby, moreover, is 'the accomplishment thereof'—i. e. the accomplishment of Liberation. 'Because one is liable to repetition of births by reason of the fact that it [the supposed Liberation] was accomplished by *means*,'—i. e. because the [thus far] liberated [soul] is still liable to repetition of births inasmuch as this [its supposed Liberation] is not *eternal*, just because it is [the result of] *act*;—for *this* reason the chief end of man does not consist in this† [that is gained through ritual observances].

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* ननु वेदोक्तार्थानुष्ठानादेव मुक्तिसम्भवात् किं प्रकृत्येत्यत आह ॥

† वेदादनुश्रूयत इत्यानुश्रविको यज्ञादिः। तस्मादपि न तत्सिद्धिः मोक्षसिद्धिः। साध्यत्वेनावृत्तियोगात् कर्मत्वेनानित्यत्वान्मुक्तस्य पुनः संसारावृत्तियोगः तस्मादपुरुषार्थत्वम्॥

b. He now shows what *does* constitute the chief end of man.*

तत्र प्राप्तविवेकस्यानावृत्तिश्रुतिः ॥ ८४ ॥

In regard to the attainment of the chief end of man the Scripture concurs with the Sánkhya.

Aph. 84.—There is scripture for it that he who has attained to discrimination in regard to these [i. e. Nature and Soul] has no repetition of births.

a. 'In regard to these'—i. e. in regard to Nature and Soul,—of him who has attained to discrimination, there is a text declaring that, in consequence of his knowledge of the distinction, there shall be no repetition of births;—the text—viz.—"*He* does not return again," &c.†

b. He states an objection to the opposite view.‡

दुःखादुःखं जलाभिषेकवन्न जाड्यविमोकः ॥ ८५ ॥

Pain can only lead to pain, not to liberation from it.

Aph. 85.—From pain [occasioned, e. g., to victims in sacrifice] must come pain [to the sacrificer,—and not *liberation* from pain], as there is not relief from chilliness by affusion of water.

a. If Liberation were to be effected by *acts* [such as sacrifices], then, since the acts involve a variety of pains, Liberation itself [—on the principle that every effect includes the qualities

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* पुरुषार्थत्वं दर्शयति ॥

† तत्र प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः प्राप्तविवेकस्य विवेकज्ञानादनावृत्तिश्रुतिः न स पुनरावर्त्तत इति श्रुतिः ॥

‡ विपक्षे दोषमाह ॥

of its cause—] would have a variety of pains; and it would be a grief from the fact that it must eventually end:—for to one who is distressed by chilliness the affusion of water does not bring liberation from his chilliness but rather [additional] chilliness.*

b. But then [some one may say], the fact that the act is productive of pain is not the *motive* [to the performance of sacrifice]; but the [real] reason is this, that the act is productive of *things desirable*:—and, in accordance with this, there is the text "By means of acts [of sacrifice] they may partake of immortality," &c. To this he replies.†

काम्येऽकाम्येऽपि साध्यत्वाविशेषात् ॥ ८६ ॥

The character of the end makes no difference in regard to the transitoriness of what is effected by works.

Aph. 86—[Liberation cannot arise from acts] because, whether the end be something desirable or undesirable, this makes no difference in regard to its being the result of *means* [and therefore not eternal but transitory].

a. Grant that pain is not what is [intended] to be accomplished by works done without desire [on the part of the virtuous sacri-

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* यदि कर्मसाध्यो मोक्षो भवेत् कर्मणो दुःखबहुलत्वात् मोक्षोऽपि दुःखबहुलः स्यात्। अन्ततः क्षयित्वेनापि दुःखं स्यात्। नहि जाड्यार्त्तस्य जाड्यविमोको जलाभिषेकात् प्रत्युत जाड्यमेवेति ॥

† ननु दुःखस्य कर्मसाध्यत्वमप्रयोजकं किन्तु काम्यकर्मसाध्यत्वं हेतुः। तथाच श्रुतिः कर्मभ्यो ऽमृतत्वमानशुरिति तत्राह ॥

ficer], still, though there *is* a difference [as you contend] between [an act done to secure] something enjoyable and an act done without reference to enjoyment, this makes no difference with respect to the fact of the Liberation's being produced by *acts*[—which, I repeat, *permanent* Liberation cannot be—]:—there must still again be pain, for it [the Liberation supposed to have been attained through works,] must be perishable because it is a *production*. The text which declares that works done without desire are instruments of Liberation, has reference to *knowledge* [which, I grant, may be gained by such means], and Liberation comes through knowledge,—so that these [works] are instruments of Liberation *mediately*;* [—but you will recollect that the present enquiry regards the *immediate* cause].

b. [But then some one may say]—supposing that Liberation may take place [as you Sánkhyas contend] through the knowledge of the distinction between Nature and Soul, still, since, from the perishableness [of the Liberation effected by *this* means as well as any other means], mundane life may return, we are both on an equality [—*we* whose Liberation you Sánkhyas look upon as transitory,—and you Sánkhyas, whose Liberation we again look upon as being, by parity of reasoning, in much the same predicament]. To this he replies.†

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* मा भून्निष्कामकर्मसाध्यं दुःखं तथापि काम्यान्निष्कामकर्मविशेषेऽपि मोक्षस्य कर्मसाध्यत्वमविशिष्टं साध्यत्वात् क्षयित्वेन पुनरपि दुःखं स्यात्। निष्कामकर्मणो मोक्षसाधनत्वश्रुतिः ज्ञानार्थं। ज्ञानाच्च मोक्ष इति पारम्पर्येण मोक्षसाधनत्वम्॥

† यदि प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकज्ञानान्मोक्षो भवेत्तथापि क्षयित्वात्पुनरपि संसार इत्यावयोस्तुल्यत्वमित्यत आह॥

निजमुक्तस्य बन्धध्वंसमात्रे परं न समानत्वम् ॥ ८७ ॥

The right means effect Liberation once for all.

Aph. 87. Of him who is essentially liberated, his bonds having absolutely perished, it [i. e. the fruit of his saving knowledge] is absolute:—there is no parity [between his case and that of him who relies on works].

a. Of him 'who is essentially liberated'—who in his very essence is free—there is the destruction of bondage. The bond [—see §56—] is Non-discrimination [between Nature and Soul]. By the removal thereof, there is the destruction—the annihilation—of Non-discrimination;—and how is it possible that there should again be a return of the mundane state when the destruction of Non-discrimination is *absolute?* Thus there is no such similarity* [between the two cases as is imagined by the objector under §86. *b*].

b. It has been asserted [in §62] that there is a class of twenty-five [things which are realities]:—and since these cannot be ascertained [or made out to be *true*] except by *proof,* therefore he displays this† [—i. e. he shows what he *means* by proof].

द्वयोरेकतरस्यचाप्यसन्निकृष्टार्थपरिच्छित्तिः प्रमा तत्साधकतमं यत्तत् ॥ ८८ ॥

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* निजमुक्तस्य स्वभावमुक्तस्य बन्धध्वंसः। बन्धो ऽविवेकस्तद्विरोधेनाविवेकध्वंसो नाशः। अविवेकनाशस्यच प्रध्वंसत्वात् कुतः संसारस्य पुनरावर्त्तनमिति न समत्वम्॥

† पञ्चविंशतिगण इत्युक्तं तत्सिद्ध्यै न प्रमाणेन विनेति तद्दर्शयति॥

What is meant by evidence.

Aph. 88. The determination of something not [previously] lodged in both [the Soul and the Intellect] nor in one or other of them, is 'right notion' *(pramá)*. That [is what we mean by proof, or evidence—*pramáṇa*—] which is in the highest degree productive thereof [—i. e. of any given 'right notion'].

a. 'Not lodged'—i. e. not deposited in 'one rightly cognizing' *(pramátri)*,—in short, not previously got at. The 'discrimination', i. e. the ascertainment [or right apprehension] of such a thing, or reality, is 'right notion':—and whether this be an affection 'of *both*'—i. e. of Intellect and also of Soul [as some hold that it is], or of only one or other of the two [as others hold], *either* way, that 'which is in the highest degree productive' of this 'right notion' is [what we term proof or] evidence *(pramáṇa)*. Such is the definition of evidence in general [—the definition of its several species falling to be consisted hereafter] :—such is the meaning.*

b. It is with a view to the exclusion of Memory, Error, and Doubt, in their order, that we employ [when speaking of the result of evidence] the expressions 'not previously known' [which excludes things remembered], and 'reality' [which excludes mistakes and fancies], and 'discrimination'† [which excludes doubt].

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* असन्निकृष्टः प्रमातर्यनारूढोऽनधिगत इति यावत्। एवम्भूतस्यार्थस्य वस्तुनः परिच्छित्तिरवधारणं प्रमा। सा च द्वयोर्बुद्धिपुरुषयोरेव धर्मो भवतु किंवैकतरमात्रस्य उभयथैव तस्याः प्रमाया यत्साधकतमं तत्प्रमाणमिति प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणमित्यर्थः॥

† स्मृतिभ्रमसंशयव्युदासाय क्रमेणानधिगत इति वस्तुन इति अवधारणमिति॥

c. In regard to this [topic of knowledge and the sources of knowledge], if 'right notion,' is spoken of as located in the *Soul* [—see §88. *a.*—], then the [proof or] evidence is an affection of the *Intellect.* If [on the other hand, the 'right notion'] is spoken of as] located in the Intellect, in the shape of an affection [of that, the affections of which are mirrored by the Soul], then it [the proof or evidence—or whatever we may choose to call that from which 'right notion' results,] is just the conjunction of an organ [with its appropriate object,—such conjunction giving rise to sense-perception—], &c. But if *both* the Soul's cognition, and the affections of the Intellect, are spoken of as [cases of] 'right notion,' then *both* of these aforesaid [—the affection of the Intellect in the first case, and the conjunction of an organ with its appropriate object, &c., in the other case—] are [to receive the name of] proof *(pramâṇa).* You are to understand that when the organ of vision, &c., are spoken of as 'evidence,' it is only as being *mediately** [the sources of right knowledge].

d. How many [kinds of] proofs are there? To this he replies.†

त्रिविधं प्रमाणं तत्सिद्धौ सर्वसिद्धेर्नाधिक्यसिद्धिः ॥ ८९ ॥

There are three kinds of evidence.

Aph. 89.—Proof is of three kinds:—there is no establishment of more, because if these be established then all [that is true] can be established [—by one or other of these three proofs].

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* अत्र यदि प्रमारूपं फलं पुरुषनिष्ठमुच्यते तदा बुद्धिवृत्तिरेव प्रमाणं। यदि बुद्धिनिष्ठं वृत्तिरूपं तत् तदेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादिरेव। यदि तु पौरुषेयबोधो बुद्धिवृत्तिश्चेोभयमपि प्रमेत्युच्यते तदोक्तमुभयमेव प्रमाणं भवति। चक्षुरादिषु प्रमाणव्यवहारः परम्परयैवेति बोध्यम्॥

† कति प्रमाणानीत्यत आह॥

a. 'Proof is of three kinds;'—that is to say, 'the use of the senses' *(pratyaksha)*, 'the recognition of signs' *(anumána)*, and 'testimony' *(śabda)*, are the [three kinds of] proofs.*

b. But then [some one may incline to say,] let 'comparison' [which is reckoned in the Nyáya a specifically distinct source of knowledge,] and the others [—such as 'Conjecture,' &c., which are reckoned in like manner in the Mímánsá—], be instruments of right knowledge [as well as these three] in [the matter of] the discriminating of Nature and Soul:—he therefore says 'because if these [three] be established,' &c. And, since, if there be the three kinds of proof, everything [that is really true] can be established [by means of them] there is no establishment of more,'—no addition to the proofs can be fairly made out,—because of the cumbrousness [—that sins against the philosophical maxim that we are not to assume more than is necessary to account for the case—]: such is the meaning†.

c. For the same reason Manu also has laid down only a triad of proofs—where he says [—see the Institutes, ch. xii. v. 105—] "By that man who seeks a distinct knowledge of his duty, these three [sources of right knowledge] must be well understood—viz. Perception, Inference, and Scriptural authority in its various shapes [of legal institute, &c]". And 'Composition' and 'Tradition' *(aitihya)*, and the like, are include under Inference and Testimony; and 'Non-perception' *(anupalabdhi)*, and the

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* त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिति प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानीत्यर्थः ॥

† ननूपमानाद्यपि प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकप्रमाणमस्त्वित्यत आह तन्सिद्धाविति त्रिविधप्रमाणसिद्धौच सर्वस्यार्थस्य सिद्धेर्नाधिक्यसिद्धिर्न प्रमाणाधिक्यं सिध्यति गौरवादित्यर्थः ॥

like, are included under Perception* [—for, the non-perception of an absent jar on a particular spot of ground, is nothing else than the perception of that spot of ground *without* a jar on it].

d. He next states the definitions of the varieties† [of proof,—having already,—§88,—given the general definition].

यत्सम्बद्धं सत्तदाकारोल्लेखिविज्ञानं तत्प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ ९० ॥

Perception defined.

Aph. 90.—Perception *(pratyaksha)* is that discernment which, being in conjunction [with the thing perceived], portrays the form thereof.

a. 'Being in conjunction'—[literally] 'existing in conjunction;'—'portrays the form thereof'—i. e. assumes the form of the thing with which it is in conjunction [—as water assumes the form of the vessel into which it is poured—]; what 'discernment'—or affection of the Intellect—[does *this*], that [affection of the Intellect—see *Yoga* Aphorisms, §5 and §8. *b.*] is the evidence called Perception;—such is the meaning.‡

b. But then, [some one may say] this [definition of Perception

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* अत एव मनुनापि प्रमाणत्रयमेवोपन्यस्तं प्रत्यक्षमनुमानञ्च शास्त्रञ्च विविधागमं त्रयं सुविदितं कार्यं धर्मशुद्धिमभीप्सतेति। उपमानैतिह्यादीनाञ्चानुमानशब्दयोः प्रवेश अनुपलब्ध्यादीनाञ्च प्रत्यक्षे प्रवेश इति ॥

† विशेषलक्षणमाह ॥

‡ सम्बद्धं सत् सम्बद्धं भवत्। तदाकारोल्लेखि सम्बद्धवस्त्वाकारधारि भवति। यद्विज्ञानं बुद्धिवृत्तिस्तत्प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणमित्यर्थः ॥

—§90—] does not extend [as we conceive it ought, and presume it is intended, to do] to the perception, by adepts in the *Yoga*, of things past, future, or concealed [by stone-walls or such intervening things as interrupt ordinary perception], because there is here no 'form of the thing—in *conjunction*' [with the mind of him who perceives it while absent]:—having pondered this doubt, he corrects it by [stating as follows] the fact that this [supernatural sort of perception] is not what he intends to define.*

योगिनामबाह्यप्रत्यक्षत्वान्न दोषः ॥ ९१ ॥

The definition not to be blamed though it should not apply to the perceptions of the mystic.

Apt. 91.—It is not a fault, [in the definition, that it does not apply to the perceptions of adepts in the *Yoga*,] because that of the adepts in the *Yoga* is not an *external* perception.

a. That is to say,—it is only *sense*-perception that is to be here defined, and the adepts of the Yoga do not perceive through the *external* [organs of sense];—therefore there is no fault [in our definition],—i. e. there is no *failure* to include the perceptions of these† [because there is no *intention* to include them].

b. [But, although this reply is as much as the objector has any right to expect,] he states the real justification‡ [of the definition in question].

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* ननु योगिनामतीतानागतव्यवहितवस्तुप्रत्यक्षे ऽव्याप्तिः सम्बद्धवस्त्वाकाराभावादित्याशंक्य तस्यालक्ष्यत्वेन समाधत्ते ॥

† ऐन्द्रियकप्रत्यक्षमेवात्र लक्ष्यं योगिनश्चाबाह्यप्रत्यक्षका अतो न दोषो न तत्प्रत्यक्षे ऽव्याप्तिरित्यर्थः ॥

‡ वास्तवं समाधानमाह ॥

लीनवस्तुलब्धातिशयसम्बन्धाद्वाऽदोषः ॥ ९२ ॥

But the definition does apply to the perceptions of the mystic.

Aph. 92.—Or, there is no fault [in the definition] because of the conjunction, with causal things, of that [mystical mind] which has attained exaltation.

a. Or, be it so, that the perception of the *Yogí* also shall be the thing to be defined, still there is no fault [in our definition, §90], —it does not fail to extend [to this also], since the mind of the *Yogí*, in the exaltation gained from the habitude produced by concentration, *does* come into conjunction with things [as existent] in their causes* [whether or not with the things as developed into products perceptible by the external senses].

b. Here the word rendered "causal" *(lína)* denotes the things, *not* in conjunction [with the senses], alluded to by the objector [in §90. *b*]:—for *we*, who assert that effects *exist* [from eternity in their causes before taking the shape of effects, and likewise in these same causes when again resolved into their causes], hold that even what is past, &c., still essentially exists, and that hence its conjunction [with the mind of the mystic or the clairvoyant] is possible.†

Objection that the definition does not apply to the perceptions of the 'Lord.'

c. But then [some one may say]—still this [definition] does not extend to the *Lord's* perceptions, because,

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* अथवास्तु योगिप्रत्यक्षमपि लक्ष्यं तथापि न दोषो नाव्याप्तिः। यतो लीनवस्तुषु लब्धयोगजधर्मजन्यातिशयस्य योगिचित्तस्य सम्बन्धो घटते ॥

† अत्र लीनशब्दः पराभिप्रेतासन्निकृष्टवाची। सत्कार्यवादिनां ह्यतीतादिकमपि स्वरूपतोऽस्तीति तत्तत्सम्बन्धसम्भवेदिति ॥

since these are from everlasting [—past, present, and future, being, as regards Him, indifferent—], they cannot *result* from conjunction. To this he replies :*—

ईश्वरासिद्धेः ॥९३॥

That any 'Lord' exists is not proved.

Aph. 93.—[This objection to the definition of Perception has no force] because it is not proved that there *is* a Lord *(iśwara)*.

a. That there is no fault [in the definition of Perception] because there is no proof that there *is* a Lord—is supplied† [from §91].

b. And this demurring to there being any 'Lord' is merely in accordance with the arrogant dictum of certain partisans [who hold an opinion not recognised by the majority]; therefore, it is to be understood, the expression employed is 'because it is not *proved* that there is a Lord,'—but not the expression 'because there *is no* Lord.'‡

c. But on the implication that there *is* a 'Lord,' what we mean to speak of [in our definition of Perception—§90—] is merely the being of the same kind with what is produced by conjunction§ [of a sense-organ with its object,—and the percep-

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* ननु तथापीश्वरप्रत्यक्षे व्याप्तिस्तस्य नित्यत्वेनासन्निकर्षजन्यत्वात्तत्राह ॥

† ईश्वरे प्रमाणाभावाददोष इत्यनुवर्त्तते ॥

‡ अयञ्चैश्वरप्रतिषेध एकदेशिनां प्रौढवादेनैव अत एवेश्वरासिद्धेरित्युक्तं न त्वीश्वराभावादिति बोध्यम् ॥

§ ईश्वराभ्युपगमे तु सन्निकर्षजन्यजातीयत्वमेव विवक्षितम् ॥

tions of the 'Lord' may be of the same *kind* with such perceptions, though they were not to come from the same *source*].

d. Having pondered the doubt '*How* should the Lord not be proved [to exist] by the Scripture and the Law [which declare his existence] ?'—he states a dilemma which excludes this.*

मुक्तबद्धयोरन्यतराभावान्न तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ९४ ॥

A dilemma to exclude proof that there is any 'Lord.'

Aph. 94.—It is not proved that He [the 'Lord'] exists, because, of free and bound, He can be neither the one nor the other.

a. The 'Lord' whom you imagine,—tell us—is He free from troubles &c., or is He in bondage through these? Since He is not,—cannot be,—either the one or the other, it is not proved that there is a 'Lord :'—such is the meaning.†

b. He explains just this point.‡

उभयथाप्यसत्करत्वम् ॥ ९५ ॥

The force of the dilemma.

Aph. 95.—Either way He would be inefficient.

a. Since, if He were free, He would have no desires which instigate Him to create; and, if He were bound, He would be

* श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यां कथमीशो न सिद्ध्येदित्याशंक्य तर्कविरोधं बाधकमाह ॥

† ईश्वरोऽभिमतः किं क्लेशादिभिर्मुक्तो वा तैर्बद्धो वा अन्यतरस्याप्यभावादसम्भवान्नेश्वरसिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥

‡ तदेवाह ॥

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under delusion;—He must be [on either alternative,] unequal to the creation &c.* [of this world].

b. But then, [it may be asked,] if such be the case, what becomes of the scripture texts which declare the 'Lord?' To this he replies.†

मुक्तात्मनः प्रशंसा उपासा सिद्धस्य वा ॥ ९६ ॥

The import of the texts which speak of the 'Lord.'

Aph. 96.—[The scriptural texts which make mention of the 'Lord,' are] either glorifications of the liberated Soul, or homages to the recognised [deities of the Hindú pantheon].

a. That is to say:—accordingly as the case may be, *some* text [among those in which the term 'Lord' occurs,] is intended—in the shape of a glorification [of Soul] as the 'Lord' [as Soul is held to be,] merely in virtue of junction [with Nature]—to incite [to still deeper contemplation],—to exhibit, as what is to be known, the liberated Soul—i. e. absolute Soul in general:—and some other text, declaratory, for example, of creatorship preceded by resolution [to create], is intended to extol [—and to purify the mind of the contemplator by enabling him to take a part in extolling—] the eternity, &c., of the familiarly known Brahmá, Vishṇu, Śiva, or other *non*-eternal 'Lord,'—since these, though possessed of the conceit [of individuality] &c., [and in so far liable to perish] have immortality in a secondary sense‡ [—seeing that the Soul in *every* combination is immortal, though the combination itself is not so].

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* मुक्तत्वे सृष्टिप्रयोजकरागाद्यभावाद्दृढत्वेच मूढत्वान्न सृष्ट्यादिक्षमत्वमित्यर्थः ॥

† नन्वेवमीश्वरप्रतिपादकश्रुतीनां का गतिरत्राह ॥

‡ यथायोगं काचित् श्रुतिर्मुक्तात्मनः केवलात्मसामान्यस्य

b. But then [some one may say], even if it were thus [as alleged under §96], what is heard [in scripture—viz.—] the fact that it [viz. Soul] is the *governor* of Nature &c., would not be the case,—for, in the world, we speak of government only in reference to modifications [preceded and determined] by resolutions [that so and so shall take place], &c. To this he replies.*

तत्सन्निधानादधिष्ठातृत्वं मणिवत् ॥ ९७ ॥

Soul, like the loadstone, acts not by resolve but through proximity.

Aph. 97.—The governorship thereof [i. e. of Soul over Nature] is from its proximity [thereto,—not from its resolving to act thereon—], as is the case with the gem [—the load-stone—in regard to iron].

a. If it were alleged that its [Soul's] creativeness or its governorship were through a *resolve* [to create or to govern], then this objection [brought forward under §96. *b.*] would apply;—but [it is not so—for] by *us* [Sánkhyas] it is held that the Soul's governorship, in the shape of creatorship, or the like, is merely from its *proximity* [to Nature]—"as is the case with the [loadstone] gem."†

ज्ञेयताविधानाय सन्निधिमात्रैश्वर्येण स्तुतिरूपा प्ररोचनार्था काचिच्च सङ्कल्पपूर्वकस्रष्टृत्वादिप्रतिपादिका श्रुतिः सिद्धस्य ब्रह्मविष्णुहराटेरेवानित्येश्वरस्याभिमानादिमतोऽपि गौणनित्यत्वादिमत्त्वान्नित्यत्वाद्युपासापरेत्यर्थः ॥

* ननु तथापि प्रकृत्याद्यधिष्ठातृत्वं श्रूयमाणं नोपपद्यते लोके सङ्कल्पादिना परिणमनस्यैवाधिष्ठानव्यवहारादिति तत्राह ॥

† यदि सङ्कल्पेन स्रष्टृत्वमधिष्ठातृत्वमुच्यते तदायं दोषः

b. As the gem, the load-stone, acts as an attracter of iron, merely by proximity, without resolving [so to act], so, by the mere conjunction of the primal Soul, Nature is changed into the principle called the 'Great One' [or Mind—see §62—]. And in this alone consists [what we speak of as] its acting as *creator* to-towards that which is superadded to it:—such is the meaning.*

c. And thus it is declared [in some one of the Puráṇas]—"As the iron acts whilst the gem [the loadstone] stands void of volition, just so the world is created by a deity who is mere Existence. Thus it is that there is in the Soul both agency [seemingly], and non-agency [really]:—it is *not* an agent, inasmuch as it is devoid of volition; and it *is* an agent, merely through approximation [to Nature]."†

d. In respect of worldly products also, animal souls overrule merely through their approximation [to Nature]; so he declares as follows.‡

स्यात्। अस्माभिस्तु पुरुषस्य सन्निधानादेवाधिष्ठातृत्वं स्रष्टृत्वादिरूपमिष्यते मणिवत्॥

* यथायस्कान्तमणेः सान्निध्यमात्रेण लोहाकर्षकत्वं सङ्कल्पादिना विना तथैवादिपुरुषस्य संयोगमात्रेण प्रकृतेर्महत्तत्त्वरूपेण परिणमनं। इदमेवच स्वोपाधिस्रष्टृत्वमित्यर्थः॥

† तथाचोक्तं। निरिच्छे संस्थिते रत्ने यथा लोहः प्रवर्त्तते। सत्तामात्रेण देवेन तथैवायं जगज्जनिः॥ अत आत्मनि कर्त्तृत्वमकर्त्तृत्वञ्च संस्थितम्। निरिच्छत्वादकर्त्तासौ कर्त्ता सन्निधिमात्रत इति॥

‡ लौकिककार्येष्वपि जीवानां सन्निधिमात्रेणैवाधिष्ठातृत्वमित्याह॥

विशेषकार्येष्वपि जीवानाम् ॥ ९८ ॥

Embodied souls do not energize.

Aph. 98.—In the case of individual products also, [the apparent agency] of animal souls [is solely through proximity].

a. 'The agency is solely through proximity,'—so much is supplied* [from §97].

b. The meaning is this,—that, in the case also of particular productions,—the creation, &c., of things individual [as contra-distinguished from that of all things in the lump—see *Vedánta-śara* §67], animal souls—i. e. souls in which the intellects [of individuals] reflect themselves [—see §100. *a.*]—over-rule merely through proximity, but not through any effort,—seeing that these [animal souls] are none other than the motionless Thought.†

c. But then [some one may say], if there were no eternal and omniscient 'Lord', then, through the doubt of a blind tradition [obviated by no intelligently effective guardianship], the *Vedas* would cease to be an authority—[a possibility which, of course, cannot be entertained for an instant]. To this he replies.‡

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* अधिष्ठातृत्वं सन्निधानादेवेत्यनुषज्यते ॥

† विशेषकार्येषु व्यष्टिसृष्ट्यादिष्वपि जीवानां अन्तःकरण-प्रतिबिम्बितचेतनानां सन्निधानादेवाधिष्ठातृत्वं नतु केनापि व्यवहारेण कूटस्थचिन्मात्रत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ ननु नित्यसर्वज्ञेश्वराभावेऽस्मत्परम्पराशङ्क्या वेदाप्रामाण्यं स्यादत आह ॥

सिद्धरूपबोद्धृत्वाद्वाक्यार्थोपदेशः ॥ ९९ ॥

How the Vedas need not the 'Lord' to authenticate them!

Aph. 99.—The declaration of the texts or sense [of the Veda, by Brahmá for example], since *he* knows the truth—[*is* authoritative evidence].

a. To complete the aphorism we must say—"since *Hiraṇya-garbha* [i. e. *Brahmá*] and others [viz. *Vishṇu* and *Śiva*], are knowers of what is certain—i. e. of what is true—, the declaration of the texts or sense of the Vedas, where *these* are the speakers, *is* evidence* [altogether indisputable].

b. But then, if Soul, by its simple proximity [to Nature—§97—], is an overruler in a *secondary* sense [only] of the term, [—as the magnet may be said, in a secondary sense, to draw the iron, while the conviction is entertained that actually, and literally, the iron draws the magnet,—] then who is the *primary* [or actual] overruler? In reference to this he says.†

अन्तःकरणस्य तदुज्ज्वलितत्वाल्लोहवदधिष्ठातृत्वम् ॥ १०० ॥

It is in the shape of the internal organ that Nature affects Soul.

Aph. 100.—The internal organ, through its being enlightened thereby [—i. e. by Soul—] is the over-ruler,—as is the iron [in respect of the magnet].

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* हिरण्यगर्भादीनां सिद्धरूपस्य यथार्थस्य बोद्धृत्वात्तद्-कृको वेदवाक्यार्थोपदेशः प्रमाणमिति शेषः ॥

† ननु पुरुषस्य चेत्सन्निधिमात्रेण गौणमधिष्ठातृत्वं तर्हि मुख्यमधिष्ठातृत्वं कस्येत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह ॥

a. The internal organ, i. e. the understanding, is the overruler, through its fancying itself to be Soul, [as it does fancy] by reason of its being enlightened by the Soul, through its happening to reflect itself in [and contemplate itself in] Soul;—'just as the iron,'—that is to say—as the attracting iron, though inactive, draws [the magnet] in consequence of its mere proximity.*

b. He now [—having discussed the evidence that consists in direct perception—] states the definition of an induction† *(anumána).*

प्रतिबन्धदृशः प्रतिबद्धज्ञानमनुमानम् ॥ १०१ ॥

An Induction defined.

Aph. 101.—The knowledge of the connected, through perception of the connection, is an induction.

a. That is to say,—an induction [or conviction of a general truth] is [a kind of] evidence consisting in a mental modification, [which is none other than] the knowledge of the connected, i. e. of the constant accompanier, through the knowledge of the constant accompaniment:—by 'connection' *(pratibandha)* here being meant 'constant attendedness' *(vyápti),* and through the perception thereof‡ [it being that the mind has possession of any general principle].

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* अन्तःकरणस्य बुद्धेः पुरुषच्छायापत्त्या तेन चैतन्येनोज्ज्वलितत्वाच्चेतनत्वाभिमानादधिष्ठातृत्वं लोहवदिति यथाकर्षको लोहो निष्क्रियोऽपि सन्निधिमात्रेण कर्षतीति ॥

† अनुमानलक्षणमाह ॥

‡ प्रतिबन्धो व्याप्तिस्तद्दृशः व्याप्तिज्ञानात् प्रतिबद्धस्य व्यापकस्य ज्ञानं वृत्तिरूपमनुमानं प्रमाणमित्यर्थः ॥

b. But an inference *(anumiti)* is knowledge in the soul*—[whilst the Induction—so far forth as it is an instrument in the establishment of knowledge deducible from it—is an affection of the internal organ, or understanding,—see §88. *c.*].

c. He next defines testimony† *(śabda)*.

आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः ॥ १०२ ॥

Valid Testimony defined.

Aph. 102.—Testimony [such as is entitled to the name of evidence—] is a fit declaration.

a. Here 'fitness' means 'suitableness;'—and so the evidence which is called 'Testimony' is the knowledge arising from a suitable declaration;—such is the meaning:—and [while this belongs to the understanding, or internal organ,—see §101. *b.*—] the result is that [knowledge] in the Soul which is called 'knowledge by hearing'‡ *(śabda-bodha)*.

b. He next volunteers to tell us what is the use of his setting forth [the various divisions of] evidence.§

उभयसिद्धिः प्रमाणात्तदुपदेशः ॥ १०३ ॥

Why the kinds of Evidence have been here set forth.

Aph. 103.—Since the establishment of both [soul and not-soul] is by means

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* अनुमितिस्तु पौरुषेयो बोध इति ॥

† शब्दं लक्षयति ॥

‡ आप्तिरत्र योग्यता। तथाच योग्यशब्दस्तज्जन्यज्ञानं शब्दाख्यप्रमाणमित्यर्थः। फलञ्च पौरुषेयशब्दबोध इति ॥

§ प्रमाणप्रतिपादनस्य स्वयमेव फलमाह ॥

of evidence,—the declaration thereof [i. e. of the kinds of evidence, has been here made].

a. It is only by means of evidence that both Soul and not-soul are established as being distinct [the one from the other];—therefore has this, viz. evidence, been here declared;—such is the meaning.*

b. Among these [several proofs] he now describes that one by which especially—viz. by a proof which is one kind of inference—Nature and Soul are here to be established discriminatively.†

सामान्यतो दृष्टादुभयसिद्धिः ॥ १०४ ॥

The existence of Soul and Nature argued from analogy.

Aph. 104.—The establishment of both [Nature and Soul] is by analogy.

a. [Analogy *(sámányato-drishṭa)* is that kind of evidence which is employed in the case] where, by the force [as an argument] which the residence of any property in the subject derives from a knowledge of its being constantly accompanied [by something which it may therefore betoken], when we have had recourse to [as the means of determining this constant accompaniment,] what is, for instance, generically of a perceptible kind, [where—under such circumstances—we repeat—] anything of a *different* kind—i. e. *not* cognizable by the senses—is established :—as when, for example having apprehended a constant accompaniment [—e. g. that an

* उभयोरात्मानात्मनोर्विवेकेन सिद्धिः प्रमाणादेव भवति अतस्तस्य प्रमाणस्योपदेशः कृत इत्यर्थः ॥

† तत्र येनानुमानविशेषेण प्रमाणेन मुख्यतो ऽत्र प्रकृति-पुरुषौ विविच्य साधनीयौ तद्दर्शयति ॥

act implies an instrument—] by taking into consideration such instruments as axes, &c., which are of earthy and other kinds, a quite heterogeneous, imperceptible, instrument of *knowledge*,—viz. [the instrument named] Sense—is established [or inferred to exist] :—such is what we mean by Analogy; and it is by *this* [species of inference] that Nature and Soul are proved to exist,—such is the meaning.*

b. Of these [viz. Nature and Soul] the argument from analogy for [the existence of] Nature is as follows. The great Principle [—viz. Understanding see §62. *c*.] is formed out of the things [called] Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion [—to the aggregate of which three in equipoise—see §62—the name of Nature is given—], because, whilst it is [undeniably] a production, it has the characters of Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion; just as a bracelet, or the like, formed of gold, or the like,† [has the characteristic properties of the gold, or the like, and is thereby known to have been formed out of gold or the like].

c. But [as regards the argument from analogy in proof of the existence] of Soul—[it is, as stated before, under §67, to the following effect] :—Nature is for the sake of *another*, because it is something that acts as a combination,—as a house, for instance,

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* यत्र सामान्यतः प्रत्यक्षादिजातीयमादाय व्याप्तिग्रहात्यक्षधर्मतावलेन तद्विजातीयो ऽप्रत्यक्षार्थस्सिध्यति यथा पृथिवीत्वादिजातीयं कुठारादिकरणमादाय व्याप्तिं गृहीत्वा तद्विजातीयमतीन्द्रियं ज्ञानकरणमिन्द्रियं साध्यत इति तत् सामान्यतो दृष्टं तस्मादुभयोः प्रकृतिपुरुषयोस्सिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥

† तत्र प्रकृतेस्सामान्यतो दृष्टमनुमानं। यथा। महत्तत्त्वं सुखदुःखमोहद्रव्योपादानकं कार्यत्वे सति सुखदुःखमोहधर्मकत्वात्सुवर्णादिजकुण्डलादिवदिति ॥

[which is a combination of various parts combined for the benefit of the tenant]. In this instance, having gathered, in regard to houses, &c., the fact, established on sense-perception, that they exist for the sake of [organised] bodies, for example,—something of a different kind therefrom [i. e. from Nature]—viz. Soul—is inferred [by analogy as something other than Nature, &c.,—[which, as being a compound thing, is not designed for itself];—such is the meaning.*

d. But then [some one may say]—since Nature is eternal, and exertion is habitual to her, [and the result of her action is the bondage of the Soul,] there should constantly be experience [whether of pleasure or of pain], and hence no such thing as thorough emancipation. To this he replies:†—

चिदवसानो भोगः ॥ १०५ ॥

When it is that experience ceases.

Aph. 105.—Experience [whether of pain or pleasure] ends with [the discernment of] Thought—[or Soul, as contradistinguished from Nature].

a. By 'Thought' we mean Soul. Experience [whether of pain or pleasure] ceases on the discerning thereof. As 'antecedent non-existence,' though devoid of a beginning, [—see *Tarkasangraha* §92—] surceases [—when the thing antecedently non-existent begins to be—], so eternal Nature [—eternal as re-

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* पुरुषस्य तु प्रधानं परार्थं संहत्यकारित्वाद्गृहादिवदित्यत्र प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं देहाद्यर्थकत्वं गृहादिषु गृहीत्वा तद्विजातीयः पुरुषः प्रधानादिपरत्वेनानुमीयत इति ॥

† ननु प्रकृतेर्नित्यत्वात्प्रवृत्तिशीलत्वाच्च सर्वदा भोग इत्यनिर्मोक्षः स्यादित्यत आह ॥

gards the absence of any beginning—] continues [no further than] till the discernment of the difference [between Nature and Soul] :—so that experience [whether of pain or pleasure] does *not* at all times occur :—such is the state of the case.*

b. [But some one may say]—if Nature were the agent, and Soul the experiencer, then it might happen that another should be the experiencer of [the results of] the acts done by one different. To this he replies :†—

अकर्तुरपि फलोपभोगो ऽन्नाद्यवत् ॥ १०६ ॥

The fruit of the action is not always the agent's.

Aph. 106.—The experience of the fruit may belong even to another than the agent, as in the case of food, &c.

a. As it belongs to the cook to prepare the food, &c., and to one who was not the agent, viz. the master, to enjoy the fruit thereof [—i. e. the fruit of the cook's actions—], so is the case here.‡

b. Having stated a practical maxim [—which may serve in practice to silence, by the *argumentum ad hominem*, him on whose

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* चिदात्मा। तद्विवेकावसानो भोगः। यथानादिरपि प्रागभावो नश्यति तथा नित्यायाः प्रकृतेर्विवेकज्ञानपर्यन्तः प्रसर इति न सर्वदा भोगापत्तिरिति भावः ॥

† यदि कर्त्तृ प्रधानं भोक्ता पुरुषस्तर्हि अन्यकृतस्य कर्मणो ऽन्यो भोक्तेति स्यादित्याह ॥

‡ यथा सूपकारस्यान्नादिकर्तृत्वमकर्तुरीश्वरस्य फलोपभोक्तृत्वं तथात्रापीति ॥

principles it may be valid—], he now declares his own doctrine* [in regard to the doubt started under §105. *b*].

अविवेकाद्वा तत्सिद्धेः कर्तुः फलावगमः ॥ १०७ ॥

Nature is agent but not patient.

Aph. 107.—Or [—to give a better account of the matter than that given in §106—], since it is from non-discrimination that it is derived, the notion that the *agent* has the fruit [of the act, is a wrong notion].

a. The soul is neither an agent nor a patient, but, from the fact that the Great Principle [—the actual agent—see §99 *b*.] is reflected in it, there arises the *conceit* of its being an agent. 'Or, since it is from non-discrimination, &c.,'—that is to say,—because it is from the failure to discriminate between Nature and Soul that this takes place,—i. e. that the conceit takes place that it is the *agent* that experiences the fruit:† [—whereas the actual agent is Nature, which, being unintelligent, can experience neither pain nor pleasure].

b. The opposite of this [wrong view referred to in §107] he states as follows.‡

नोभयञ्च तत्त्वाख्याने ॥ १०८ ॥

Soul is neither agent nor patient.

Aph. 108.—And when the truth is made known, there is [seen to be] neither [agency, in Soul, nor experience].

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* व्यवहारसिद्धान्तमुक्त्वा स्वसिद्धान्तमाह ॥

† न पुरुषः कर्त्ता न वा भोक्ता किन्तु महत्तत्त्वप्रतिबिम्बितत्वात् कर्तृत्वाभिमानः । अविवेकाद्वेति प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्विवेकाग्रहात्तत्सिद्धेः कर्तुः फलोपभोगाभिमानसिद्धेरिति ॥

‡ एतद्व्यतिरेकमाह ॥

a. 'When the truth is told' [and discerned], i. e. when, by means of evidence, Nature and Soul are *perceived* [in their entire distinctness one from the other], 'there is neither'—i. e. neither the condition [as regards soul] of an agent or a patient.*

b. Having discussed [the varieties of] evidence, he now states the distribution of the object-matter of evidence.†

विषयो ऽविषयो ऽप्यतिदूरादेर्हानोपादानाभ्या-
मिन्द्रियस्य ॥ १०९ ॥

What is perceptible under certain circumstances may be imperceptible under others.

Aph. 109.—[A thing may be] an object [perceptible] and also [at another time] not an object, through there being, in consequence of great distance, &c., a want of, or [in the absence of opposing causes] an appliance of, the sense.

a. An object [is a perceived object], through the proximity, or conjunction, of the sense [with the object]. A thing may be not an object [perceived], through the want of the sense,—i. e. through the want of conjunction [between the sense and what would otherwise be its object]. And this want of conjunction [may result] from the junction's being prevented by great distance, &c.‡

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* तत्त्वाख्याने प्रमाणेन प्रकृतिपुरुषयोस्साक्षात्कारे नोभयं न कर्तृत्वं न भोक्तृत्वमिति ॥

† प्रमाणमुक्त्वा प्रमेयव्यवस्थामाह ॥

‡ इन्द्रियस्योपादानात् सम्बन्धाद्विषयः । इन्द्रियस्य हानात् सम्बन्धाभावादविषयः । असम्बन्धश्चातिदूरादेरयोग्यत्वात् ॥

What may prevent perception.

b. [To explain the "&c.," and exemplify the causes that may prevent the conjunction, required in order to perception, between the thing and the sense, we may remark that]—it is in consequence of great distance that a bird [flying very high up] in the sky is not perceived:—[then again] in consequence of extreme proximity the collyrium located in the eye [is not perceived by the eye itself]:—a thing placed in [the inside of, or on the opposite side of,] a wall [is not perceived] in consequence of the obstruction:—from distraction of mind the unhappy, or other [agitated person], does not perceive the thing that is at his side [—or under his very nose—]:—through its subtilty an Atom [is not perceived]:—nor is a very small sound when overpowered by the sound of a drum:—and so on.*

c. How [—or, for which of the possible reasons just enumerated—] comes the imperceptibleness of *Nature?* In regard to this he declares:†—

सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिः ॥ ११० ॥

The subtilty of Nature.

Aph. 110.—Her imperceptibless arises from her subtilty.

a. 'Her'—i. e. *Nature's*—imperceptibleness is from subtility. By subtilty is meant the fact of being difficult to investigate,

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* अतिदूरादिद्रियति पक्षी नोपलभ्यते। अतिसामीप्याल्लोचनस्याञ्जनं। व्यवधानात्कुड्यस्थं वस्तु। मनोऽनवस्थानाच्छोकादिग्रस्तस्य पार्श्वस्थवस्त्वग्रहणं। सौक्ष्म्यादणोः। अभिभवात् मर्दलध्वनिना स्वल्पध्वनेरित्यादि ॥

† प्रकृतेः कथमनुपलब्धिरित्यत आह ॥

not [—as a Naiyáyika might perhaps here prefer understanding the term—] the consisting of Atoms,—for Nature is [not atomic, in the opinion of the Sánkhyas, but] all-pervasive.*

b. How then [it may be asked] is [the existence of] Nature determined? To this he replies:†—

कार्यदर्शनात्तदुपलब्धेः ॥ १११ ॥

| *Nature inferred from the existence of productions.*

Aph. 111.—[Nature exists] because her existence is gathered from the beholding of productions.,

a. As the knowledge of [there being such things as] atoms comes from the beholding of jars, &c., [—which are agglomerations—], so the knowledge of Nature comes from the beholding of products which have the three Qualities;‡ [—see §62. *a.*—and the existence of which implies a cause, to which the name of Nature is given, in which these constituents exist from eternity].

b. Some [—the Vedántins—]say that the world has *Brahma* as its cause; others [—the Naiyáyikas—] that it has atoms as its cause; but our seniors [—the transmitters of the Sánkhya

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* तस्याः प्रकृतेरनुपलब्धिरौच्यात्। दुरूहत्वं सौच्यं न त्वणुत्वं प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वादिति ॥

† कथं तर्हि प्रकृतिव्यवस्थेत्यत आह ॥

‡ यथा घटादिदर्शनात्परमाणुज्ञानं तथा त्रिगुणकार्यदर्शनात् प्रकृतिज्ञानमिति ॥

doctrine—] that it has *Nature* as its cause:—so he sets forth a doubt [which might naturally found itself] thereon.*

वादिविप्रतिपत्तेस्तदसिद्धिरिति चेत्॥ ११२॥

A doubt thrown on the existence of Nature by the contradiction of dissentients.

Aph. 112.—If [you throw out the doubt that] it [—viz. the existence of Nature—] is not established, because of the contradiction of asserters [of other views, then you will find an answer in the next aphorism].

a. 'Because of the contradiction of asserters [of the Vedánta or Nyáya], *it* is not established,'—i. e. Nature [—as asserted by the Sánkhyas—] is not established.†

b. But then [—to set forth the objection of these counter-asserters—], if a product existed antecedently to its production [as that product,] *then* an eternal Nature [such as you Sánkhyas contend for] would be proved to exist as the [necessary] substratum thereof,—since, you will declare that a cause is inferred only as the invariable accompanier of an effect; but it is denied by us asserters [of the Vedánta, &c.] that the effect *does* exist [antecedently to its production—well] *if* [this doubt be thrown out];—such is the meaning‡ [of the aphorism].

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* ब्रह्मकारणं जगदिति केचित् परमाणुकारणमित्यन्ये प्रधानकारणकमिति दृष्ट्वा इति तत्र संशयमाह॥

† वादिनां विप्रतिपत्तेस्तदसिद्धिः प्रधानासिद्धिः॥

‡ ननु कार्यं चेदुत्पत्तेः प्राक् सिद्धं स्यात् तदा तदाधारतया नित्या प्रकृतिः कार्यसाहित्येनैव कारणानुमानवक्ष्यमाणत्वात् वादिविप्रतिपत्तेस्तत्कार्यस्यैवासिद्धिरिति यदीत्यर्थः॥

c. He states his doctrine on this point.*

तथा त्वेकतरदृष्ट्या एकतरसिद्धेर्नापलापः ॥ ११३ ॥

Mutual denials settle nothing.

Aph. 113.—But since thus each [doctrine] is established in the opinion of each, a [mere unsupported] denial is not [decisive].

a. If one side were disproved merely by the dissent of the opponent, then [look you] there is dissent against the other side too,—so how should *it* be established? If the one side is established by there being inevitably attendant the recognition of the constant accompanier on the recognition of that which is constantly accompanied by it, it is the same with *my* side also;—therefore my inference from effect [to cause] is not to be denied† [in this peremptory fashion].

b. Well then [—the opponent may say—], let [the inference of] cause from effect be granted, how is it that this [cause] is *Nature*—and nothing else [—such as Atoms, for instance]? To this he replies.‡

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* सिद्धान्तमाह ॥

† यदि वादिविप्रतिपत्तिमात्रेण पक्षासिद्धत्वं विपक्षेऽपि विप्रतिपत्तिरस्तीति कथं तत्सिद्धिः। यदि व्याप्यज्ञानाद् व्यापकज्ञानस्याविनाभावित्वात्पक्षसिद्धिस्तर्हि ममाप्येवमिति न कार्यादनुमानापलापः ॥

‡ ननु कार्यात्कारणमस्तु तच्च प्रकृतिरेवेति कथमित्यत आह ॥

त्रिविधविरोधापत्तेः ॥ ११४ ॥

Nature the only hypothesis consistent with what appears.

Aph. 114.—Because [if we were to infer any other cause than Nature] we should have a contradiction to the threefold [aspect which things really exhibit].

a. Quality is threefold [see §62. *a.*]—viz. Goodness, Passion, and Darkness:—there would be a contradiction to *these*,—such is the meaning.*

b. The drift here is as follows:—If the character of cause [of all things around us] belonged to Atoms, or the like, then there would be a contradiction to the fact of being an aggregate of pleasure, pain, and delusion, which is recognisable in the world;† [—because nothing, we hold, can exist in the effect which did not exist in the cause,—and pleasure, pain, &c., are no properties of Atoms].

c. He now repels the doubt as to whether the production of an effect is that of what existed [antecedently] or of what did not exist.‡

नासदुत्पादो दृष्टाङ्गवत् ॥ ११५ ॥

What never was will never be.

Aph. 115.—The production of what is no entity, as a man's horn, does not take place.

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* त्रिविधो गुणस्सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि तद्विरोध इत्यर्थः ॥

† इदमत्राकूतं यदि परमाणुादीनां कारणत्वं तदा जगत्युपलभ्यमानस्य सुखदुःखमोहात्मकत्वस्य विरोधः स्यादिति ॥

‡ इदानीं कार्यस्य सत उत्पत्तिरसतो वेति संशयं निरस्यति ॥

a. Of that which, like the horn of a man, is not an entity, even the production is impossible;—such is the meaning. And so the import is, that that effect alone which [antecedently] exists is [at any time] produced.*

b. He states an argument, why an effect must be some [previously existent] entity.†

उपादाननियमात्॥ ११६॥

A product cannot be of nothing.

Aph. 116.—Because of the rule that there must be some material [of which the product may consist].

a. And only when both are extant is there from the presence of the cause the presence of the effect:—otherwise everywhere, and always, every effect might be produced,—[the presence of the cause being, on the supposition, superfluous]. This he states as follows.‡

सर्वत्र सर्वदा सर्वासम्भवात्॥ ११७॥

Else any thing might occur at any time anywhere.

Aph. 117.—Because every thing is not possible every where, always.

a. That is to say,—because in the world we see that every thing is *not* possible, i. e. that every thing is *not* produced,

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* नरशृङ्गतुल्यस्यासत उत्पादोऽपि न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः तथाच सदेव कार्यमुत्पद्यत इत्याशयः॥

† सत्कार्ये न्यायमाह॥

‡ कारणसम्बन्धात्कार्यसम्बन्धश्च विद्यमानयोरेव। अन्यथा सर्वत्र सर्वदा सर्वोत्पत्तिरस्यात्। एतदेवाह।

'every where,' i. e. in every place,—'always,' i. e. at all times.*

b. And for the following reason also, he declares, there is no production of what existed not† [antecedently].

शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् ॥ ११८ ॥

Effects pre-exist potentially in their causes.

Aph. 118.—Because that which is possible is made out of that which is competent [to the making of it.]

a. Because the being the material [of any future product] is nothing else than the fact of [being it *potentially*, i. e. of] having the power to be the product; and this power is nothing else than the product's condition as that of what has not yet come to pass;—therefore, since that which has the power, viz., the cause, makes the product which is capable [of being made out of it], it is not of any nonentity that the production takes place:—such is the meaning.‡

b. He states another argument.§

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* सर्वत्र सर्वस्मिन् देशे सर्वदा सर्वस्मिन् काले सर्वासम्भवात्सर्वानुत्पत्तेर्लोकदर्शनादित्याशयः ॥

† इतश्च नासदुत्पाद इत्याह ॥

‡ कार्यशक्तिमत्त्वमेव ह्युपादानत्वं शक्तिश्च कार्यस्यानागतावस्थैवेति शक्तस्य कारणस्य शक्यकार्यकरणादपि नासत उत्पाद इत्यर्थः ॥

§ अपरं न्यायमाह ॥

कारणभावाच्च ॥ ११९ ॥

The product is nothing else than the cause.

Aph. 119—And because it [—the product—] is [nothing else than] the cause [in the shape of the product].

a. It is declared in scripture, that, previously to production, moreover, there is no difference between the cause and its effect; —and since it is thereby settled that a product is an entity, production is not of what [previously] existed not:—such is the meaning.*

b. He ponders a doubt.†

न भावे भावयोगश्चेत् ॥ १२० ॥

A doubt whether that which is can be said to become.

Aph. 120.—If [it be alleged that] there is no possibility of that *becoming*, which already *is*—[then the answer will be found in the next aphorism].

a. That is to say,—but then, if it be thus [—that every effect exists antecedently to its production—], since the effect [—*every* effect—] must be eternal [without beginning], there is no possibility of [or room for] the adjunction of *becoming*,—the adjunction of *arising*,—in the case of a product which is [already, by hypothesis,] in the shape of an entity,—because the employment of the term '*arising*' [or the fact of being produced] has refer-

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* उत्पत्तेः प्रागपि कार्यस्य कारणाभेदः श्रूयते तस्माच्च सत्कार्यसिद्धा नासदुत्पाद इत्यर्थः ॥

† शङ्कते ॥

ence solely to what did *not* exist [previously]:—if this be urged:—such is the meaning.*

b. He declares the doctrine in regard to this point.†

नाभिव्यक्तिनिबन्धनौ व्यवहाराव्यवहारौ॥ १२१ ॥

Production is only manifestation, and so of the opposite.

Aph. 121.—Nay,—the employment and the non-employment [of the term 'production'] are occasioned by the manifestation [or non-manifestation of what is spoken of as produced or not].

a. 'Nay'—i. e. the view stated [in §120] is not the right one.‡

b. As the whiteness of white cloth which had become dirty is brought manifestly out by means of washing, &c., so, by the operation of the potter is the pot brought into manifestness;—whereas, on the blow of a mallet, it becomes hidden,§—[and no longer appears as a *pot*].

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* नन्वेवं सति कार्यस्य नित्यत्वे सति भावरूपे कार्ये भावयोग उत्पत्तियोगो न सम्भवति असत एवोत्पत्तिव्यवहारात् इतिचेदित्यर्थः॥

† सिद्धान्तमाह॥

‡ न नोक्तपक्षो युक्त इत्यर्थः॥

§ यथा शुक्लपटस्य मलिनस्य क्षालनादिना शुक्लत्वमभिव्यज्यते तथा कुलालस्य व्यापाराद् घटोऽभिव्यज्यते मुद्गराभिघातात्तिरोभूयते॥

c. And manifestation [is no fiction of ours, for it] is seen ;—or example, that of oil, from sesamum-seeds, by pressure; of milk, from the cow, by milking; of the statue, that resided in the midst of the stone, by the operation of the sculptor; of rice from the rice in the husk, by threshing; &c.*

d. Therefore the employment or non-employment of the [term] the *production* of an effect are dependent on *manifestation* —dependent on the manifestation of the *effect* :—that is to say, —the employment of [the term] production is in consequence of the manifestation [of what is spoken of as produced], and the non-employment of [the term] production is in consequence of there being no manifestation [of that which is therefore not spoken of as produced],— but [the employment of the term production is] not in consequence of that becoming an entity which was not an entity.†

e. But if [the employment of the term] *production* is occasioned by [the fact of] *manifestation,* by what is occasioned [the employment of the term] *destruction*? To this he replies.‡

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* दृष्टाचाभिव्यक्तिः पीडनेन तिलेषु तैलस्य दोहनेन गवि पयसः शिलामध्यस्थप्रतिमायाः लैङ्गिकव्यापारेण अवघातेन धान्ये तण्डुलस्येत्यादि ॥

† तस्मात्कार्योत्पत्तेर्व्यवहाराव्यवहारौ। अभिव्यक्तिनिबन्धनौ कार्याभिव्यक्तिनिमित्तकौ। अभिव्यक्तितः उत्पत्तिव्यवहारो ऽभिव्यक्त्यभावाच्चोत्पत्तिव्यवहाराभावो नत्वसतस्तत्त्वेत्यर्थः ॥

‡ अभिव्यक्तिनिबन्धनात्तूत्पत्तिः किंनिबन्धनो विनाश इत्यत आह ॥

नाशः कारणलयः॥ १२२॥

What is meant by destruction.

Aph. 122.—Destruction [of any thing] is the resolution [of the thing spoken of as destroyed,] into the cause [from which it was produced].

a. The resolution, by the blow of a mallet, of a jar into its cause [—i. e. into the particles of clay which constituted the jar],—to *this* are due both [the employment of] the term 'destruction', and the kind of action [or behaviour] belonging to any thing* [which is termed its destruction].

b. [But some one may say]—if there were [only] a resolution [of a product into that from which it arose], a resurrection [or *παλιγγενεσις*] of it would be seen, and this is *not* seen:—well [—we reply—] it is not seen by blockheads, but it *is* seen by those who can discriminate. For example, when thread is destroyed, it is changed into the shape of earth [—as when burned to ashes]:—and the earth is changed into the shape of a cotton-tree; and this [successively] changes into the shape of flower, fruit, and thread [spun again from the fruit of the cotton-plant]. So is it with all entities.†

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* मुद्गराभिघाताद् घटस्य कारणे यो लयः तन्निबन्धनो नाश इति शब्दार्थक्रियाभेदौ॥

† यदि लयः पुनरुद्भवो दृश्येत नच दृश्यत इति मूढैर्न दृश्यते विवेचकैर्दृश्यत एव। तथाहि। तन्तौ नष्टे मृद्रूपेण परिणामः। मृदश्च कार्पासवृक्षरूपेण परिणामः। तस्य पुष्पफलतन्तुरूपेण परिणामः। एवं सर्वे भावा इति॥

c. Pray—[some one may ask]—is this *manifestation* [that you speak of under §121] something real, or something not real? If it be something real [and which, therefore, never ceases to be] then the effect [during this constant manifestation] ought constantly to be *perceived*; and if it be *not* real, then there is an end of your 'existent product' [§115 *b.*], because, also of this [manifestation—as being not from eternity—] there must be [in order to give rise to it] another manifestation, and of this another, and so on without end, [—seeing that a *manifestation* can be the result of nothing else than a manifestation,—on the principle that an effect consists of neither more nor less than its cause]. To this he replies.*

पारम्पर्यतोऽन्वेषणाद्बीजाङ्कुरवत्॥ १२३॥

How manifestation may occur without being an entity.

Aph. 123.—Because they seek each other reciprocally, as is the case with seed and plant, [—manifestation may generate manifestation from eternity to eternity].

a. Be it so, that there are thousands of manifestations, still there is no fault, for there *is* no starting point,—as is the case with seed and plant,† [—which we may suppose to have served from eternity as sources one to another reciprocally].

b. He states another argument.‡

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* किमभिव्यक्तिः सती असती वा। सती चेत् नित्यकार्योपलब्धिः स्यात्। असती चेत् सत्कार्यहानिः तस्या अपि अभिव्यक्तिरन्या तस्या अप्यन्येत्यनवस्थेत्यत आह॥

† भवत्वभिव्यक्तिसहस्रं तथापि न दोषोऽनादित्वात् बीजाङ्कुरवदिति॥

‡ युक्त्यन्तरमाह॥

उत्पत्तिवद्वा ऽदोषः ॥ १२४ ॥

The objections to the theory of manifestation retorted.

Aph. 124.—Or, [at all events, our theory of 'manifestation' is as] blameless as [that of] 'production'.

a. Pray [let us ask],—is *production* produced, or is it not? If it is produced, then of this [production of production] there must be production;—so that there is a *regressus in infinitum*, [such as you allege against our theory under §122. *c*]. If it be *not* produced, then, pray, is this because it is *un-real*, or because it is eternal? If because it is un-real, then production never is at all, so that it should never be perceived, [as you allege that it is]. Again, if [production is not something produced] because it is *eternal*, then there should be at all times the production of [all possible] effects,—[which you will scarcely pretend is the case]. Again, if you say,—since 'production' itself *consists* of production, what need of supposing an ulterior production [of production]?—then, in like manner, [*I* ask,]—since 'manifestation' itself *consists* of manifestation, what need of supposing an ulterior manifestation [of manifestation]? The view which you hold on this point is *ours* also,*—[and thus every objection stated or hinted under §122. *c*. is capable of being retorted].

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* किमुत्पत्तिरुत्पद्यते न वा। उत्पद्यते चेत् अस्या उत्पत्तिरित्यनवस्था। नोत्पद्यते चेत् किमसत्त्वान्नित्यत्वाद्वा। यद्यसत्त्वात्कदाचिदप्युत्पत्तिर्नास्तीति सर्वदानुपलम्भः स्यात्। अथ नित्यत्वात् सर्वदा कार्योत्पत्तिः स्यात्। अथोत्पत्तेः स्वयमेवोत्पत्तिरूपत्वात्किमुत्पत्त्यन्तरकल्पनयेति तर्ह्यभिव्यक्तेरप्यभिव्यक्तिरूपत्वात्किमभिव्यक्त्यन्तरकल्पनयेति तुल्यं। तत्र यत्तव सिद्धान्तः सोऽस्माकमपि॥

b. He now states the community of properties [that exists] among the products of Nature mutually.*

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ॥ १२५ ॥

The characters common to all products.

Aph. 125.—[A product of nature is] caused, un-eternal, mutable, not all-pervading, multitudinous, dependent, mergent.

a. 'Caused'—i. e. having a cause. 'Un-eternal,'—i. e. destructible. 'Not all-pervading,' i. e. not present everywhere. 'Mutable'—i. e. distinguished by the act of leaving [one form] and assuming [another form]. It [the soul] leaves the body it had assumed, [and probably takes another]; and bodies, &c., move [and are mutable, as is notorious]. 'Multitudinous'—i. e.—, in consequence of the distinction of souls, [everything is proportionately multitudinous,—each man—e. g.—seeing a separate rainbow, though it be called but one]. 'Dependent'—i. e. [dependent] on its cause. Mergent,—that is to say, it [i. e. each product, in due time,] is resolved into that from which it originated].†

b. [But some one may say],—if realities be the twenty-five [which the Sánkhyas enumerate—see §62—and no more], pray, are such common operations as knowing, enjoying, &c., absolutely *nothing ?*—[if you say that they are so] then you give up

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* प्रकृतिकार्याणामन्योन्यं साधर्म्यमाह ॥

† हेतुमत् कारणवत्। अनित्यं विनाशि। अव्याप्यसर्वगम्। सक्रियं त्यागोपादानादिक्रियाविशिष्टम्। उपात्तदेहं त्यजति शरीरादयश्च स्यन्दन्ते। अनेकं पुरुषभेदात। आश्रितं स्वकारणे। लिङ्गं स्वकारणे लयं गच्छतीति ॥

what you *see*—[in order to save a hypothesis, with which that which you see is irreconcilable]. To this he replies.*

आञ्जस्यादभेदतो वा गुणसामान्यादेस्तत्सिद्धिः प्रधान-व्यपदेशाद्वा॥ १२६ ॥

The qualities of the Nyáya are implied in the term Nature.

Aph. 126—There is the establishment of these, [which you fancy that we do not recognise because we do not explicitly enumerate them,] either by reason that these ordinary qualities [—as contradistinguished from the *three* Qualities of the Sánkhya—] are truly nothing different; or [—to put it in another point of view—] because they are hinted by [the term] Nature [—in which, like our own three Qualities, they are implied].

a. Either from their being nothing different from the twenty-four principles—'truly'—really—quite evidently,—since the character of these [twenty-four] fits the ordinary qualities, &c., [which you fancy are neglected in our enumeration of things,]—'there is the establishment of these'—i. e. there is their establishment [as realities] through their being implied just in those† [twenty-four principles which are explicitly specified in the Sánkhya].

b. The word 'or' shows that there is another alternative [reply, in the aphorism, to the objection in question]. 'Or because

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* यदि पञ्चविंशति तत्त्वं किं ज्ञानसुखादीनां सामान्यकारणानामभाव एव तदाच दृष्टपरित्याग इत्यत आह ॥

† आञ्जस्यात् स्वरूपतः प्रत्यक्षत एव वा चतुर्विंशति-तत्त्वादभेदतस्तल्लक्षणयोगाद्गुणसामान्यादीनां तत्सिद्धिस्तेष्वे-वान्तर्भावात् सिद्धिः ॥

they are hinted by [the term] Nature :'— that is to say,—the qualities, &c., [such as Knowledge,] are established [as realities], just because they are hinted by [the term] Nature, by reason that these qualities are, mediately, products of Nature,—for there is no difference between product and cause;—but the omission to mention them [explicitly] is not by reason of their not being at all.*

c. He next mentions the points in which Nature and her products agree.†

त्रिगुणाचेतनत्वादि द्वयोः ॥ १२७ ॥

The characters common to Nature and her products.

Aph. 127.—Of both [Nature and her products] the fact that they consist of the three Qualities [§62. *a.*] and that they are irrational —[is the common property].

a. Consisting of the three qualities, and being irrational,—[such in the meaning of the compound term with which the aphorism commences]. By the expression "&c." is meant their being intended for *another*, [—see §67—]. 'Of both'—i. e. of the cause [viz. Nature], and of the effects [—viz. all natural products—], such is the meaning‡.

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* वाशब्दः पक्षान्तरं सूचयति । प्रधानव्यपदेशाद्वा । गुणानां पारम्पर्येण प्रधानकार्यत्वेन कार्यकारणयोरभेदात्प्रधानव्यपदेशादेव गुणादिसिद्धिर्नत्वभावादननुकीर्त्तनमिति ॥

† प्रकृतिकार्ययोस्साधर्म्यमाह ॥

‡ त्रिगुणत्वमचेतनत्वं । आदिशब्दात् परार्थत्वं । द्वयोरिति कार्यकारणयोरित्यर्थः ॥

b. He next states the mutual differences of character among the three Qualities which [see §62] are the [constituent] parts of Nature.*

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादाद्यैर्गुणानामन्योन्यवैधर्म्यम्॥ १२८ ॥

In what the three Qualities differ.

Aph. 128.—The Qualities [§62] differ in character, mutually, by pleasantness, unpleasantness, lassitude, &c., [in which forms severally the Qualities present themselves].

a. 'Pleasantness,'—i. e. Pleasure. By the '&c,' is meant Goodness (*sattwa*), which is light [i. e., not heavy,] and illuminating. 'Unpleasantness,'—i. e. Pain. By the '&c.' [in reference to this,] is meant Passion *(rajas)*, which is urgent and restless. 'Lassitude,'—i. e. stupefaction. By the '&c.' is meant Darkness *(tamas)*, which is heavy and enveloping. It is by these habits that the Qualities, viz:—Goodness, Passion, and Darkness differ;—such is the remainder† [required to complete the aphorism].

b. At the time of telling their differences, he tells in what respects they agree.‡

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* प्रकृतिविभागस्य त्रिगुणस्यान्योन्यवैधर्म्यमाह॥

† प्रीतिः सुखम्। आदिशब्दाल्लघु प्रकाशकं सत्त्वम्। अप्रीतिर्दुःखम्। आदिशब्दादुपष्टम्भकं चलञ्च रजः। विषादो मोहः। आदिशब्दाद्गुरुवरणकं तमः। एतैर्धर्मैर्गुणानां सत्त्वरजस्तमसां वैधर्म्यम्भवतीति शेषः॥

‡ तेषां वैधर्म्यकथनावसरे साधर्म्यमाह॥

लघ्वादिधर्मैरन्योन्यं साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्यं गुणानाम् ॥ १२९ ॥

In what respects the Qualities agree as well as differ.

Aph. 129.—Through Lightness and other habits the Qualities, mutually, agree and differ.

a. The meaning is as follows. The enunciation [—in the shape of the term *laghu* 'light'—is not one intended to call attention to the concrete—viz. what things are light,—but] is one where the abstract [—the nature of light things—viz. 'lightness'—*laghutwa*] is the prominent thing. 'Through Lightness and other habits,'—i. e. through the characters of Lightness, Restlessness, and Heaviness,—the Qualities differ. Their *agreement* is through what is hinted by the expression 'and other.' And this consists in their mutually predominating [one over the other from time to time], producing each other, consorting togegether, and being reciprocally present [—the one in the other—], for the sake of the soul.*

b. By the expression [—in § 125—] 'caused,' &c., it was declared that the 'Great one' [or Mind], &c., are *products*. He states the proof of this.†

उभयान्यत्वात्कार्यत्वं महदादेर्घटादिवत् ॥ १३० ॥

Proof that Mind, &c., are products.

Aph. 130.—Since they are other than both [Soul and Nature—the only two un-

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* अयमर्थः । भावप्रधानो निर्देशः । लघ्वादिधर्मैर्लघुचलनगुरुत्वैर्गुणानां वैधर्म्यम् । आदिपदसूचितेन साधर्म्यम् । तच्च पुरुषार्थमन्योन्याभिभवजननमिथुनवृत्तित्वम् ॥

† हेतुमदित्यादिना महदादीनां कार्यत्वमुक्तम् । तत्र प्रमाणमाह ॥

caused entities—], Mind, and the rest, are products, as is the case with a jar or the like.

a. That is to say,—like a jar or the like, Mind and the rest are products, because they are something other than the two which [alone] are eternal, viz., Nature and Soul.*

b. He states another reason.†

परिमाणात् ॥ १३१ ॥

A second proof.

Aph. 131.—Because of their measure, [which is a limited one].

a. That is to say, [Mind and the rest are products] because they are limited in measure,‡ [while the only two that are uncaused, viz. Nature and soul, are unlimited].

b. He states another argument.§

समन्वयात् ॥ १३२ ॥

A third proof.

Aph. 132.—Because they conform [to Nature].

a. [Mind and the rest are products] because they well [follow and] correspond with Nature, i. e., because the Qualities of Nature [§62] are seen in all things:‖ [and it is a maxim that there is nothing in the effect that was not in the cause].

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* नित्याभ्यां प्रकृतिपुरुषाभ्यमन्यत्वात् घटादेरिव महदादेः कार्यत्वमित्यर्थः ॥

† हेत्वन्तरमाह ॥

‡ परिमितत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

§ अपरां युक्तिमाह ॥

‖ प्रधानेन सह सम्यगन्वयात् प्रधानगुणानां सर्वपदार्थेषु दर्शनात् ॥

b. He states the same thing* [in the next aphorism].

शक्तितश्चेति ॥ १३३ ॥

A fourth proof.

Aph. 133.—And, finally, because it is through the power [of the cause alone, that the product can do aught].

a. It is by the power of its cause that a product energizes [—as a chain restrains an elephant only by the force of the iron—], so that Mind and the rest, being [except through the strength of Nature] powerless, produce *their* products in subservience to Nature;—otherwise, since it is their habit to energize, they would at all times produce their products†—[which it will not be alleged that they do].

b. And the word *iti*, in this place, is intended to notify the completion of the set of [positive] reasons‡ [why Mind and the others should be regarded as *products*].

c. He next states [—in support of the same assertion—] the argument from negatives,§ [i. e. the argument drawn from the consideration as to what becomes of Mind and the others when they are *not* products].

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* एतदेवाह ॥

† कारणशक्त्या कार्यं प्रवर्त्तत इति महदादयः क्षीणाः सन्तः प्रकृत्यनुसारेण कार्यं जनयन्ति। अन्यथा प्रवृत्तिशीलत्वात्सर्वदा कार्यं जनयेयुः ॥

‡ इतिशब्दश्चात्र हेतुवर्गसमाप्तिसूचनार्थः ॥

§ व्यतिरेकमाह ॥

तद्वाने प्रकृतिः पुरुषो वा ॥ १३४ ॥

Proof of the same from negatives.

Aph. 134.—On the quitting thereof [—quitting the condition of product—], there is Nature or Soul, [into one or other of which the product must needs have resolved itself].

a. Product or not-product,—such is the pair of alternatives. 'On the quitting thereof,'—i. e. when Mind and the rest quit the condition of product,—Mind and the rest [of necessity] enter into Nature or Soul,*[—these two alone being not-products].

b. [But perhaps some one may say that] Mind and the rest may exist quite independently of the pair of alternatives [just mentioned]. In regard to this he declares as follows.†

तयोरन्यत्वे तुच्छत्वम् ॥ १३५ ॥

Mind and the rest would not be at all, if neither product nor not-product.

Aph. 135.—If they were other than these two they would be void.

a. If Mind and the rest were other 'than these two,' i. e. than product or not-product [—§134—], they would be in the shape of what is 'void,'—i. e. in the shape of nonentity.‡

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* कार्यमकार्यञ्चेति कोटिद्वयं। तद्वाने महदादेः कार्यताहाने प्रकृतौ पुरुषे वा महदादीनां प्रवेश इति ॥

† उभयकोटिविनिर्मुक्ता एव महदादयो भविष्यन्तीत्याह।

‡ तयोः कार्याकार्ययोरन्यत्वे महदादीनां तुच्छरूपत्वमभावरूपत्वम् ॥

b. Well now, [some one may say,] why should it be under the character of a *product* that Mind and the rest are a sign of [there being such a principle as] Nature ? They may be [more properly said to be] a sign merely in virtue of their not *occurring apart* from it. To this he replies.*

कार्यात्कारणानुमानं तत्साहित्यात् ॥ १३६ ॥

What kind of causes can be inferred from their effects.†

Aph. 136.—The cause is inferred from the effect [—in the case of Nature and her products—], because it accompanies it.

a. This may indeed be the case where the nature [or essence] of the cause is not seen in the effect, as [is the case with] the inference—from the rising of the moon—that the sea is swoln [into full tide,—rising, with maternal affection, towards her son who was produced from her bosom on the occasion of the celebrated Churning of the Ocean. Though the swelling of the tide does not occur 'apart from' the rising of the moon, yet here the cause —moon-rise—is not seen in the effect—tide; and consequently, though we infer the effect from the cause, the cause could not have been inferred from the effect]. But in the present case, since we see in Mind and the rest, the characters of Nature, the cause *is* inferred from the effect. 'Because it accompanies it'—i. e. because, in Mind and the rest, we see the properties of Nature†—[i. e. Nature herself actually present, as we see the clay which is the cause of a jar actually present in the jar].

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* अथ किमर्थं महदादयः कार्यत्वेन प्रकृतेर्लिङ्गं । अविनाभावादेव लिङ्गमविष्यन्तीत्यत्राह ॥

† भवत्वेवं यत्र कारणरूपं कार्ये न दृश्यते यथा चन्द्रोदयात्समुद्रवृद्ध्यनुमानम् । अत्र तु प्रधानरूपस्य महदादौ

b. [But it may still be objected,—] if it be thus, then let that principle itself—the 'Great one' [or Mind]—be the cause of the world:—what need of *Nature?* To this he replies.*

अव्यक्तं त्रिगुणाल्लिङ्गात्॥ १३७॥

How Mind must have an antecedent.

Aph. 137.—The undiscrete, [Nature, must be inferred] from its effect, in which are the three Qualities, [which constitute Nature].

a. 'It goes to dissolution'—such is the import of the term *linga*, here rendered 'effect.' From that [effect],—viz. the 'Great' principle [or Mind]—in which are the three Qualities, Nature must be inferred. And that the 'Great' principle, in the shape of ascertainment [or distinct intellection], is limited [or discrete], and perishable, is established by direct observation. Therefore [—i. e. since Mind, being perishable, must be resolvable into something else,] we infer that into which it is resolvable,† [—in other words its 'cause,'—here analogously termed *lingin*, since 'effect' had been termed *linga*].

b. But then, [some one may say,] still something quite differ-

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दर्शनात् कार्यात्कारणानुमानमेव तत्साहित्यात् प्रकृतिरूपस्य महदादौ दर्शनात्॥

* एवं चेत् महत्तत्त्वमेव जगत्कारणमस्तु किं प्रधानेनेत्यत आह॥

† स्वयं गच्छतीति लिङ्गं कार्यम्। तस्मात् त्रिगुणात् महत्तत्त्वात् प्रधानमनुमातव्यम्। महत्तत्त्वञ्चाध्यवसायरूपं व्यक्तं विनापि प्रत्यक्षसिद्धम्। तेन लिंग्यनुमानम्॥

ent may be the cause [of all things];—what need of this *Nature* of yours? In regard to this he remarks as follows.*

तत्कार्यतस्तत्सिद्धेर्नापलापः ॥ १३८ ॥

Why Nature, and nothing else, must be the root of all.

Aph. 138.—There is no denying that it [—Nature—] *is*, because of its effects, [—which will be in vain attributed to any other source].

a. Is the cause of this [world] a product or not a product? If it were a product, then, the same being [with equal propriety to be assumed to be] the case with *its* cause, there would be a *regressus in infinitum*. If effects be from any *root* [—to which there is nothing antecedent—], then *this* is that [to which we give the name of *Nature*]. 'Because of its effects,'—that is to say, because of the effects of Nature. There is no denying 'that it *is*,'—i. e. that *Nature* is.†

b. Be it so—[let us grant—] that Nature *is*; yet [—the opponent may contend—] *Soul* positively cannot be,—for [if the existence of causes is to be inferred from their products, Soul cannot be thus demonstrated to exist, seeing that] it has *no* products. In regard to this he remarks as follows.‡

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* ननु तथाप्यन्यदेव कारणमभविष्यति किं प्रकृत्येत्यत्राह ॥

† तत्कारणं कार्यमकार्यं वा । कार्यत्वे तत्कारणस्यापि तथात्वे सत्यनवस्था । मूलकार्यत्वे तदेव सेति । तत्कार्यत इति प्रकृतिकार्यत इत्यर्थः । तत्सिद्धेः प्रकृतिसिद्धेर्नापलापः ॥

‡ भवतु प्रकृतिसिद्धिः पुरुषस्य सिद्धिस्तु न स्यादेव । न हि तस्य कार्यमस्तीत्यत्राह ॥

सामान्येन विवादाभावात् धर्मवन्न साधनम् ॥१ ३९॥

It is not from any effect that soul is inferred.

Aph. 139.—[The relation of cause and effect is] not [alleged as] the means of establishing [the existence of Soul], because, as is the case with [the disputed term] 'merit,' there is no dispute about there being such a kind of thing, [though *what* kind of thing *is* matter of dispute].

a. There is no dispute about 'there being such a thing'—i. e. as to there being Soul simply [—since everybody, who does not talk stark nonsense, must admit a Soul, or *self*, of *some* kind—]; for the dispute is [not as to its *being*, but] as to its peculiarity [of being],—as [whether it be] multitudinous or sole, all-pervading or *not* all-pervading, and so forth. Just as in every [philosophical system or] theory there is no dispute as to [there being something to which may be applied the term] 'merit' *(dharma)*; for the difference of opinion has regard to the particular kind of [thing,—such as sacrifices according to the Mímánsa creed, or good works according to the Nyáya,—which shall be held to involve] 'merit.'*

b. 'Not the means of establishing' that [—viz. the existence of soul]:—i. e. the relation of cause and effect is not the means of establishing it. This implies—"I will mention *another* means of establishing it."†

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* सामान्येन तावदात्मनि विवादो नास्ति विशेषे हि विवादो अनेक एको व्यापको ऽव्यापक इत्यादि। यथा सर्वेषिन् दर्शने धर्म इत्यविवादः धर्मविशेषे हि विप्रतिपत्तिः॥

† न तत्साधनं। न तत्र कार्यकारणभावः साधनम्। अन्यत्साधनं वक्ष्यामीत्यभिसन्धिः॥

b. [But some one may say—] Souls are nothing else than the body and its organs, &c.;—what need of imagining anything else? To this he replies.*

शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तः पुमान् ॥ १४० ॥

Materialism scouted.

Aph. 140.—Soul is something else than the body, &c.

a. [The meaning of the aphorism is] plain.†

b. He propounds an argument in support of this.‡

संहतपरार्थत्वात् ॥ १४१ ॥

The discerptible is subservient to the indiscerptible.

Aph. 141.—Because that which is combined [and is therefore discerptible,] is for the sake of some other [*not* discerptible].

a. That which is discerptible is intended for something else that is indiscerptible. If it were intended for something else that is discerptible, there would be a *regressus in infinitum.*§

b. And combinedness [—involving—see §67—discerptibleness—] consists in the Qualities' making some product by their state of mutual commixture;—or [to express it otherwise—] combinedness is the state of the soft and hard—[which distinguishes matter from spirit]. And this exists occultly in Na-

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* देहेन्द्रियादय एवात्मानः किमन्यकल्पनयेत्यत आह ॥

† व्यक्तम् ॥

‡ अत्र न्यायमाह ॥

§ यत्संहतं तदसंहतपरार्थं संहतपरार्थत्वे ऽनवस्था स्यात् ॥

ture and the rest, because, otherwise, discerptibleness would not prove discoverable in the products thereof.*

c. He elucidates this same point.†

त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात् ॥ १४२ ॥

Soul presents no symptom of being material.

Aph. 142.—[Soul is something else than the body, &c.], because there is [in Soul] the reverse of the three Qualities, &c.

a. Because, in Soul, there is 'the reverse' of the three Qualities, &c.,—i. e. because they are not seen in it. By the '&c.' is meant—because the *other* characters of Nature also are not seen [in Soul]‡.

b. He states another argument§.

अधिष्ठानाच्चेति ॥ १४३ ॥

Another proof that soul is not material.

Aph. 143.—And [Soul is not material] because of its superintendence [over Nature].

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* संहतत्वञ्च गुणानामन्योन्यमिथुनभावेन कार्यकरणं अथवा द्रवकठिनता संहतत्वं। तच्च प्रकृत्यादौ तिरोभूतमस्ति अन्यथा तत्कार्येषु संहतताऽदर्शनप्रसङ्गात्॥

† तदेव स्पष्टयति॥

‡ पुरुषे त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात् तददर्शनात्। आदिशब्दादन्येषां प्रकृतिधर्माणामप्यदर्शनादिति॥

§ न्यायान्तरमाह॥

a. For a superintendent is an intelligent being, and Nature is unintelligent,—such is the meaning*.

b. He states another argument†.

भोक्तृभावात् ॥ १४४ ॥

Another proof.

Aph. 144.—And [Soul is not material] because of its being the experiencer.

a. Nature it is that is experienced;—the experiencer is Soul. Although Soul, from its being unchangeably the same, is not [really] an experiencer, still the assertion [in the aphorism] is made because of the fact that the reflection of the Intellect befals it‡ [—and thus makes it *seem* as if it experienced:—see §59. *a*].

b. Efforts are engaged in for the sake of Liberation. Pray, is this [for the benefit] of the soul or of Nature—[since Nature, in the shape of Mind, is, it seems, the experiencer]? To this he replies.§

कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेः ॥ १४५ ॥

For Soul, not Nature, is liberation wanted.

Aph. 145.—[It is for Soul and not for Nature,] because the exertions are with a

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* चेतनो ह्यधिष्ठाता भवति प्रकृतिश्च जडेत्यर्थः ॥

† युक्त्यन्तरमाह ॥

‡ भोग्या प्रकृतिः। भोक्ता पुरुषः। यद्यपि कूटस्थत्वादात्मनो भोक्तृत्वं नास्ति तथापि बुद्धिच्छायापत्त्येत्यर्थः ॥

§ मोक्षार्थं प्रवृत्तिः। सा किमात्मनः प्रकृतेर्वा इत्यत आह ॥

view to isolation [from all qualities,—a condition to which Soul is competent, but Nature not].

a. The very essence of Nature cannot depart from it [so as to leave it in the state of absolute solitary isolation contemplated], for the three Qualities are its very essence, [the departure of which from it would leave nothing behind]; and because it would thus prove to be *not* eternal [—while in reality it *is* eternal]. The isolation *(kaivalya)* of that alone is possible of which the qualities are reflectional [and not constitutive—see §59 *a.*—] and that is Soul.*

b. Of what nature is this [Soul]? To this he replies.†

जडप्रकाशायोगात्प्रकाशः ॥ १४९ ॥

The nature of the Soul.

Aph. 146.—Since light does not pertain to the unintelligent, light, [which must pertain to something or other, is the essence of the Soul, which, self-manifesting, manifests whatever else is manifest].

a. It is a settled point that the unintelligent does not shine—[it is not self-manifesting]. If Soul also were unintelligent [—as the Naiyáyikas hold it to be in *substance*—knowledge being by them regarded not as its essence or substratum but as one of its *qualities*—], then there would need to be another light for *it*;—and, as the simpler theory, let Soul itself consist essentially of light‡.

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* त्रिगुणस्वभावत्वात् प्रकृतेर्न स्वभावप्रच्यवः अनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च । यस्यौपाधिकगुणास्तस्य कैवल्यं सम्भवति सचात्मेति ॥

† स किंरूप इत्यत आह ॥

‡ जडो न प्रकाश इति सिद्धम् । यद्यात्मापि जडः स्यात्

b. And there is scripture [in support of this view:—for example the two following texts from the *Vrihadáranyaka Upanishad*]:—'Wherewith shall one distinguish that wherewith one distinguishes all this [world]?' 'Wherewith shall one take cognizance of the cognizer?'*

c. [But the Naiyáyika may urge—] *let* Soul be unintelligent [in its substance], but having Intelligence as its attribute. *Thereby* it manifests all things, but it is not essentially Intelligence. To this he replies.†

निगुणत्वान्न चिद्धर्मा ॥ १४७ ॥

Soul has no quality.

Aph. 147.—It [Soul] has not Intelligence as its attribute, because it is without quality.

a. If soul were associated with attributes, it would be [as we hold everything to be that is associated with attributes] liable to alteration, and therefore there would be no Liberation,‡—[its attributes, or susceptibilities, always keeping it liable to be affected by something or other;—or, the absolutely simple being the only unalterable].

तस्याप्यन्येन प्रकाशेन भवितव्यं लाघवाच्चात्मैव प्रकाशरूपोऽस्तु ॥

* श्रुतिश्च । येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयात् । विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयादिति ॥

† जडोऽप्यात्मास्तु चिद्धर्मा तेन जगत्प्रकाशयति न तु चिद्रूप इत्यत आह ॥

‡ यद्यात्मनो धर्मयोगः स्यात् परिणामित्वं स्यात् ततश्चानित्यत्वाच्च इति ॥

b. He declares that there is a contradicton to Scripture* [in the view which he is contending against].

श्रुत्या सिद्धस्य नापलापस्तत्प्रत्यक्षबाधात् ॥ १४८ ॥

Scripture higher evidence than supposed intuition.

Aph. 148.—There is no denial [to be allowed] of what is established by Scripture, because the [supposed] evidence of intuition for this [i. e. for the existence of qualities in the Soul] is confuted [by the scriptural declaration of the contrary].

a. The text—'For this Soul is un-companioned,' &c., would be confuted if there were any annexation of qualities† [to Soul:—and the notion of confuting Scripture is not to be entertained for a moment].

b. But the literal meaning [of the aphorism] is this, that, the fact, established by scripture, of its [i. e. soul's] being devoid of qualities, cannot be denied,—because the scripture itself confutes the [supposed] intuitive perception thereof,—i. e. the [supposed] intuitive perception of qualities, &c.,‡ [in the soul].

सुषुप्त्याद्यसाक्षित्वम् ॥ १४९ ॥

Argument against the soul's being unintelligent.

Aph. 149.—[If soul were unintelligent] it would not be witness [of its own comfort] in profound [and dreamless] sleep, &c.

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* श्रुतिविरोधमाह ॥

† असङ्गो ह्ययम्पुरुष इत्यादिश्रुतिर्गुणयोगे बाधिता स्यात् ॥

‡ अक्षरार्थस्तु श्रुत्या सिद्धस्य निर्गुणत्वादेर्नापलापः सम्भवति तत्प्रत्यक्षस्य गुणादिप्रत्यक्षस्य श्रुत्यैव बाधादिति ॥

a. If soul were unintelligent, then in deep sleep, &c., it would not be a witness—a knower. But that this is not the case [may be inferred] from the phenomenon that 'I slept *pleasantly*, &c.' By the '&c' [in the aphorism] dreaming is included.*

b. The Vedántins say that 'soul is *one* only'; and so, again, 'For Soul is eternal, omnipresent, changeless, void of blemish:'—'Being one [only], it is divided [into a seeming multitude] by Nature *(śakti)*—i. e.—Illusion *(máyá)*,—but not through its own essence, [—to which there does not belong multiplicity].' In regard to this he says as follows.†

जन्मादिव्यवस्थातः पुरुषबहुत्वम् ॥ १५० ॥

There is a multiplicity of soul.

Aph. 150.—From the several allotment of birth, &c., a multiplicity of souls [is to be inferred].

a. 'Birth, &c.' By the '&c.,' growth, death, &c., are included. 'From the several allotment' of these, i. e. from their being appointed—[birth to one, death to another, and so on]. 'A multiplicity of souls,'—that is to say, souls are many. If soul were one only, then when *one* is born, *all* would be born, &c.‡

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* सुषुप्त्यादौ असाक्षित्वमज्ञातृत्वं स्यात् नचैवं सुखमस्वाप्समिति प्रतिभासनात्। आदिशब्दात् स्वप्नग्रहणम् ॥

† एक एवात्मेति वेदान्तिनः। तथाच नित्यसर्वगतो ह्यात्मा कूटस्थो दोषवर्जितः। एक एव स भिद्यते शक्त्या मायया न स्वभावत इत्यत्राह ॥

‡ जन्मादीति आदिना उपचयमरणादि गृह्यते। तद्व्यवस्थातः तन्नियमात् पुरुषबहुत्वं बहव आत्मान इत्यर्थः। यद्येक एवात्मा एकस्मिन् जायमाने सर्वे जायेरन्निति ॥

b. He ponders as a doubt the opinion of the others* [—viz. of the Vedántins].

उपाधिभेदेऽप्येकस्य नानायोग आकाशस्येव घटादिभिः ॥ १५१ ॥

The view of the Vedánta on this point.

Aph. 151.—[The Vedántins would have us believe that] there being a difference in its investments, moreover, multiplicity attaches [seemingly] to the one [Soul], as is the case with Space by reason of jars, &c., [which mark out the spaces that they occupy].

a. As Space is one, [and yet] in consequence of the difference of adjuncts,—jars, &c.—when the jar is destroyed, it is [familiarly] said 'the jar's space is destroyed'—[for there then no longer exists a space marked out by the jar];—so also, on the hypothesis of there being but one Soul, since there is a difference of corporeal limitation, on the destruction thereof [—i. e. of the limitation occasioned by any particular body—], it is merely a way of talking [to say] 'The soul has perished.' [This indeed is the case] also on the hypothesis that there are many souls; otherwise, since soul is eternal [—without beginning or end—as both parties agree—], how could there be the appointment of birth and death?†

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* परमतमाशङ्कते ॥

† यथैकमाकाशं घटाद्युपाधिभेदात् घटे नष्टे घटाकाशं नष्टमिति व्यपदिश्यते तथैकात्मपक्षेऽपि देहावच्छेदभेदात् तन्नाशे आत्मा नष्ट इति व्यपदेशमात्रम्। नानात्मपक्षेऽपि अन्यथा आत्मनो नित्यत्वात् कथं जन्ममरणव्यवस्थेति ॥

b. He states [what may serve for] the removal of doubt* [as to the point in question].

उपाधिर्भिद्यते न तु तद्वान्॥ १५२॥

Refutation of the Vedánta on this point.

Aph. 152.—The investment is different [—according to the Vedántins—], but not that to which this belongs, [—and the absurd consequences of such an opinion will be seen].

a. 'The investment is different'—[—there are diverse bodies, of John, Thomas, &c.]; 'that to which this belongs'—i. e. that [Soul] to which this investment [of body in all its multiplicity] belongs,'—is *not* different [—but is one only—]; such is the meaning. And [now consider], in consequence of the destruction of one thing, we are not to speak as if there were the destruction of something else,—because this [evidence of a thing's being destroyed] would present itself where it ought not—[the destruction of Devadatta presenting itself as a fact when we are considering the case of Yajnadatta, who is not for *that* reason to be assumed to be dead];—and, on the hypothesis that Soul is one, the [fact that the Vedánta makes an] imputation of inconsistent conditions is quite evident, since Bondage and Liberation do not [and cannot] belong [simultaneously] to *one*. But the conjunction and [simultaneous] non-conjunction of the sky [or space] with smoke, &c., [of which the Vedántin may seek to avail himself as an illustration,] are *not* contradictory, for it is not the nature of Conjunction to abide in something wholly pervaded by it†; [—whereas, on the other hand, it would be nonsense to speak of Bondage as affecting one portion of a monad, and Liberation affecting another portion, as a monkey may be in con-

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* समाधानमाह॥

† उपाधिर्भिद्यते तद्वानुपाधिमान् न भिद्यत इत्यर्थः। नचान्यनाशादन्यत्र नाशव्यवहारोऽतिप्रसङ्गात्। एकात्म-

junction with a branch of a tree without being in conjunction with the stem].

b. "What may be [proved] by this?" To this he replies.*

एवमेकत्वेन परिवर्त्तमानस्य न विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः ॥ १५३ ॥

The Sánkhya is free from the charge of absurdity to which the Vedánta is open.

Aph. 153.—Thus [—i. e. by taking the Sánkhya view —] there is no imputation of contradictory conditions to [a Soul supposed to be] everywhere present as *one*.

a. 'Thus'—i. e. [if you regard the matter rightly] according to the manner here set forth,—there is no 'imputation,' or attribution, of incompatible conditions, Bondage, Liberation, &c., to a soul existing 'everywhere,' throughout all, as a monad.†

b. [But the Vedántin may contend]—we *see* the condition of another attributed even to one quite different, as—e. g.—Nature's character as an agent [is attributed] to Soul—which is one other [than Nature]. To this he replies.‡

अन्यधर्मत्वे ऽपि नारोपात्तत्सिद्धिरेकत्वात् ॥ १५४ ॥

Imputation is not proof.

Aph. 154.—Even though there be [imputed to Soul] the possession of the con-

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पक्षेच व्यक्त एव विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः एकस्यबन्धमोक्षाभावात्। आकाशस्य तु धूमादियोगायोगावविरुद्धौ संयोगस्याव्याप्यवृत्तित्वात् ॥

* एतेन किं स्यादित्यत आह ॥

† एवमुक्तरीत्या एकत्वेन परितः सर्वतो वर्त्तमानस्यात्मनो बन्धमोक्षादिविरुद्धधर्माणामध्यास आरोपो न भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

‡ अन्यधर्मस्याप्यन्यत्रारोपो दृष्टो यथा प्रकृतेः कर्त्तृत्वं पुरुषे ऽन्यत्रेत्यत्राह ॥

dition of another, this [—that it really possesses such—] is not established by the imputation, because it [Soul] is *one* [absolutely simple unqualified entity].

a. [The notion] that Soul is an agent is a mistake, because, that Soul is *not* an agent is true; and the imputation [of agency to Soul] is *not* true, and the combination of the true and the untrue is not real. Neither birth nor death, or the like, is compatible with Soul, because it is un-companioned,* [—unattended either by qualities or by actions].

b. [But the Vedántin may say]—and thus there will be an opposition to the scripture,—for according to that—" Brahma is one without a second;—there is nothing here diverse;—death after death does he obtain who here sees as it were a multiplicity." To this he replies.†

नाद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधो जातिपरत्वात् ॥ १५५ ॥

Scripture, speaking of Soul as one, is speaking of it generically.

Aph. 155.—There is no opposition to the scriptures [declaratory] of the non-duality [of Soul], because the reference [in such texts] is to the *genus* [or to Soul in general].

a. But there is no opposition [in our Sánkhya view of the matter] to the scriptures [which speak] of the oneness of Soul, because these [scriptural texts] refer to the *genus*. By *genus* we

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* पुरुषकर्तृत्वं भ्रान्तं पुरुषाकर्तृत्वस्य सत्त्वात् आरोपस्यासत्यत्वात् । नच सत्यासत्ययोस्सम्बन्धस्तात्त्विको भवति । असङ्गित्वादात्मनो न जन्ममरणादि सम्भवति ॥

† एवञ्च श्रुतिविरोधः स्यात् तथाचैकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन मृत्योस्स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति । अत्राह ॥

mean sameness, the fact of being of the same nature;—and it is to this alone that the texts about the non-duality [of Soul] have reference. It is not the indivisibleness [of Soul,—meaning by its indivisibleness the impossibility that there should be more souls than one,—that is meant in such texts—] because there is no motive [for viewing Soul as *thus* indivisible];—such is the meaning.*

b. But then [—the Vedántin may rejoin—] the Bondage and Liberation are incompatible of any single soul [—and yet these may coexist according to the opinion] of him who asserts that souls are many. To this he replies.†

विदितबन्धकारणस्य दृष्या तद्रूपम् ॥ १५६ ॥

The compatibility of Bondage and Freedom.

Aph. 156.—Of him [i. e. of that soul] by whom the cause of Bondage is known, there is that condition [of isolation, or entire liberation], by the perception [of the fact that Nature and soul are distinct, and that he really was *not* bound even when he seemed to be so].

a. By whom is known 'the cause of Bondage'—viz., the non-perception that Nature and soul are distinct,—of him, 'by discerning it'—i. e. by cognizing the distinction,—there is 'that condition'—viz., the condition of isolation, [—the condition, see §145, to which the soul aspires. The soul in Bondage which is no real bondage, may be typified by Don Quixote hanging in

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* आत्मैक्यश्रुतीनां विरोधस्तु नास्ति तासां जातिपरत्वात्। जातिसामान्यमेकरूपत्वं। तत्रैवाद्वैतश्रुतीनां तात्पर्यात्। नाखण्डत्वं प्रयोजनाभावादित्यर्थः ॥

† नन्वनेकात्मवादिनोऽपि एकस्यात्मनो बन्धमोक्षौ विरुद्धावित्यत्राह ॥

the dark from the ledge of a supposed enormous precipice, and bound to hold on for his life, from not knowing that his toes were within six inches of the ground].*

b. [Well, rejoins the Vedántin,] Bondage [—as you justly observe—] is dependent on non-perception, and is not real:—it is a maxim that non-perception is removed by perception:—and, on this showing, we see the [force of the] reasoning on the hypothesis that soul is one, but not on that of Soul's being multitudinous. To this he replies.†

नात्वदृष्ट्या चक्षुष्मतामनुपलम्भः ॥ १५७ ॥

He jeereth the Vedántin.

Aph. 157.—Nay—because the blind do not see, can those that have their eyesight not perceive?

a. What,—because a blind man does not see, does also one who has his eyesight not perceive? There are many arguments [in support of the view] of those who assert that souls are many, [—though *you* do not see them—]: such is the meaning.‡

b. He declares, for the following reason also, Souls are many.§

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* विदितं बन्धकारणं प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकादर्शनं यस्य तस्य दृष्ट्या विवेकज्ञानेन तद्रूपं कैवल्यरूपम् ॥

† विवेकादर्शननिमित्तो बन्धो न तात्त्विकः। दर्शनाद्दर्शनं निवर्त्तत इति युक्तिः। एवञ्चैकात्मपक्ष एव न्यायं पश्यामो न नानात्मक इत्यत्राह ॥

‡ अन्धो न पश्यतीति किं चक्षुष्मानपि नोपलभते। नानात्मवादिनामनेके न्यायास्सन्तीत्यर्थः ॥

§ इतोऽपि नानात्मान इत्याह ॥

वामदेवादिर्मुक्तो नाद्वैतम् ॥ १५८ ॥

Scripture proof that Souls are many.

Aph. 158.—Vámadeva, as well as others, has been liberated, [if we are to believe the scriptures, therefore] the non-duality [asserted in the same scriptures] is not [a fact,—if we are to understand it in the sense of the Vedántins].

a. In the Puráṇas, &c., we hear—"Vámadeva has been liberated," "Suka has been liberated," and so on. If Soul were *one*, since the liberation of all would take place on the liberation of one, the scriptural mention of a diversity [of separate and successive liberations] would be self-contradictory.*

b. [But the Vedántin may rejoin]—on the theory that Souls are many,—since the world has been from eternity [without beginning], and from time to time some one or other is liberated, so, by degrees *all* having been liberated, there should be a universal void;—but on the theory that Soul is *one*, Liberation is merely the departure of an adjunct [which, the Vedántin flatters himself, does not involve the inconsistency which he objects to the Sánkhya]. To this he replies.†

अनादावद्ययावद्भावाद्भविष्यदप्येवम् ॥ १५९ ॥

As it has been, so will it be.

Aph. 159.—Though it [—the world —] has been from eternity, since

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* पुराणादौ श्रुतं वामदेवो मुक्तश्शुको मुक्त इत्यादि । यद्येक एवात्मा एकमुक्तौ सर्वमुक्तेर्भेदश्रुतिबाधः स्यात् ॥

† नानात्मपक्षे ऽनादौ संसारे कदापि को ऽपि मुच्यते इति क्रमेण सर्वमुक्तौ सर्वशून्यता स्यात् एकात्मपक्षे तु उपाधिविगम एव मोक्ष इत्यवाह ॥

there, up to this day, has not been [an entire emptying of the world], the future also [may be inferentially expected to be] thus [as it has been heretofore].

a. Though the world has been from eternity, since up to this day we have not seen it become a void, there is no proof [in support] of the view that there will be Liberation* [of *all* Souls, so as to leave a void].

b. He states another solution of the difficulty.†

इदानीमिव सर्वत्र नात्यन्तोच्छेदः ॥ १६० ॥

The stream of mundane things will flow on for ever.

Aph. 160.—As now [things are, so] everywhere [will they continue to go on;—hence there will be] no absolute cutting short [of the course of mundane things].

a. Since souls are [in number] without end, though Liberation successively take place, there will not be [as a necessary consequence] a cutting short of the world. As now, so every where,—i. e. in time to come also,—there will be Liberation, but not therefore an absolute cutting short [of the world], since of this the on-flowing is eternal.‡

b. On the theory also that Liberation is the departure of an adjunct [§158. *b.*], we should find a universal void,—so that the

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* अनादौ संसारे ऽद्य यावच्छून्यताया अदर्शनात् भविष्यति मुक्तिरिति पक्षे नास्ति प्रमाणम् ॥

† समाधानान्तरमाह ॥

‡ अनन्तत्वादात्मनां क्रमेण मुक्तिरपि स्यात् संसारोच्छेदो ऽपि न स्यात्। इदानीमिव सर्वत्र भविष्यत्काले ऽपि मुक्तिर्भविष्यतीति नात्यन्तोच्छेदो ऽस्य प्रवाहनित्यत्वात् ॥

doubt is alike [in its application to either view]. Just as there might be an end of all things on the successive liberation of many souls, so since all adjuncts would cease when [the fruit of] works [—this fruit being in the shape of Soul's association with body as its adjunct—] came to an end, the world would be void* [on the Vedánta theory as well as on the Sánkhya one].

c. Now—[if the Vedántin says,] there will not be a void, because adjuncts are [in number] endless; then it is the same on the theory that Souls are many too;—for therefore, while those get liberated who become knowing [in regard to the fact that Nature and Soul are different], there will not be a void, because there is everlastingly no end of multitudes of souls in the universe.†

d. Pray [—some one may ask—] is Soul essentially bound or free? If [essentially] bound, then, since its essence cannot depart, there is no Liberation;—for if it [the essence] departed, then it [Soul] would [cease with the cessation of its essence and] not be eternal. If [on the other hand, you reply that it is essentially] free, then meditation, and the like, [which you prescribe for the attainment of liberation] is unmeaning. To this he replies.‡

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* उपाधिविगमो मोक्ष इति पक्षेऽपि सर्वशून्यताप्रसङ्ग इति तुल्योऽनुयोगः। यथा नानात्मनां क्रमेण मुक्तौ सर्वोच्छेदः तथा कर्मोच्छेदे सर्वोपाधिनाशाज्जगच्छून्यं स्यात्॥

† अथोपाधीनामनन्तत्वान्न शून्यता नानात्मपक्षेऽपि तुल्यमत एव हि विद्वत्सु मुच्यमानेषु सन्ततं ब्रह्माण्डजीवलोकानामनन्तत्वादशून्यता॥

‡ किमात्मा बद्धो मुक्तो वा। बद्धत्वे स्वरूपस्याप्रच्यवादनिर्मोक्षः प्रच्यवेऽनित्यत्वम्। मुक्तत्वे व्यर्थो ध्यानादिरित्यत आह॥

व्यापिनो भूयरूपः ॥ १६१ ॥

Soul is ever free, though it may seem bound in all sorts of ways.

Aph. 161.—It [Soul] is altogether free, [but seemingly] multiform [through a delusive semblance of being bound].

a. It is not bound, nor is it liberated, but it is ever free; [see §19]. But the destruction of ignorance [as to its actual freedom] is effected by meditation, &c.,* [which are therefore not unmeaning, as alleged in §160. *d*].

b. It has been declared that Soul is a witness. Since it is a witness [—some one may object—] even when it has attained to discriminating [between Nature and Soul], there is no Liberation,—[Soul, on this showing, being not an absolutely simple entity but something *combined* with the character of a spectator or witness]. To this he replies.†

अङ्गसम्बन्धात्साक्षित्वम् ॥ १६२ ॥

How Soul is a spectator.

Aph. 162.—It [Soul] is a witness through its connection with sense-organs [—which quit it on Liberation].

a. A sense-organ is an organ of sense. Through its connection therewith, it [Soul] is a witness;—and where is its connection with sense-organs [—these products of Nature—see §62—]

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* न बद्धो नायं मुच्यते किन्तु नित्यमुक्तः। अज्ञाननाशस्तु ध्यानादिना क्रियत इति ॥

† आत्मनस्साक्षित्वमुक्तम्। प्राप्तविवेकस्यापि साक्षित्वे ऽनिर्मोक्ष इत्यत्राह ॥

when discrimination [between Nature and Soul] has taken place?*

b. [Well—some one may ask—] at all times of *what* nature is Soul? To this he replies.†

नित्यमुक्तत्वम् ॥ १६३ ॥

The real condition of Soul.

Aph. 163.—[The nature of Soul is] constant freedom.

a. 'Constant freedom,'—that is to say, it is positively always devoid of the Bondage called Pain [—see §1 and 19—], because Pain, and the rest, are modifications of Understanding‡—[which —see §62—is a modification of Nature, from which Soul is really distinct].

औदासीन्यञ्चेति ॥ १६४ ॥

Soul's indifference.

Aph. 164.—And finally [the nature of the Soul is] indifference [to Pain and Pleasure alike].

a. By 'indifference' is meant inaction. The word *iti* [rendered 'finally'] implies that the exposition of the Nature of Soul is completed.§

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* अत्रमिन्द्रियं तत्सम्बन्धात्साक्षित्वं विवेकेच क्रेन्द्रियसम्बन्ध इति ॥

† सर्वदा किंरूप आत्मेत्यत आह ॥

‡ नित्यमुक्तत्वं सदैव दुःखाद्यसम्बन्धशून्यत्वं दुःखादेर्बुद्धिपरिणामत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

§ औदासीन्यमकर्तृत्वम् । इतिशब्दः पुरुषधर्मप्रतिपादनसमाप्तौ ॥

b. [Some one may say]—the fact of Soul's being an agent is declared in Scripture:—how is this [—if, as you say, it be *not* an agent]? To this he replies.*

उपरागात्कर्तृत्वं चित्सान्निध्याच्चित्सान्निध्यात् ॥ १६५ ॥

How Soul, which is not an agent, is yet spoken of as such.

Aph. 165.—Its [—Soul's—fancy of] being an agent is from the proximity of Intellect, from the proximity of Intellect.

a. Its 'being an agent'—i. e. its Soul's *fancy* of being an agent, is 'from the proximity of Intellect,'—i. e. from the influence of Nature† [—see §19—of which Intellect—see §62—is a modification].

b. The repetition of the expression 'from the proximity of Intellect' is meant to show that we have reached the conclusion:—for thus do we see [practised] in the scriptures,‡—[e. g. where it is said in the Veda—"Soul is to be known, it is to be discriminated from Nature: thus it does not come again, it does not come again"].

c. So much, in this commentary on Kapila's aphorisms delaratory of the Sánkhya, for the First Book—that on the [topics or] object-matter§ [of the Sánkhya system].

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* आत्मनः कर्तृत्वं श्रूयते तत्कथमित्यत आह ॥

† चित्सान्निध्येन प्रकृत्युपरागादात्मनः कर्तृत्वं कर्तृत्वाभिमानः ॥

‡ चित्सान्निध्यादिति वीप्सा परिसमाप्त्यै। श्रुतौ तथा दृष्टत्वादिति ॥

§ इति कापिलसांख्यप्रवचनसूत्रवृत्तौ विषयाध्यायः प्रथमः ॥

END OF BOOK I.

THE APHORISMS

OF THE

SÁNKHYA PHILOSOPHY

BY

KAPILA,

WITH ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARY.

BOOKS II, III & IV.

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THE

SÁNKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA.

BOOK II.

INTRODUCTION.

a. The object-matter [of the Institute] has been set forth [in B. I.]. Now, in order to prove that it is not the *Soul* that undergoes the alterations [observable in the course of things], he will tell diffusely in the Second Book how the creation is formed out of the Primal Principle. There too the nature of the products of Nature is to be declared fully, with a view to the very clear discrimination of Soul from these. Therefore, according to the verses:—

b. "Whoso rightly knows its changes, and the Primal Agent [Nature], and Soul the eternal, he, thirsting no more, is emancipated,"—

c. we remark that, with reference to the character, &c., of Emancipation, all the three [things mentioned in these verses] require to be known. And here, in the first place, with advertence to the consideration that if Nature, which is unintelligent, were to create without a motive, we should find even the emancipated one bound, he states the *motive* for the creation of the world.*

* शास्त्रस्य विषयो निरूपितः। साम्प्रतं पुरुषस्यापरिणामित्वोपपादनाय प्रकृतितः सृष्टिप्रक्रियामतिविस्तरेण

विमुक्तमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं वा प्रधानस्य ॥ १ ॥

The motive for creation,

Aph. 1.—Of Nature [the agency, or the becoming a maker, is] for the emancipation of what is [really, though not apparently] emancipated, or else for [the removal of] itself.

a. The expression 'the becoming a maker' is borrowed from the last aphorism of the preceding Book. Nature makes the world for the sake of removing the pain, which is really a shadow [B. I. §59], belonging to the Soul which is in its very nature free from the bonds of pain,—or [—to explain it otherwise—] for the sake of removing pain [connected] by means of but a shadowy link; or [on the other hand] it is 'for the sake of itself,' —that is to say, for the sake of removing the actually real pain [which consists] of itself.*

b. Although experience [of good and ill] also, as well as

द्वितीयाध्याये वक्ष्यति । तत्रैव प्रधानकार्याणां स्वरूपं विस्तरतो वक्तव्यं तेभ्योऽपि पुरुषस्यातिस्फुटविवेकाय । अत एव ।

विकारं प्रकृतिं चैव पुरुषं च सनातनम् ।
यो यथावद्विजानाति स विद्वष्णो विमुच्यते ॥

इति मोक्षधर्मादिषु त्रयाणामेव ज्ञेयत्ववचनम् । तत्र चादावचेतनायाः प्रकृतेर्निष्प्रयोजनसृष्टित्वे मुक्तस्यापि बन्धप्रसङ्ग इत्याशयेन जगत्सर्जने प्रयोजनमाह ॥

* कर्तृत्वमिति पूर्वाध्यायशेषसङ्गादनुषज्यते स्वभावतो दुःखबन्धाद्विमुक्तस्य पुरुषस्य प्रतिबिम्बरूपदुःखमोक्षार्थं प्रतिबिम्बसम्बन्धेन दुःखमोक्षार्थं वा प्रधानस्य जगत्कर्तृत्वम् । अथवा स्वार्थम् । स्वस्य पारमार्थिकदुःखमोक्षार्थमित्यर्थः ॥

Emancipation, is a motive for creation, yet Emancipation alone is mentioned, inasmuch as it is the principal one.*

c. But then if creation were for the sake of Emancipation, then, since Emancipation might take place through creation once for all, there would not be creation again and again :—to which he replies.†

विरक्तस्य तत्सिद्धेः ॥ २ ॥

Successive creation why.

Aph. 2.—Because this [Emancipation] actually is of him that is devoid of passion.

a. Emancipation does not take place through creation once for all, but it is [the lot only] of him that has been extremely tormented many times by the various pain of birth, death, sickness, &c.; and therefore [successive creation goes on] because Emancipation actually occurs in the case only of him in whom complete dispassion has arisen through the knowledge of the distinctness of Nature and Soul :—such is the meaning.‡

b. He tells the reason why dispassion does not take place through creation once for all.§

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* यद्यपि मोक्षवद्भोगोऽपि सृष्टेः प्रयोजनं तथापि मुख्यत्वान्मोक्ष एवोक्तः ॥

† ननु मोक्षार्थं चेत् सृष्टिस्तर्हि सकृत्सृष्ट्यैव मोक्षसम्भवे पुनः पुनः सृष्टिर्न स्यादिति तत्राह ॥

‡ नैकदा सृष्टेर्मोक्षः किन्तु बहुशो जन्ममरणव्याध्यादिविविधदुःखेन भृशं तप्तस्य ततश्च प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्विवेकख्यात्युत्पन्नपरवैराग्यस्यैव मोक्षोत्पत्तिसिद्धेरित्यर्थः ॥

§ सकृत्सृष्ट्या वैराग्यासिद्धौ हेतुमाह ॥

न श्रवणमात्रात् तत्सिद्धिरनादिवासनाया बलवत्त्वात् ॥ ३ ॥

Force of the foregoing reason.

Aph. 3.—It is not effected by the mere hearing, because of the forcibleness of the impressions from eternity.

a. Even the hearing [of scripture, in which the distinctness of Nature from Soul is enounced,] comes [—not to all alike, but only—] through the merit of acts done in many births [or successive lives]. Even then, dispassion is not established through the mere hearing, but through direct cognition; and direct cognition does not take place suddenly, because of the forcibleness of false impressions that have existed from eternity, —but [the required direct cognition takes place] through the completion of Concentration, and there is an abundance of obstacles to Concentration [—see Yoga Aphorisms, B. II];— therefore only after many births does dispassion and Emancipation take place at any time of any one at all:—such is the meaning.*

b. He states another reason for the continuous flow of creation.†

बहुभृत्यवद्वा प्रत्येकम् ॥ ४ ॥

Another reason.

Aph. 4.—Or as people have severally many dependents.

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* श्रवणमपि बहुजन्मकृतपुण्येन भवति। तत्रापि श्रवणमात्रान्न वैराग्यसिद्धिः किन्तु साक्षात्कारात्। साक्षात्कारश्च झटिति न भवति। अनादिमिथ्यावासनाया बलवत्त्वात्। किन्तु योगनिष्ठया। योगे च प्रतिबन्धबाहुल्यमित्यतो बहुजन्मभिरेव वैराग्यं मोक्षश्च कदाचित् कस्यचिदेव सिद्ध्यतीत्यर्थः॥

† सृष्टिप्रवाहे हेत्वन्तरमाह॥

a. As householders have severally many who are dependent upon them, according to the distinction of wife, children, &c., so also the Qualities, Goodness, &c., [B. I. §62, *b*] have severally got to emancipate innumerable Souls. Therefore, however many Souls may have been emancipated, the on-flow of creation takes place for the emancipation of other Souls,—for Souls are [in number] without end;—such is the meaning. And so the Yoga aphorism [B. II. §22] says "Though it have ceased to be, in respect of him that has done the work, it has not [absolutely] ceased to be, because it is common to others besides him."*

b. But then, why is it asserted that Nature alone creates, when, by the text "From that or this Soul, proceeded the Ether," &c., it is proved that *Soul* also creates? To this he replies.†

प्रकृतिवास्तवेच पुरुषस्याध्याससिद्धिः ॥ ५ ॥

A doubt disposed of.

Aph. 5.—And since it belongs really to Nature, it follows that it is fictitiously attributed to Soul.

a. And since Nature's character of creator is decided to be

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* यथा गृहस्थानां प्रत्येकं बहवो भर्तव्या भवन्ति स्त्रीपुत्रादिभेदेन। एवं सत्त्वादिगुणानामपि प्रत्येकमसङ्ख्यपुरुषा विमोचनीया भवन्ति। अतः कियत्पुरुषमोक्षेऽपि पुरुषान्तरमोचनार्थं सृष्टिप्रवाहो घटते। पुरुषाणामानन्त्यादित्यर्थः। तथा च योगसूत्रम्। कृतार्थं प्रति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्वादिति ॥

† ननु प्रकृतेरेव स्रष्टृत्वं कथमुच्यते। तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूत इति श्रुत्या पुरुषस्यापि स्रष्टृत्वसिद्धेरिति तत्राह ॥

real, there is really, in the scriptures, only a fictitious [or figurative] attribution of creativeness to Soul.*

b. But then, if it be thus, how is it laid down that Nature's creativeness moreover is *real*, since we are told [in scripture] that creation moreover is on a level with a dream? To this he replies.†

कार्यतस्तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ६ ॥

The reality of Nature's creativeness.

Aph. 6.—It is proved from the products.

a. That is to say, because the real creative character of Nature is established just 'from the products,' viz., by that evidence [see §111, B. I.] which acquaints us with the subject [in which the creative character inheres], for *products* are real, inasmuch as they produce impressions and exhibit acts.‡ [The reality of external things is established here just as it is by Locke, who says "I think God has given me assurance enough as to the existence of things without me; since by their different application I can produce in myself both *pleasure and pain (artha)*, which is one great concernment of my present state." These existing products being admitted, the Sánkhya argues that they must have a cause;—and, as this cause means neither more nor less than something creative, whatever proves the existence of the cause, proves, at the same time, its creative character.]

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* प्रकृतौ स्रष्टृत्वस्य वस्तुत्वे च सिद्धे पुरुषस्य स्रष्टृत्वाध्यास एव श्रुतिषु सिद्ध्यति ॥

† नन्वेवं प्रकृतावपि स्रष्टृत्वं वास्तवमिति कुतोऽवधृतं स्रष्टेः स्वप्नादितुल्यताया अपि श्रवणादिति तत्राह ॥

‡ कार्याणामर्थक्रियाकारितया वास्तवत्वेन कार्यत एव धर्मिग्राहकप्रमाणेन प्रकृतेर्वास्तवस्रष्टृत्वसिद्धेरित्यर्थः ॥

b. But then [it may be said,] on the alternative [see §1] that Nature works for *herself*, she must energize with reference to the *emancipated* Soul also :—to this he replies.*

चेतनोद्देशान्नियमः कण्टकमोक्षवत् ॥ ७ ॥

Who escape nature.

Aph. 7.—The rule is with reference to one knowing,—just as escape from a thorn.

a. The word *chetana* here means 'one knowing,' because the derivation is from *chit* 'to be conscious'. As one and the same thorn is not a cause of pain just to him who, being 'one knowing,' i. e., aware of it, escapes from that same, but actually is so in respect of *others*,—so Nature also is escaped just by 'one knowing,'—one aware,—one who has accomplished the matter;—just to *him* does it not consist of pain; but to others, who are *not* knowing, it actually is a cause of pain;—such is the 'rule,'—meaning the distribution. Hence also, of Nature, which is by its own nature bound [—inasmuch as it *consists* of bonds—], the self-emancipation is possible; so that it does not energize with reference to the emancipated Soul†—[§6, *b*].

b. But then [suggests some one], what was said [at §5] that, in respect of Soul, the creative character is only fictitiously attributed,—this is not proper, because it is fitting that, by the conjunction of Nature, *Soul* also should be modified into Mind, &c;—for, a modification, of wood, &c., resembling earth, &c.,

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* ननु प्रकृतेः स्वार्थत्वपक्षे मुक्तपुरुषं प्रत्यपि सा प्रवर्तेत तन्नाह ॥

† चितौ सज्ज्ञान इति व्युत्पत्त्या चेतनोऽत्राभिज्ञः। यथैकमेव कण्टकं यश्चेतनोऽभिज्ञस्तस्मादेव मुच्यते तं प्रत्येव दुःखात्मकं न भवत्यन्यान् प्रति तु भवत्येव तथा प्रकृतिरपि चेतनादभिज्ञात् कृतार्थादेव मुच्यते तं प्रत्येव दुःखात्मिका

through the conjunction of earth, &c., is seen:—to which he replies.*

अन्ययोगेऽपि तत्सिद्धिर्नाञ्जस्येनायोदाहवत् ॥ ८ ॥

Soul not creative, though associated with what is so.

Aph. 8.—Even though there be conjunction with the other, this [power of giving rise to products] does not exist in it immediately,—just like the burning action of iron.

a. Even though there be conjunction with Nature, there belongs to Soul no creativeness 'immediately,' i. e., directly. An illustration of this is, 'like the burning action of iron':—as iron does not possess directly a burning power, but this is only fictitiously attributed to it, being through the fire conjoined with it;—such is the meaning. But in the example just mentioned, it is admitted that there is an alteration of both, for this is proved by sense-evidence; but in the instance under doubt, since the case is accounted for by the modification of one only, there is cumbrousness in postulating the modification of both; —because, otherwise, by the conjunction of the China-rose, it would turn out that the colour of the crystal was changed.†

न भवति। अन्याननभिज्ञान् प्रति तु दुःखात्मिका भवत्येवेति नियमो व्यवस्थेत्यर्थः। एतेन स्वभावतो बद्धाया अपि प्रकृतेः स्वमोक्षो घटत इत्यतो न मुक्तपुरुषं प्रति प्रवर्तत इति ॥

* ननु पुरुषे स्रष्टृत्वमध्यस्तमात्रमिति यदुक्तं तन्न युक्तम्। प्रकृतिसंयोगेन, पुरुषस्यापि महदादिपरिणामौचित्यात्। दृष्टो हि पृथिव्यादियोगेन काष्ठादेः पृथिव्यादिसदृशः परिणाम इति तत्राह ॥

† प्रकृतियोगेऽपि पुरुषस्य न स्रष्टृत्वसिद्धिराञ्जस्येन

b. It has already been stated [§1] that the fruit of creation is emancipation. Now he states the principal occasional cause of creation.*

रागविरागयोर्योगः सृष्टिः ॥ ९ ॥

Creation when. *Aph.* 9.—When there is passion or dispassion, there is concentration [in the latter case, and] creation [in the former].

a. When there is passion, there is creation; and when there is dispassion, there is 'concentration,' i. e., the abiding [of Soul] in its own nature [—see Yoga Aph. B. I, 3];—in short, emancipation, or the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle—[Yoga Aph. B. 1, 2]:—such is the meaning. And so the import is, that, Passion is the cause of creation, because of their being simultaneously present or absent.†

b. After this he begins to state the manner of creation.‡

साक्षात्। तत्र दृष्टान्तोऽयोदाहवत्। यथायसो न दग्धृत्वं साक्षादस्ति किन्तु स्वसंयुक्ताग्निद्वारकमध्यस्तमेवेत्यर्थः। उक्तदृष्टान्ते तूभयोः परिणामः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वादिष्यते सन्दिग्धस्थले त्वेकस्यैव परिणामेनोपपत्तावुभयोः परिणामकल्पने गौरवम्। अन्यथा जपासंयोगात् स्फटिकस्य रागपरिणामापत्तेरिति ॥

* सृष्टेः फलं मोक्ष इति प्रागुक्तम्। इदानीं सृष्टेर्मुख्यं निमित्तकारणमाह ॥

† रागे सृष्टिर्विरागे च योगः स्वरूपेऽवस्थानम्। मुक्तिरिति यावत्। अथवा चित्तवृत्तिनिरोध इत्यर्थः। तथा चान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां रागः सृष्टिकारणमित्याशयः ॥

‡ इतः परं सृष्टिप्रक्रियां वक्तुमारभते ॥

महदादिक्रमेण पञ्चभूतम् ॥ १० ॥

Order of creation. *Aph.* 10.—In the order [—see §12, *b*—] of Mind, &c., [is the creation] of the five elements.

a. 'Creation' is supplied from the preceding aphorism.*

b. He mentions a distinction† [between these successively creative energies and the primal one].

आत्मार्थत्वात् सृष्टेनषामात्मार्थ आरम्भः ॥ ११ ॥

Difference between Nature and its products. *Aph.* 11.—Since creation is for the sake of Soul, the origination of these is not for their own sake.

a. 'Of these,' i. e., of Mind, &c.,—since the creativeness is 'for the sake of Soul,' i. e., for the sake of the emancipation of Soul,—the 'origination,' i. e., the creativeness, is not for the sake of themselves, since, inasmuch as they are perishable, they [—unlike Nature,—see §1—] are not susceptible of emancipation:—such is the meaning.‡

b. He declares the creation of limited space and time.§

दिक्कालावाकाशादिभ्यः ॥ १२ ॥

Time and space whence. *Aph.* 12.—[Relative] Space and Time [arise] from the Ether, &c.

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* सृष्टिरिति पूर्वसूत्रादनुवर्तते ॥

† विशेषमाह ।

‡ एषां महदादीनां स्रष्टृत्वस्यात्मार्थत्वात् पुरुषमोक्षार्थत्वान्न स्वार्थ आरम्भः स्रष्टृत्वं विनाशित्वेन मोक्षायोगादित्यर्थः ॥

§ खण्डदिक्कालयोः सृष्टिमाह ॥

a. The Space and Time which are *eternal* [and absolute], *those* two, being the *source* of the Ether, are really distinctive qualities of Nature;—therefore it is consistent that Space and Time should be all-pervading. But the Space and Time which are limited, *these* arise from the Ether, through the conjunction of this or that [limiting] object:—such is the meaning. By the "&c.," [in the aphorism,] is meant "from the apprehending of this or that [limiting] object."*

b. Now he exhibits, in their order, through their nature and their habits, the things mentioned [in §10] as "in the order of Mind, &c."†

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिः ॥ १३ ॥

Intellect defined. *Aph.* 13.—Intellect is judgment.

a. 'Intellect' is a synonyme of the Great Principle [or Mind,—see B. I, §72]; and 'judgment', called also ascertainment, is its peculiar modification; such is the meaning;—but they are set forth as identical;—because a property, and that of which it is the property, are indivisible. And it is to be understood that this Intellect is 'Great,' because it pervades all effects other than itself, and because it is of great power.‡

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* नित्यौ यौ दिक्कालौ तावाकाशप्रकृतिभूतौ प्रकृतेर्गुणविशेषावेव। अतो दिक्कालयोर्विभुत्वोपपत्तिः। यौ तु खण्डदिक्कालौ तौ तु तत्तदुपाधिसंयोगादाकाशादुत्पद्येते इत्यर्थः। आदिशब्देनोपाधिग्रहणादिति ॥

† इदानीं महदादिक्रमेणोक्तान् स्वरूपतो धर्मतश्च क्रमेण दर्शयति ॥

‡ महत्तत्त्वस्य पर्यायो बुद्धिरिति। अध्यवसायश्च निश्चयाख्यस्यासाधारणी वृत्तिरित्यर्थः। अभेदनिर्देशस्तु धर्म-

b. He mentions other properties also of the Great Principle.*

तत्कार्यं धर्मादि ॥ १४ ॥

Products of intellect.

Aph. 14.—Virtue, &c., are products of it.

a. The meaning is, that Virtue, Knowledge, Dispassion, and [supernatural] Power, moreover, are formed out of *intellect*,—not formed of *self-consciousness (ahankára)*, because intellect alone [and not self-consciousness,] is a product of superlative Purity† [—without admixture of Passion and Darkness].

b. But then, if it be thus, how can the prevalence of *de*merit, in the portions of intellect lodged in men, cattle, &c., be accounted for? To this he replies.‡

महदुपरागाद्विपरीतम् ॥ १५ ॥

Opposite products of intellect.

Aph. 15.—The Great one becomes reversed through adjacent tincture.

a. That same 'Great one,' i. e. the Great Principle [or intellect], through being tinged by Passion and Darkness, also becomes 'reversed' [—see §14, *a*—], i. e., vile, with the properties

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धर्म्यभेदात्। अस्याश्च बुद्धेर्महत्त्वं स्वेतरसकलकार्यव्यापकत्वान्महैश्वर्याच्च मन्तव्यम् ॥

* महत्तत्त्वस्यापरानपि धर्मानाह ॥

† धर्मज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्याण्यपि बुद्ध्युपादानकानि नाहङ्काराद्युपादानकानि बुद्धेरेव निरतिशयसत्त्वकार्यत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ नन्वेवं कथं नरपश्वादिगतानां बुद्ध्यंशानामधर्मप्राबल्यमुपपद्यतां तत्राह ॥

of Demerit, Ignorance, Non-dispassion, and want of [supernatural] Power; such is the meaning.*

b. Having defined the Great Principle, he defines its product—Self-consciousness.†

अभिमानोऽहङ्कारः ॥ १६ ॥

Self-consciousness. *Aph.* 16.—Self-consciousness is a conceit.

a. 'Self-consciousness' is what makes the Ego, as a potter [makes a pot],—the thing [called] the internal instrument *(anta'karaṇa)*; and this, inasmuch as a property and that of which it is the property are indivisible, is spoken of as 'a conceit,' in order to acquaint us that this is its peculiar modification. Only when a thing has been determined by intellect [—i. e., by an act of judgment—see §13, *a*—], do the making of an Ego, and the making of a Meum, take place.‡

b. He mentions the product of Self-consciousness, which has arrived in order.§

एकादशपञ्चतन्मात्रं तत्कार्यम् ॥ १७ ॥

Products of Self-consciousness. *Aph.* 17.—Its product is the eleven, and the five Subtile Elements.

a. The meaning is, that the eleven organs, and the five Subtile

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* तदेव महन्महत्तत्त्वं रजस्तमोभ्यामुपरागाद्विपरीतं क्षुद्रमधर्माज्ञानावैराग्यानैश्वर्यधर्मकमपि भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

† महत्तत्त्वं लक्षयित्वा तत्कार्यमहङ्कारं लक्षयति ॥

‡ अहङ्करोतीत्यहङ्कारः कुम्भकारवत् अन्तःकरणद्रव्यं स च धर्मधर्म्यभेदादभिमान इत्युक्तोऽसाधारणवृत्तितास्चनाय बुद्ध्या निश्चित एवार्थेऽहङ्कारममकारौ जायेते ॥

§ क्रमागतमहङ्कारस्य कार्यमाह ॥

Elements, viz., Sound, &c., are the product of Self-consciousness.*

b. Among these, moreover, he mentions a distinction.†

सात्त्विकमेकादशकं प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात् ॥ १८ ॥

The Mind whence.

Aph. 18.—The eleventh, consisting of [the principle of] Purity, proceeds from modified Self-consciousness.

a. The 'eleventh,' i. e., the completer of the eleven, viz., Mind, [alone] among the set consisting of sixteen [§17] consists of Purity:—therefore it is produced from Self-consciouness 'modified,' i. e., pure;—such is the meaning. And hence, too, it is to be reckoned that the ten organs are from the Passionate Self-consciousness, and the Subtile Elements from the Dark Self-consciousness.‡

b. He exhibits the eleven organs.§

कर्मेन्द्रियबुद्धीन्द्रियैरान्तरमेकादशकम् ॥ १९ ॥

Of the Organs.

Aph. 19.—Along with the organs of action and the organs of understanding, another is the eleventh.

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* एकादशेन्द्रियाणि शब्दादिपञ्चतन्मात्रं चाहङ्कारस्य कार्यमित्यर्थः ॥

† अत्रापि विशेषमाह ॥

‡ एकादशानां पूरणमेकादशकं मनः षोडशात्मगणमध्ये सात्त्विकम्। अतस्तद्वैकृतात् सात्त्विकाहङ्काराज्जायत इत्यर्थः। अतश्च राजसाहङ्काराद्दशेन्द्रियाणि तामसाहङ्काराच्च तन्मात्राणीत्यवगन्तव्यम् ॥

§ एकादशेन्द्रियाणि दर्शयति ॥

a. The organs of action are five, the vocal organ, the hands, the feet, the anus, and the generative organ; and the organs of understanding are five, those called the organs of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. Along with these ten, 'another,' viz., Mind, is 'the eleventh,' i. e., is the eleventh organ:—such is the meaning.*

b. He refutes the opinion that the Organs are formed of the Elements.†

आहङ्कारिकत्वश्रुतेर्न भौतिकानि ॥ २० ॥

The Nyáya view rejected.

Aph. 20.—They are not formed of the Elements, because there is scripture for their being formed of Self-consciousness.

a. Supply 'the organs.'‡

b. Pondering a doubt, he says.§

देवतालयश्रुतिर्नारम्भकस्य ॥ २१ ॥

A text explained.

Aph. 21.—The text regarding absorption into deities is not [declaratory] of an originator.

a. That text which there is about absorption into deities, is not 'of an originator,'—that is to say, it does not refer to an originator;—because [—although a thing, e. g., a jar, when it ceases to be a jar, is usually spoken of as being resolved into its

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* कर्मेन्द्रियाणि वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थानि पञ्च ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि च चक्षुःश्रोत्रत्वग्रसनघ्राणाख्यानि पञ्च। एतैर्दशभिः सहान्तरं मन एकादशकमेकादशेन्द्रियमित्यर्थः ॥

† इन्द्रियाणां भौतिकत्वमतं निराकरोति ॥

‡ इन्द्रियाणीति शेषः ॥

§ आशङ्क्याह ॥

originator, viz., into earth,—yet] we see the absorption of a drop of water into what notwithstanding is *not* its originator, viz., the ground.*

b. Some say that the Mind, included among the organs, is eternal. He repels this.†

तदुत्पत्तिश्रुतेर्विनाशदर्शनाच्च ॥ २२ ॥

No organ eternal.

Aph. 22.—[No organ is eternal,] because we have scripture for their beginning to be, and because we see their destruction.

a. All these organs, without exception, have a beginning,—for the scripture says, "From this is produced the vital air, the mind, and all the organs;"—and because we are certified of their destruction by the fact that, in the conditions of being aged, &c., the mind also, like the sight and the rest, decays: such is the meaning.‡

b. He rebuts the atheistical opinion that the sense [—for example—] is just the sets of eyeballs [&c].§

अतीन्द्रियमिन्द्रियं भ्रान्तानामधिष्ठाने ॥ २३ ॥

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* देवतासु या लयश्रुतिः सा नारम्भकविषयिणीत्यर्थः। अनारम्भकेऽपि भूतले जलबिन्दोर्लयदर्शनात् ॥

† इन्द्रियान्तर्गतं मनो नित्यमिति केचित् तत् परिहरति ॥

‡ तेषां सर्वेषामेवेन्द्रियाणामुत्पत्तिरस्ति। एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च। इत्यादिश्रुतेः। दृङ्नाद्यवस्थासु चक्षुरादीनामिव मनसोऽप्यपचयादिना विनाशनिर्णयाच्चेत्यर्थः ॥

§ गोलकजातमेवेन्द्रियमिति नास्तिकमतमपाकरोति ॥

The Sense not to be confounded with its site.

Aph. 23.—The Sense is supersensuous, [it being the notion] of mistaken persons [that the Sense exists] in [identity with] its site.

a. Every Sense is supersensuous, and not perceptible; but only in the opinion of mistaken persons does the Sense exist 'in its site,' e. g., in the eye-ball, in the condition of identity [with the eye-ball] :—such is the meaning. The correct reading is [—"The sense is something supersensuous;—to confound it with] the site,* [is a mistake]."

b. He rebuts the opinion that one single Sense, through diversity of powers, performs various offices.†

शक्तिभेदेऽपि भेदसिद्धौ नैकत्वम् ॥ २४ ॥

All the organs not one organ.

Aph. 24.—Moreover, a difference being established if a difference of powers be conceded, there is not a oneness [of the organs].

a. Even by the admission that a diversity of powers belongs to one single organ, the diversity of organs is established, because *powers* are assuredly organs:—therefore there is not a singleness of organ;—such is the meaning.‡

b. But then [it may be said], there is something unphilosophi-

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* इन्द्रियं सर्वमतीन्द्रियं न तु प्रत्यक्षं भ्रान्तानामेव त्वधिष्ठानं गोलकं तादात्म्येनेन्द्रियमित्यर्थः। अधिष्ठानमित्येव पाठः ॥

† एकमेवेन्द्रियं शक्तिभेदाद्विलक्षणकार्यकारीति मतमपाकरोति ॥

‡ एकस्यैवेन्द्रियस्य शक्तिभेदस्वीकारेऽपीन्द्रियभेदः सिद्ध्यति शक्तीनामपीन्द्रियत्वात्। अतो नैकत्वमिन्द्रियस्येत्यर्थः ॥

cal in supposing various kinds of organs to arise from one single Self-consciousness :—to which he replies.*

न कल्पनाविरोधः प्रमाणदृष्टस्य ॥ २५ ॥

Theoretical considerations cannot upset facts.

Aph. 25.—A theoretical discordance is not [of any weight] in the case of what is matter of ocular evidence.

a. This is simple.†

b. He tells us that, of the single leading organ, the Mind, the other ten are kinds of powers.‡

उभयात्मकं मनः ॥ २६ ॥

Diversified operation of Mind.

Aph. 26.—The Mind identifies itself with both.

a. That is to say, the Mind identifies itself with the organs of intellection and of action.§

b. Of his own accord he explains the meaning of the expression "identifies itself with both."‖

गुणपरिणामभेदान्नानात्वमवस्थावत् ॥ २७ ॥

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* नन्वेकस्मादहङ्कारान्नानाविधेन्द्रियोत्पत्तिकल्पनायां न्यायविरोधस्तत्राह ॥

† सुगमम् ॥

‡ एकस्यैव मुख्येन्द्रियस्य मनसोऽन्ये दश शक्तिभेदा इत्याह ॥

§ ज्ञानकर्मेन्द्रियात्मकं मन इत्यर्थः ॥

‖ उभयात्मकमित्यस्यार्थं स्वयं विवृणोति ॥

How this happens.

Aph. 27.—By reason of the varieties of transformation of the Qualities, there is a diversity [of the Mind,] according to circumstances.

a. As a single man supports a variety of characters, through the force of association,—being, through association with his beloved, a lover,—through association with one indifferent, indifferent,—and, through association with some other, something other,—so the Mind also, through association with the organ of vision, or any other, becomes various, through its becoming one with the organ of vision, or any other,—by its being [thereby] distinguished by the modification of seeing, or the like. The argument in support of this is, 'of the Qualities, &c.'; the meaning being, because of the adaptability of the Qualities, Goodness, &c., to varieties of transformation.*

b. He mentions the object of the organs of intellection and of action.†

रूपादिरसमलान्त उभयोः ॥ २८ ॥

What the organs deal with.

Aph. 28.—Of both [the object is], beginning with Colour, what ends with the dirt of Taste.

a. The 'dirt' of the tastes of food, &c., means ordure, &c.,‡

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* यथैक एव नरः सङ्गवशान्नानात्वं भजते कामिनीसङ्गात् कामुको विरक्तसङ्गादिरक्तोऽन्यसङ्गाच्चान्य एवं मनोऽपि चक्षुरादिसङ्गाच्चक्षुराद्येकीभावेन दर्शनादिवृत्तिविशिष्टतया नाना भवति। तत्र हेतुर्गुणेत्यादि। गुणानां सत्त्वादीनां परिणामभेदेषु सामर्थ्यादित्यर्थः ॥

† ज्ञानकर्मेन्द्रिययोर्विषयमाह ॥

‡ अन्नरसानां मलः पुरीषादिः ॥

[into which the food, consisting of the *quality* Taste, &c., is partly transformed].

b. Of what Soul *(indra)*, through what service, these are termed Organs *(indriya)*,—both these things he tells us.*

द्रष्टृत्वादिरात्मनः करणत्वमिन्द्रियाणाम् ॥ २९ ॥

The Organs and their possessors.

Aph. 29.—The being the seer, &c., belongs to the Soul; the instrumentality belongs to the Organs.

a. For, as a king, even without himself energizing, becomes a warrior through his instrument, his army, by directing this by orders simply,—so the Soul, though quiescent, through all the organs, of vision, &c., becomes a seer, a speaker, and a judger, and the like, merely through the proximity called 'Conjunction,'—because it moves these as the loadstone† [does the iron, without exerting any effort].

b. Now he mentions the special modifications of the triad of internal organs.‡

त्रयाणां स्वालक्षण्यम् ॥ ३० ॥

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* यस्येन्द्रस्य येनोपकारेणैतानीन्द्रियाणीत्युच्यते तदुभयमाह ॥

† यथा हि महाराजः स्वयमव्याप्रियमाणोऽपि सैन्येन करणेन योद्धा भवत्याज्ञामात्रेण प्रेरकत्वात् तथा कूटस्थोऽपि पुरुषश्चक्षुराद्यखिलकरणैर्द्रष्टा वक्ता सङ्कल्पयिता चेत्येवमादिर्भवति संयोगाख्यसान्निध्यमात्रेणैव तेषां प्रेरकत्वादयस्कान्तमणिवदिति ॥

‡ इदानीमन्तःकरणत्रयस्यासाधारणवृत्तीराह ॥

Differences in the internal organs.

Aph. 30.—Of the three there is a diversity among themselves.

a. The aspect of Intelligence is attention,—of Self-consciousness, conceit [of personality],—of Mind, decision and doubt.*

b. He mentions also a common aspect of the three.†

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥ ३१ ॥

A character common to the three..

Aph. 31. The five airs, Breath, &c., are the common modification of the [three internal] instruments.

a. That is to say, the five, in the shape of Breath, &c., which are familiarly known as 'airs', because of their circulating as the air does,—these are the joint or common 'modification,' or kinds of altered form, 'of the instruments,' i. e., of the triad of internal instruments.‡

b. The determination is not ours, as it is that of the Vaiśeshikas, that the modifications of the organs take place successively only, and not simultaneously;—so he says.§

क्रमशोऽक्रमशश्चेन्द्रियवृत्तिः ॥ ३२ ॥

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* बुद्धेर्वृत्तिरध्यवसायोऽभिमानोऽहङ्कारस्य सङ्कल्पविकल्पौ मनस इति ॥

† त्रयाणां साधारणीं वृत्तिमप्याह ॥

‡ प्राणादिरूपाः पञ्च वायुवत् सञ्चारात् वायवो ये प्रसिद्धास्ते सामान्या साधारणी करणस्यान्तःकरणत्रयस्य वृत्तिः परिणामभेदा इत्यर्थः ॥

§ वैशेषिकाणामिवास्माकं नायं नियमो यदिन्द्रियवृत्तिः क्रमेणैव भवति नैकदेत्याह ॥

Sense-impressions not exclusively successive.

Aph. 32.—The modifications of the organs take place both successively and simultaneously.

a. This is simple.*

b. Lumping the modifications of the understanding, with a view to showing how they are the cause of the world, he, in the first place, exhibits [them†.]

वृत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः ॥ ३३ ॥

The ideas which constitute the world.

Aph. 33.—The modifications, which are five, are [some of them] painful and [others] not painful.

a. That the modifications are of five sorts, is declared by Patanjali's aphorism,‡ [—see Yoga Aphorisms B. I, §6].

b. He acquaints us with the nature of Soul.§

तन्निवृत्तावुपशान्तोपरागः स्वस्थः ॥ ३४ ॥

Soul's relation thereto.

Aph. 34.—On the cessation thereof, its tincture ceasing, it abides in itself.

a. That is to say, during the state of repose of these modifications, it [the Soul], the reflection of these having ceased, is abiding in itself,—being at *other* times also, as it were, in isolation, [—though seemingly not so]. And to this effect there is a

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* सुगमम् ॥

† पिण्डीकृत्य बुद्धिवृत्तीः संसारनिदानताप्रतिपादनार्थमादौ दर्शयति ॥

‡ वृत्तीनां पञ्चप्रकारत्वं पातञ्जलसूत्रेणोक्तम् ॥

§ पुरुषस्य स्वरूपं परिचाययति ॥

triad of Aphorisms of the Yoga,* [viz. B. I., §§2, 3, and 4].

b. He explains this by an illustration.†

कुसुमवच्च मणिः ॥ ३५ ॥

This illustrated. *Aph.* 35.—And as [by] a flower the gem.

a. The "and" implies that this is the *reason* [of what was asserted in the preceding aphorism], the meaning being, as the gem [is tinged, apparently,] by a flower. As the gem called rock-crystal, by reason of a flower of the Hibiscus, becomes red,—not abiding in its own state,—and, on the removal thereof, becomes colourless,—abiding in its own state,—in like manner‡ [is the Soul apparently tinged by the adjunction of the Qualities].

b. But then [it may be asked], by whose *effort* does the aggregate of the organs come into operation, since Soul is motionless, and since it is denied that there is any Lord [or Demiurgus]? To this he replies.§

पुरुषार्थं करणोद्भवोऽप्यदृष्टोद्वासात् ॥ ३६ ॥

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* तासां वृत्तीनां विरामदशायां शान्ततत्प्रतिबिम्बकः स्वस्थो भवति कैवल्य इवान्यदापीत्यर्थः। तथा च योगसूत्रत्रयम् ॥

† एतदेव दृष्टान्तेन विवृणोति ॥

‡ चकारो हेतौ कुसुमेनेव मणिरित्यर्थः। यथा जपाकुसुमेन स्फटिकमणी रक्तोऽस्वस्थो भवति तन्निवृत्तौ च रागशून्यः स्वस्थो भवति तद्वदिति ॥

§ ननु कस्य प्रयत्नेन करणजातं प्रवर्ततां पुरुषस्य कूटस्थत्वादीश्वरस्य च प्रतिषिद्धत्वादिति तत्राह ॥

What moves the Organs to operate.

Aph. 36.—The Organs also arise, for the sake of Soul, from the development of desert.

a. The meaning is, that, just as Nature energizes for the sake of Soul, so do also the Organs arise, i. e., the energizing of the Organs is just in consequence of the development of the deserts of the Soul,—[see Yoga Aphorisms B. II, §13, *b*]. And the desert belongs entirely to the investment,* [—the Soul not really possessing either merit or demerit].

b. He mentions an instance of a thing's spontaneously energizing for the sake of another.†

धेनुवद्वत्साय ॥ ३७ ॥

An illustration.

Aph. 37.—As the cow for the calf.

a. As the cow, for the sake of the calf, quite spontaneously distils milk, and awaits no other effort, just so, for the sake of the master, Soul, the Organs energize quite spontaneously; such is the meaning. And it is *seen* that, out of profound sleep, understanding of its own accord wakes up.‡

b. With reference to the question how many Organs there are, external and internal combined, he says.§

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* प्रधानप्रवृत्तिवत् पुरुषार्थं करणोद्भवः करणानां प्रवृत्तिरपि पुरुषस्यादृष्टाभिव्यक्तेरेव भवतीत्यर्थः। अदृष्टं चोपाधेरेव ॥

† परार्थं स्वतःप्रवृत्तौ दृष्टान्तमाह ॥

‡ यथा वत्सार्थं धेनुः स्वयमेव क्षीरं स्रवति नान्यं यत्नमपेक्षते तथैव स्वामिनः पुरुषस्य कृते स्वयमेव करणानि प्रवर्तन्त इत्यर्थः। दृश्यते च सुषुप्तात् स्वयमेव बुद्धेरुत्थानमिति ॥

§ बाह्याभ्यन्तरैर्मिलित्वा कियन्ति करणानीत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह ॥

करणं त्रयोदशविधमवान्तरभेदात् ॥ ३८ ॥

The number of the Organs.

Aph. 38.—Organ is of thirteen sorts, through subordinate division.

a. The triad of internal organs, and the ten external organs, combined, are thirteen;—he says 'sorts,' in order to declare that of these moreover there is an infinity, through their distinction into individuals. He says 'through subordinate division,' with a reference to the fact that it is *understanding* which is the principal organ;—the meaning being, because the organs [or functions] of the single organ, called understanding, are more than one.*

b. But then, since understanding alone is the principal instrument in furnishing its object [of emancipation] to Soul, and the instrumentality of the others is secondary,—in this case what is secondariness? In regard to this he says.†

इन्द्रियेषु साधकतमत्वगुणयोगात् कुठारवत् ॥ ३९ ॥

Efficiency of the organs whence.

Aph. 39.—Because the quality of being most efficient, is conjoined with the organs,—as in the case of an axe.

a. The quality of the organ, the understanding, in the shape of being most efficient, on behalf of soul, exists derivatively in the

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* अन्तःकरणत्रयं दश बाह्यकरणानि मिलित्वा त्रयोदश तेष्वपि व्यक्तिभेदेनानन्त्यं प्रतिपादयितुं विधमित्याक्तम्। बुद्धिरेव मुख्यं करणमित्याशयेनोक्तमवान्तरभेदादिति। एकस्यैव बुद्ध्याख्यकरणस्य करणानामनेकत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

† ननु बुद्धिरेव पुरुषेऽर्थसमर्पकत्वान्मुख्यं करणमन्येषां च करणत्वं गौणं तत्र को गुण इत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह ॥

[other] organs; therefore it is made out that an organ is of thirteen kinds;—such is the connection with the preceding aphorism.*

b. 'As in the case of an axe.' As, although, the blow itself, since it is this that puts an end to our non-possession of the fruit, is the principal efficient in the cutting, yet the axe also is an efficient, because of its conjunction with the quality of being the principal efficient;—so [here also]:—such is the meaning. He does not here say that Self-consciousness is secondarily efficient,—meaning to imply that it is one with the internal organ.†

c. Specifying the precise state of the case in regard to the condition of secondary and principal, he says.‡

द्वयोः प्रधानं मनो लोकवद्भृत्यवर्गेषु ॥ ४० ॥

Pre-eminence of Mind illustrated.

Aph. 40.—Among the two, the principal is Mind, just as, in the world, among troops of dependents.

a. 'Among the two,' viz., the external and the internal, 'Mind,' i. e., understanding simply, is 'the principal,' i. e., chief;—in short is the immediate cause;—because it is it that furnishes Soul with its end;—just as, among troops of dependents, some one

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* इन्द्रियेषु पुरुषार्थसाधकतमत्वरूपः करणस्य बुद्धेर्गुणः परम्परयात्यन्तत्वयोदशविधं करणमुपपद्यत इति पूर्वसूत्रेणान्वयः ॥

† कुठारवदिति । यथा फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्नतया प्रहारस्यैव च्छिदायां मुख्यकरणत्वेऽपि प्रकृष्टसाधनत्वगुणयोगात् कुठारस्यापि करणत्वं तथेत्यर्थः । अन्तःकरणस्यैकत्वमभिप्रेत्याहङ्कारस्य गौणकरणत्वमत्र नोक्तम् ॥

‡ गौणमुख्यभावे व्यवस्थां विशिष्याह ॥

single person is the prime minister of the king, and the others, governors of towns, &c., are his subordinates;—such is the meaning.*

b. Here the word 'Mind' does not mean the third internal organ† [§30, *a*, but simply understanding].

c. He tells, in three aphorisms, the reasons why understanding is the principal.‡

अव्यभिचारात् ॥ ४१ ॥

Reason why Understanding is the principal.

Aph. 41.—Because there is no wandering away.

a. That is to say, because it [understanding] pervades all the organs,—or because there is no fruit [in the shape of knowledge] apart from it.§

तथाशेषसंस्काराधारत्वात् ॥ ४२ ॥

Another reason.

Aph. 42.—So too because it is the depository of all the self-continuant impressions.

a. Understanding alone is the depository of all self-continuant impressions, and not the Sight, &c., or Self-consciousness, or the

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* द्वयोर्बाह्यान्तरयोर्मध्ये मनो बुद्धिरेव प्रधानं मुख्यम्। साक्षात्करणमिति यावत्। पुरुषेऽर्थसमर्पकत्वात्। यथा भृत्यवर्गेषु मध्ये कश्चिदेव लोको राज्ञः प्रधानो भवत्यन्ये च तदुपसर्जनीभूता ग्रामाध्यक्षादयस्तद्वदित्यर्थः ॥

† अत्र मनःशब्दो न तृतीयान्तःकरणवाची ॥

‡ बुद्धेः प्रधानत्वे हेतूनाह त्रिभिः सूत्रैः ॥

§ सर्वकरणव्यापकत्वात् फलाव्यभिचाराद्वेत्यर्थः ॥

Mind; else it could not happen that things formerly seen, and heard, &c., should be remembered by the blind, and deaf, &c.*

स्मृत्यानुमानाच्च ॥ ४३ ॥

Another reason.

Aph. 43.—And because we infer this by reason of its meditating.

a. That is to say,—and because we infer its pre-eminence, through its 'meditating,'—through its modification in the shape of meditation. For the modification of thought called 'meditation' is the noblest of all the modifications, and the Understanding itself, which, as being the depository thereof, is further named Thought [*chitta,*—from the same root as *chintá*—], is nobler than the organs whose modifications are other than this;—such is the meaning.†

b. But then suppose that the modification 'meditation' belongs only to the *Soul* [—suggests some one]. To this he replies.‡

स्वसंवेद्यं न स्वतः ॥ ४४ ॥

Meditation not spontaneous in Soul.

Aph. 44.—It cannot be through its own nature.

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* बुद्धेरेवाखिलसंस्काराधारता न तु चक्षुरादेरहङ्कारमनसोर्वा पूर्वदृष्टश्रुताद्यर्थानामन्वबधिरादिभिः स्मरणानुपपत्तेः ॥

† स्मृत्या चिन्तनरूपया वृत्त्या प्राधान्यानुमानाच्चेत्यर्थः। चिन्तावृत्तिर्हि ध्यानाख्या सर्ववृत्तिभ्यः श्रेष्ठा तदाश्रयतया च चित्तापरनाम्नी बुद्धिरेव श्रेष्ठान्यवृत्तिककरणेभ्य इत्यर्थः ॥

‡ ननु चिन्तावृत्तिः पुरुषस्यैवास्तु तत्राह ॥

a. That is to say, meditation cannot belong to Soul naturally, because of the immobility* [of Soul].

b. But then, if thus the pre-eminence belong to understanding alone, how was it said before [at §26,] that it is the *Mind* that takes the nature of both [sets of organs, in apparent contradiction to the view propounded at §39]? To this he replies.†

आपेक्षिको गुणप्रधानभावः क्रियाविशेषात्॥ ४५ ॥

An organ may be relatively principal and secondary.

Aph. 45.—The condition of secondary and principal is relative, because of the difference of function.

a. In respect to the difference of function, the condition, as secondary or principal, of the instruments [of Soul] is relative; —in the operations of the Sight, &c., the Mind is principal; and in the operation of the Mind, Self-consciousness, and in the operation of Self-consciousness, Intellect is principal.‡

b. But then, what is the cause of this arrangement, viz., that of this [or that] Soul, this [or that] Intellect alone, and not another Intellect, is the instrument? With reference to this he says.§

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* स्वतः पुरुषस्य स्मृतिर्न सम्भवेत् कूटस्थत्वादित्यर्थः॥

† नन्वेवं बुद्धिरेव प्राधान्ये कथं मनस उभयात्मकत्वं प्रागुक्तं तत्राह॥

‡ क्रियाविशेषं प्रति करणानामापेक्षिको गुणप्रधानभावश्चक्षुरादिव्यापारेषु मनः प्रधानं मनोव्यापारे चाहङ्कारोऽहङ्कारव्यापारे च बुद्धिः प्रधानम्॥

§ नन्वस्य पुरुषस्येयं बुद्धिरेव करणं न बुद्ध्यन्तरमित्येवं व्यवस्था किन्निमित्तिकेत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह॥

तत्कर्मार्जितत्वात् तदर्थमभिचेष्टा लोकवत् ॥ ४६ ॥

Each one reaps as he hath sowed.

Aph. 46.—The energizing is for the sake of this [or that], because of its having been purchased by the works of this [or that],—just as in the world.

a. The meaning is, that, 'the energizing,' i. e., all operation, of the instrument, is for the sake of [this or] that Soul, because of its having been purchased by [this or] that Soul's works [or deserts],—just as in the world. As, in the world [or in ordinary affairs], whatever axe, or the like, has been purchased by the act, e. g., of buying, by whatever man,—the operation of that [axe, or the like], such as cleaving, is only for the sake of that man [who purchased it]:—such is the meaning. The import is, that, *therefrom* is the distributive allotment of instruments* [inquired about, under §45. *b*].

b. Although there is *no* act in Soul, because it is immovable, still, since it is the means of Soul's experience, it is *called* the act of Soul, just like the victories, &c., of a king [which are really the acts of his servants], because of Soul's being the owner† [of the results of acts, as the king is of the results of the actions of his troops].

c. In order to make clear the chiefship of Intellect, he sums up.‡

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* तत्पुरुषीयकर्मजत्वात् करणस्य तत्पुरुषार्थमभिचेष्टा सर्वव्यापारो भवति लोकवदित्यर्थः। यथा लोके येन पुरुषेण क्रयादिकर्मणार्जितो यः कुठारादिस्तत्पुरुषार्थमेव तस्य छिदादिव्यापार इत्यर्थः। अतः करणव्यवस्थेति भावः॥

† यद्यपि कूटस्थतया पुरुषे कर्म नास्ति तथापि पुरुषभोगसाधनतया पुरुषस्वामिकत्वेन राज्ञो जयादिवदेव पुरुषस्य कर्मोच्यते॥

‡ बुद्धेः प्राधान्यं प्रकटीकर्त्तुमुपसंहरति॥

समानकर्मयोगे बुद्धेः प्राधान्यं लोकवल्लोकवत् ॥ ४७ ॥

Summing up.

Aph. 47.—Admitting that they act alike, the pre-eminence belongs to Intellect,—just as in the world, just as in the world.

a. Although the action of all the instruments is the same, in being for the sake of Soul, still the pre-eminence belongs to Intellect alone,—just as in the world. The meaning is, because it is just as the pre-eminence, in the world, belongs to the prime minister,—among the rulers of towns, and the rest, even although there be no difference in as far as regards their being [all alike workers] for the sake of the king. Therefore, in all the institutes, is Intellect alone celebrated as "the great one." The repetition [viz., "just as in the world, just as in the world,"] implies the completion of the Book.*

b. So much for [this abstract of] the Second Book, on Nature and its products, in the commentary, on Kapila's Declaration of the Sánkhya, composed by the venerable Vijñánáchárya.†

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* यद्यपि पुरुषार्थत्वेन समान एव सर्वेषां करणानां व्यापारस्तथापि बुद्धेरेव प्राधान्यं लोकवत्। लोके हि राजार्थकत्वाविशेषेऽपि ग्रामाध्यक्षादिषु मध्ये मन्त्रिणः प्राधान्यं तद्वदित्यर्थः। अत एव बुद्धिरेव महानिति सर्वशास्त्रेषु गीयत इति। द्वितीयाध्यायसमाप्तौ ॥

† इति श्रीविज्ञानाचार्यनिर्मिते कापिलसाङ्ख्यप्रवचनस्य भाष्ये प्रधानकार्याध्यायो द्वितीयः ॥

END OF BOOK II.

THE APHORISMS OF THE SÁNKHYA.

BOOK III.

INTRODUCTION.

a. From this forward, the gross product of Nature, the great elements and the duad of bodies, are to be described; and thereafter the going into various wombs, and the like, [this description being given] with a view to that less perfect degree of dispassionateness which is the cause of one's engaging upon the means of knowledge; and thereafter, with a view to perfect freedom from passion, all the means of knowledge are to be told: so the Third Book commences.*

अविशेषाद्विशेषारम्भः ॥ १ ॥

The elements whence.

Aph. 1.—The origination of the diversified is from that which has no difference.

a. 'Which has no difference,' i. e., that in which there exists not a distinction in the shape of calmness, fierceness, dulness, &c.,—viz., the Subtile Elements, called "the five somethings

* इतः परं प्रधानस्य स्थूलकार्यं महाभूतानि शरीरद्वयं च वक्तव्यं ततश्च विविधयोनिगत्यादयो ज्ञानसाधनानुष्ठानहेत्वपरवैराग्यार्थं ततश्च परवैराग्याय ज्ञानसाधनान्यखिलानि वक्तव्यानीति तृतीयारम्भः ॥

simply;"—from this [set of five] is the origination of 'the diversified,'—[so called] from their possessing a difference in the shape of the calm, &c.,—viz., the gross, the great Elements:—such is the meaning. For the fact of consisting of pleasure, or the like, in the shape of the calm, and the rest, is manifested, in the degrees of greater and less, &c., in the gross Elements only, not in the Subtile,—because *these*, since they have but the one form of the calm, are manifest to the concentrated* [but to no others].

b. So then, having stated, by composing the preceding Book, the origin of the twenty-three Principles, he states the origination, therefrom, of the duad of bodies.†

तस्माच्छरीरस्य ॥ २ ॥

The Body whence. *Aph.* 2.—Therefrom, of the Body.

a. 'Therefrom,' i. e., from the twenty-three Principles, there is the origination of the pair of Bodies, the Gross [Body] and the Subtile;—such is the meaning.‡

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* नास्ति विशेषः शान्तघोरमूढत्वादिरूपो यत्रेत्यविशेषो भूतसूक्ष्मं पञ्चतन्मात्राख्यं तस्माच्छान्तादिरूपविशेषवत्त्वेन विशेषाणां स्थूलानां महाभूतानामारम्भ इत्यर्थः। सुखाद्यात्मकता हि शान्तादिरूपा स्थूलभूतेष्वेव तारतम्यादिभिः रभिव्यज्यते न सूक्ष्मेषु तेषां शान्तैकरूपतयैव योगिभिव्यक्तेरिति ॥

† तदेवं पूर्वाध्यायमारभ्य त्रयोविंशतितत्त्वानामुत्पत्तिमुक्त्वा तस्माच्छरीरद्वयोत्पत्तिमाह ॥

‡ तस्मात् त्रयोविंशतितत्त्वात् स्थूलसूक्ष्मशरीरद्वयस्यारम्भ इत्यर्थः ॥

b. Now he proves that mundane existence could not be accounted for otherwise than on the ground of the twenty-three Principles.*

तद्बीजात् संसृतिः ॥ ३ ॥

Mundane existence whence.

Aph. 3.—From the seed thereof is mundane existence.

a. 'Thereof,' i. e., of the Body;—'from the seed,' i. e., from the Subtile one, as its cause, in the shape of the twenty-three Principles,—is 'mundane existence,' i. e., do the going and coming of Soul take place;—for it is impossible that, of itself, there should be a going, &c., of that which, in virtue of its all-pervadingness, is immovable:—such is the meaning. For Soul, being conditioned by the twenty-three Principles, only by means of that investment migrates from Body to Body, with a view to experiencing the fruits of previous works.†

b. He states the limit of mundane existence.‡

आविवेकाच्च प्रवर्तनमविशेषाणाम् ॥ ४ ॥

Mundane existence till when.

Aph. 4.—And till there is discrimination, there is the energizing of these which have no differences.

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* सम्प्रति त्रयोविंशतितत्त्वे संसारान्यथानुपपत्तिं प्रमाणयति ॥

† तस्य शरीरस्य बीजात् त्रयोविंशतितत्त्वरूपात् सूक्ष्मादेतेः पुरुषस्य संसृतिर्गतागते भवतः कूटस्थस्य विभुतया खतो गत्याद्यसम्भवादित्यर्थः । त्रयोविंशतितत्त्वेऽवस्थितो हि पुरुषस्तेनैवोपाधिना पूर्वकृतकर्मभोगार्थं देहादेहं संसरति ॥

‡ संसृतेरवधिमप्याह ॥

a. The meaning is, that, of all Souls whatever, devoid of the differences of being Lord or not Lord, &c., [—though seemingly possessed of such differences,—] 'energizing,' i. e., mundane existence, is inevitable just till there is discrimination [of Soul from its seeming investments], and it does not continue there after.*

b. He states the reason of this.†

उपभोगादितरस्य ॥ ५ ॥

The reason of this. *Aph.* 5.—Because of the other's experiencing.

a. The meaning is, because of the necessity 'that the other,' i. e., that that [Soul] which does not discriminate, should experience the fruit of its own acts.‡

b. He states that, even while there is a Body, during the time of mundane existence, fruition [really] is not.§

सम्प्रति परिमुक्तो द्वाभ्याम् ॥ ६ ॥

Soul's bondage only seeming. *Aph.* 6.—It is now quite free from both.

a. 'Now,' i. e., during the time of mundane existence, Soul

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* ईश्वरानीश्वरत्वादिविशेषरहितानां सर्वेषामेव पुंसां विवेकपर्यन्तमेव प्रवर्तनं संसृतिरावश्यकी विवेकोत्तरं च न सेत्यर्थः ॥

† तत्र हेतुमाह ॥

‡ इतरस्याविवेकिन एव स्वीयकर्मफलभोगावश्यम्भावादित्यर्थः ॥

§ देहसत्त्वेऽपि संसृतिकाले भोगो नास्तीत्याह ॥

is really free 'from both,' i. e., from the pairs, viz., cold and heat, pleasure and pain, &c;—such is the meaning.*

b. He next proceeds to describe separately the duad of Bodies.†

मातापित्रजं स्थूलं प्रायश इतरन्न तथा ॥ ७ ॥

The gross and Subtile Bodies distinguished.

Aph. 7.—The Gross [Body] usually arises from father and mother; the other one is not so.

a. The Gross one arises from father and mother 'usually,' i. e., for the most part,—for there is mention also of a Gross Body *not* born of a womb;—and 'the other,' i. e., the Subtile Body, is 'not so,' i. e., does not arise from a father and mother, because *it* arises from creation, &c.;—such is the meaning.‡

b. He decides the question—through disguise by which one, of the Bodies—Gross and Subtile,—the conjunction of the pairs [pleasure and pain, &c.,] with Soul takes place.§

पूर्वोत्पत्तेस्तत्कार्यत्वं भोगादेकस्य नेतरस्य ॥ ८ ॥

Which of the bodies is the cause of Soul's bondage.

Aph. 8.—To that which arose antecedently it belongs to be that whose result

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* सम्प्रति संसृतिकाले पुरुषो द्वाभ्यां शीतोष्णसुखदुःखादिद्वन्द्वैः परिमुक्तो भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

† अतः परं शरीरद्वयं विशिष्य वक्तुमुपक्रमते ॥

‡ स्थूलं मातापित्रजं प्रायशो बाहुल्येनायोनिजस्यापि स्थूलशरीरस्य स्मरणादितरच्च सूक्ष्मशरीरं न तथा न मातापित्रजं सर्गाद्युत्पन्नत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

§ स्थूलसूक्ष्मशरीरयोर्मध्ये किमुपाधिकः पुरुषस्य द्वन्द्वयोगस्तदवधारयति ॥

is this,—because it is to the one that there belongs fruition, not to the other.

a. 'To be that whose result is this,' i. e, to have pleasure and pain as its effect [reflected in Soul], belongs to that Subtile Body alone whose origin was 'antecedent,' i. e., at the commencement of the creation [or annus magnus]. Why?—because the fruition of what is called pleasure and pain belongs to only 'the one,' i. e., the Subtile Body, but not to 'the other,' i. e., the Gross Body, because all are agreed that there is neither pleasure nor pain, &c., in a body of earth:—such is the meaning.*

b. He tells the nature of the Subtile Body just mentioned.†

सप्तदशैकं लिङ्गम् ॥ ९ ॥

The Subtile Body how constituted.

Aph. 9.—The seventeen, as one, are the Subtile Body.

a. The Subtile Body, further, through its being container and contained, is twofold. Here the seventeen [—to be just mentioned—], mingled, are the Subtile Body; and that, at the beginning of a creation, is but one, in the shape of an aggregate [—as the forest, the aggregate of many trees, is but one—]: such is the meaning. The seventeen are the eleven organs, the five Subtile Elements, and Understanding. Self-consciousness is included under Understanding.‡

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* पूर्वं सर्गादावुत्पत्तिर्यस्य लिङ्गशरीरस्य तस्यैव तत्कायत्वं सुखदुःखकार्यकत्वं कृत एकस्य लिङ्गदेहस्यैव सुखदुःखाद्यभोगात्। न त्वितरस्य स्थूलशरीरस्य मृतशरीरे सुखदुःखाद्यभावस्य सर्वसम्मतत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

† उक्तस्य सूक्ष्मशरीरस्य स्वरूपमाह ॥

‡ सूक्ष्मशरीरमप्याधाराधेयभावेन द्विविधं भवति तत्र सप्तदश मिलित्वा लिङ्गशरीरं तच्च सर्गादौ समष्टिरूपमेक-

b. But, pray, if the Subtile Body be *one*, then how should there, through distinction of Souls, be diverse experiences? To this he replies.*

व्यक्तिभेदः कर्मविशेषात् ॥ २० ॥

How there come to be individuals.

Aph. 10.—There is distinction of individuals through diversity of desert.

a. Although, at the beginning of the creation, there was but one Subtile Body, in the shape of that investment [—of Soul,—see *Vedánta-sára* §62—named] *Hiraṇya-garbha*, still, subsequently moreover, there becomes a division of it into individuals,'—a plurality partitively in the shape of individuals,—as at present there is, of the Subtile Body of a father, a plurality, partitively, in the shape of the Subtile Body of son, daughter, &c. He tells the cause of this, saying, 'through diversity of desert,'—meaning, through actions, &c., which are causes of the experiences of other animal souls.†

b. But then, on this showing, since the Subtile one alone, from its being the site of fruition, is [what ought to be denoted

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मेव भवतीत्यर्थः। एकादशेन्द्रियाणि पञ्चतन्मात्राणि बुद्धिश्चेति सप्तदश। अहङ्कारस्य बुद्धावेवान्तर्भावः॥

* ननु लिङ्गं चेदेकं तर्हि कथं पुरुषभेदेन विलक्षणा भोगाः स्युस्तत्राह॥

† यद्यपि सर्गादौ हिरण्यगर्भोपाधिरूपमेकमेव लिङ्गं तथापि तस्य पश्चाद्व्यक्तिभेदो व्यक्तिरूपेणांशतो नानात्वमपि भवति। यथेदानीमेकस्य पितृलिङ्गदेहस्य नानात्वमंशतो भवति पुत्रकन्यादिलिङ्गदेहरूपेण। तत्र कारणमाह कर्मविशेषादिति। जीवान्तराणां भोगहेतुकर्मादेरित्यर्थः॥

by the term] *Body*, how is the term Body applied to the Gross one? To this he replies.*

तदधिष्ठानाश्रये देहे तद्वादः ॥ ११ ॥

Why the gross Body is called a Body.

Aph. 11.—From its being applied to *it* [—viz., to the Subtile one], it is applied to the Body which is the tabernacle of the abiding thereof.

a. But then, what proof is there of another body,—other than the one consisting of the six sheaths,—serving as a tabernacle for the Subtile Body? With reference to this he says.†

न स्वातन्त्र्यात् तदृते छायावच्चित्रवच्च ॥ १२ ॥

The Subtile Body dependent on the gross body.

Aph. 12.—Not independently [can the Subtile Body exist], without that [Gross Body],—just like a shadow and a picture.

a. That is to say,—the Subtile Body does not stand independently, 'without that,' i. e., without a support; as a shadow, or as a picture, does not stand without a support. And so, having abandoned a Gross Body, in order to go to another world, it is settled that the Subtile Body takes another body, to serve as its tabernacle:—such is the import.‡

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* नन्वेवं भोगायतनतया लिङ्गस्यैव शरीरत्वे स्थूले कथं शरीरव्यवहारस्तत्राह ॥

† ननु षाट्कौशिकातिरिक्ते लिङ्गशरीराधिष्ठानभूते शरीरान्तरे किं प्रमाणमित्याकाङ्क्षायामाह ॥

‡ तल्लिङ्गशरीरं तदृतेऽधिष्ठानं विना स्वातन्त्र्यान्न तिष्ठति। यथा छाया निराधारा न तिष्ठति यथा वा चित्रमित्यर्थः। तथा च स्थूलदेहं त्यक्त्वा लोकान्तरगमनाय लिङ्गदेहस्याधारभूतं शरीरान्तरं सिध्यतीति भावः ॥

b. But then [it may be said], of the Subtile Body, since it is limited substance, as the Air, or the like, let the *Ether* [or *Space*], by association, be the substratum,—it is purposeless to suppose anything else:—to this he replies.*

मूर्तत्वेऽपि न सङ्घातयोगात् तरणिवत् ॥ १३ ॥

For it must have a material support.

Aph. 13.—Nay,—even though it be limited, —because of its association with masses,—just as the sun.

a. Though it be limited, it does not abide independently, without association,—for since, just like the sun, it consists of *light*—it is inferred to be associated with a mass. All lights,—the sun and the rest—are seen only under the circumstances of association [of the luminiferous imponderable] with earthy substances; and the Subtile Body consists of 'Purity,' which is Light,—therefore it must be associated with the Elements.†

b. He determines the magnitude of the Subtile Body.‡

अणुपरिमाणं तत्क्रुतिश्रुतेः ॥ १४ ॥

Size of the Subtile Body.

Aph. 14.—It is of atomic magnitude, for there is scripture for its acting.

a. 'It,' the Subtile Body, is 'of atomic magnitude,' i. e.,

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* ननु मूर्तद्रव्यतया वाय्वादेरिव लिङ्गस्याकाशमेवासङ्गेनाधारोऽस्तु व्यर्थमन्यत्र सङ्गकल्पनमिति तत्राह ॥

† मूर्तत्वेऽपि न खातन्त्र्यादसङ्गतयावस्थानं प्रकाशरूपत्वेन सूर्यस्येव सङ्घातसङ्गानुमानादित्यर्थः। सूर्यादीनि सर्वाणि तेजांसि पार्थिवद्रव्यसङ्गेनैवावस्थितानि दृश्यन्ते लिङ्गं च सत्त्वप्रकाशमयमतो भूतसङ्गतमिति ॥

‡ लिङ्गस्य परिमाणमवधारयति ॥

limited,—but not absolutely an *atom*, because it is declared to have parts. Wherefore?—'for there is scripture for its acting,'—i. e., because there is a text about its acting. When a thing is all-pervading, it cannot act, [action being motion]: but the proper reading is "because there is scripture for its *moving*."*

b. He states another argument for its being limited.†

तदन्नमयत्वश्रुतेश्च ॥ १५ ॥

Another proof of this.

Aph. 15.—And because there is scripture for its being formed of food.

a. That is to say,—it, viz., the Subtile Body, cannot be all-pervading, because there is scripture for its being partially formed of food;—for if it were all-pervading, it would be eternal. Although Mind, &c., are not formed of the Elements, still it is to be understood that they are spoken of as formed of food because they are filled with homogeneous particles through contact with food,‡ [as the light of a lamp is supplied by contact with the oil].

b. For what purpose is the mundane existence, the migrating

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* तल्लिङ्गमणुपरिमाणं परिच्छिन्नं न त्वत्यन्तमेवाणु सावयवस्योक्तत्वात्। कुतः क्रुतिश्रुतेः क्रियाश्रुतेः। विभुत्वे सति क्रिया न सम्भवति। तद्गतिश्रुतेरिति पाठस्तु समीचीनः॥

† परिच्छिन्नत्वे युक्त्यन्तरमाह॥

‡ तस्य लिङ्गस्यैकदेशतोऽन्नमयत्वश्रुतेर्न विभुत्वं सम्भवतीति। विभुत्वे सति नित्यतापत्तेरित्यर्थः। यद्यपि मनआदीनि न भौतिकानि तथाप्यन्नसंसृष्टसजातीयांशपूरणादन्नमयत्वादिव्यवहारो बोध्यः॥

from one body to another [Gross] body, of Subtile Bodies which are *unintelligent*? With reference to this he says.*

पुरुषार्थं संसृतिर्लिङ्गानां स्वपकारवद्राज्ञः ॥ १६ ॥

Why the Subtile Body migrates.

Aph. 16.—The mundane existence of Subtile Bodies is for the sake of Soul,—just like a king's cooks.

a. That is to say,—as the cooks of a king frequent the kitchens for the sake of the king, so the Subtile Bodies transmigrate for the sake of Soul.†

b. The Subtile Body has been discussed in respect of all its peculiarities; now he discusses the Gross Body so also.‡

पाञ्चभौतिको देहः ॥ १७ ॥

The Gross Body whence.

Aph. 17.—The Body consists of the five elements.

a. That is to say,—the Body is a modification of the five elements mingled.§

b. He mentions another opinion.‖

चातुर्भौतिकमित्येके ॥ १८ ॥

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* अचेतनानां लिङ्गानां किमर्थं संसृतिदेहाद्देहान्तरसञ्चार इत्याशङ्कायामाह ॥

† यथा राज्ञः सूपकाराणां पाकशालासु सञ्चारो राजार्थं तथा लिङ्गशरीराणां संसृतिः पुरुषार्थमित्यर्थः ॥

‡ लिङ्गशरीरमशेषविशेषतो विचारितमिदानीं स्थूलशरीरमपि तथा विचारयति ॥

§ पञ्चानां भूतानां मिलितानां परिणामो देह इत्यर्थः ॥

‖ मतान्तरमाह ॥

Another opinion.

Aph. 18.—Some say that it consists of *four* elements.

a. This [is alleged] with the import that the *Ether* does not originate* [anything].

ऐकभौतिकमित्यपरे ॥ १९ ॥

Another opinion.

Aph. 19.—Others say that it consists of *one* element.

a. The import is, that the body is of Earth only, and the other elements are merely supporters. Or 'of one element' means of one or other element:† [—see the Rosicrucian doctrine in the *Tarka-sangraha*, §13, &c].

b. He tells us what is proved by the fact that the Body consists of the Elements.‡

न सांसिद्धिकं चैतन्यं प्रत्येकादृष्टेः ॥ २० ॥

Intellect not the result of organization.

Aph. 20.—Intellect is not natural [—the natural result of organization—] because it is not found in them severally.

a. That is to say,—since we do not find intellect in the separated Elements, intellect is not natural to the Body which consists of the Elements, but is adventitious.§

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* आकाशस्यानारम्भकत्वमभिप्रेत्येदम् ॥

† पार्थिवमेव शरीरमन्यानि च भूतान्युपष्टम्भकमात्राणीति भावः। अथवैकभौतिकमेकैकभौतिकमित्यर्थः ॥

‡ देहस्य भौतिकत्वेन यत् सिद्ध्यति तदाह ॥

§ भूतेषु पृथक् कृतेषु चैतन्यादर्शनाद्भौतिकस्य देहस्य न स्वाभाविकं चैतन्यं किन्त्वौपाधिकमित्यर्थः ॥

b. He states another refutation* [of the notion that Intellect is a property of the Body].

प्रपञ्चमरणाद्यभावश्च ॥ २१ ॥

A further argument.

Aph. 21.—And there would not be the death, &c., of anything.

a. That is to say,—and, if the Body had intellect natural to it, there would not be the death, the profound sleep, &c., 'of anything,'—of all things. For death, profound sleep, &c., mean the body's being non-intelligent;—and this, if it were by its own nature intelligent, would not take place,—because the essential nature of a thing remains as long as the thing remains.†

b. Pondering a doubt, as to the assertion [in §20], viz., "because it is not found in them severally,"—he repels it.‡

मदशक्तिवच्चेत् प्रत्येकपरिदृष्टे सांहत्ये तदुद्भवः ॥ २२ ॥

An illustrative objection disposed of.

Aph. 22.—If you say that it is like the power of something intoxicating, [we reply, that] this might arise, on conjunction, if we had seen in each [something conducive to the result].

a. But then, as an intoxicating power, though not residing in the substances severally, resides in the mixed substance,—so may Intellect also be;—if any one say this, it is not so. If it *had* been seen in each [constituent], its appearance in the com-

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* बाधकान्तरमाह ॥

† प्रपञ्चस्य सर्वस्यैव मरणसुषुप्याद्यभावश्च देहस्य स्वाभाविकचैतन्ये सति स्यादित्यर्थः। मरणसुषुप्तादिकं हि देहस्याचेतनता सा च स्वाभाविकचैतन्ये सति नोपपद्यते स्वभावस्य यावद्द्रव्यभावित्वादिति ॥

‡ प्रत्येकादृष्टेरिति यदुक्तं तत्राशङ्क्य परिहरति ॥

pound might have had place. But in the case in question, it is not the case that it is seen in each. Therefore, in the illustration [of something intoxicating resulting from mixture], it being established, by the Institutes, &c., that there is in each ingredient a *subtile* tendency to intoxicate, it is only settled that, at the time when these combine, there will be a *manifestation* of the [already existing] power of intoxicating;—but in the thing illustrated, it is not established by any proof whatsoever, that there is intelligence, in a subtile [or undeveloped] state, in the elements separately:—such is the meaning.*

b. It was stated [§16] that the Subtile Bodies transmigrate for the sake of Soul:—in regard to this, he tells, in two aphorisms, by what operation belonging to the birth of the Subtile Bodies, which means their transmigrations into Gross Bodies, what aims of Soul are accomplished.†

ज्ञानान्मुक्तिः ॥ २३ ॥

Purpose of the Subtile Body's taking a gross one.

Aph. 23.—From knowledge—salvation.

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* ननु यथा मादकता शक्तिः प्रत्येकद्रव्यादृत्तिरपि मिलितद्रव्ये वर्तत एवं चैतन्यमपि स्यादिति चेन्न प्रत्येकपरिदृष्टे सति सांहत्ये तदुद्भवः सम्भवेत्। प्रकृते तु प्रत्येकपरिदृष्टत्वं नास्ति। अतो दृष्टान्ते प्रत्येकं शास्त्रादिभिः सूक्ष्मतया मादकत्वे सिद्धे संहतभावकाले मादकत्वाविर्भावमात्रं सिद्ध्यति। दार्ष्टान्तिके तु प्रत्येकभूतेषु सूक्ष्मतया न केनापि प्रमाणेन चैतन्यं सिद्धमित्यर्थः॥

† पुरुषार्थं संसृतिर्लिङ्गानामित्युक्तं तत्र लिङ्गानां स्थूलदेहसञ्चाराख्यजन्मनो यो यः पुरुषार्थो येन येन व्यापारेण सिद्ध्यति तदाह सूत्राभ्याम्॥

a. That is to say,—by the transmigration of the Subtile Body, through birth, there takes place the direct operation of discrimination [between Soul and Not-Soul]; and thence, in the shape of emancipation, Soul's [chief] End.*

बन्धो विपर्ययात् ॥ २४ ॥

Bondage whence. *Aph.* 24.—Bondage is from misconception

a. Through the transmigration of the subtile body, from misconception, is there that [less worthy] end of soul, in the shape of bondage, consisting of pleasure and pain;—such is the meaning.†

b. Liberation and Bondage, [resulting] from knowledge and misconception [respectively], have been mentioned. Of these, in the first place, he explains Liberation [arising] from knowledge.‡

नियतकारणत्वान्न समुच्चयविकल्पौ ॥ २५ ॥

Knowledge has neither co-operater nor substitute. *Aph.* 25.—Since this [knowledge] is the precise cause [of liberation], there is neither association [of anything else with it, e. g., good works], nor alternativeness, [e. g., of good works in its stead].

a. In respect of there being neither association nor alternativeness, he states an illustration.§

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* लिङ्गसंसृतितो जन्मद्वारा विवेकसाक्षात्कारस्तस्मान्मुक्तिरूपः पुरुषार्थो भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

† विपर्ययात् सुखदुःखात्मको बन्धरूपः पुरुषार्थो लिङ्गसंसृतितो भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

‡ ज्ञानविपर्ययाभ्यां मुक्तिबन्धावुक्तौ तत्रादौ ज्ञानान्मुक्तिं विचारयति ॥

§ समुच्चयविकल्पयोरभावे दृष्टान्तमाह ॥

स्वप्नजागराभ्यामिव मायिकामायिकाभ्यां नोभयोर्मुक्तिः पुरुषस्य ॥ २६ ॥

This illustrated.

Aph. 26.—The emancipation of soul does not depend on both [knowledge and works, or the like], just as [any end that one aims at is not obtained] from dream and from the waking state, [together or alternatively,—which are severally] illusory and not illusory.

a. But even if it be so [—may some one say—], there may be association, or alternativeness, of knowledge of the truth, with that knowledge which is termed Worship of [the One all-constitutive divine] Soul,—since there is no *illusoriness* in *this* object of Worship. To this he replies.*

इतरस्यापि नात्यन्तिकम् ॥ २७ ॥

Man's conception of the All is faulty.

Aph. 27.—Even of that other it is not complete.

a. Even of that 'other,' i. e., of the [just-mentioned] object of worship, the non-illusoriness is not complete,—because imaginary things also enter into [our conception of, and overlie, and disguise] the object of worship—the [One all-constitutive] Soul:—such is the meaning. †

b. He states in what *part* of it—is the illusoriness of the [meditative] Worship‡ [just referred to].

सङ्कल्पितेऽप्येवम् ॥ २८ ॥

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* नन्वेवमप्यात्मोपासनाख्यज्ञानेन सह तत्त्वज्ञानस्य समुच्चयविकल्पौ स्यातामुपास्यस्यामायिकत्वादिति तत्राह ॥

† इतरस्याप्युपास्यस्य नात्यन्तिकममायिकत्वमुपास्यात्मन्यध्यस्तपदार्थानामपि प्रवेशादित्यर्थः ॥

‡ उपासनस्य मायिकत्वं यस्मिन्नंशे तदाह ॥

Where the fault applies. *Aph.* 28—Moreover it is in what is *fancied* that it is thus.

a. That is to say,—moreover it is thus,—i. e., moreover there is illusoriness,—in that portion, of the thing meditated, which [portion of it] is fancied by the Mind, [—while it does not exist in reality]. For,—the object of worship having been declared in such texts as "All this indeed is Brahma,"—the illusoriness belongs entirely to that portion [of the impure conception of "the All" which presents itself, to the undiscriminating, under the aspect of] the world.*

b. Then,—what is the fruit of Worship? with reference to this, he says †

भावनोपचयाच्छुद्धस्य सर्वं प्रकृतिवत् ॥ २९ ॥

The fruit of Worship. *Aph.* 29,—From the achievement of meditation there is to the pure [Soul] everything,—just like Nature.

a. Through the effecting of the worship which is termed meditation, there becomes to the 'pure,' i. e., the sinless, Soul, all power,—just as belongs to Nature:—such is the meaning. That is to say,—as Nature creates, sustains, and destroys,—so also the Purity of the understanding of the worshipper, by instigating Nature, creates, &c.‡

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* मनःसङ्कल्पिते ध्येयांश एवमपि मायिकत्वमपीत्यर्थः। सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मेत्यादिश्रुत्युक्ते ह्युपास्ये प्रपञ्चांशस्य मायिकत्वमेवेति ॥

† तर्ह्युपासनस्य किं फलमित्याकाङ्क्षायामाह ॥

‡ भावनाख्योपासनानिष्पत्त्या शुद्धस्य निष्पापस्य पुरुषस्य प्रकृतेरिव सर्वमैश्वर्यं भवतीत्यर्थः। प्रकृतिर्यथा सृष्टिस्थिति-

b. It has been settled that Knowledge alone is the means of Liberation. Now he mentions the means of Knowledge.*

रागोपहतिर्ध्यानम् ॥ ३० ॥

Removal of obstacles to knowledge.

Aph. 30.—Meditation is [the cause of] the removal of Desire.

a. That is to say,—Meditation is the cause of the removal of that affection of the mind by objects, which is a hinderer of knowledge.†

b. With advertence to the fact that knowledge arises from the effectuation of Meditation, and not from merely commencing upon it, he characterises the effectuation of Meditation.‡

वृत्तिनिरोधात् तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ३१ ॥

Meditation at what point perfected.

Aph. 31.—It is perfected by the repelling of the modifications [of the Mind].

a. He mentions§ also the means of Meditation.§

संहारं करोति। एवमुपासकस्य बुद्धिसत्त्वमपि प्रकृतिप्रेरणेन सृष्ट्यादिकर्तृ भवतीति ॥

* ज्ञानमेव मोक्षसाधनमिति स्थापितम्। इदानीं ज्ञानसाधनान्याह ॥

† ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धको यो विषयोपरागश्चित्तस्य तदुपघातहेतुर्ध्यानमित्यर्थः ॥

‡ ध्याननिष्पत्त्यैव ज्ञानोत्पत्तिर्नारम्भमात्रेणेत्याशयेन ध्याननिष्पत्तेर्लक्षणमाह ॥

§ ध्यानस्यापि साधनान्याह ॥

धारणासनस्वकर्मणा तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ३२ ॥

Practices conducive to meditation.

Aph. 32.—This is perfected by Restraint, Postures, and one's Duties.

a. That is to say,—Meditation results from the triad, which shall be mentioned, viz., Restraint, &c.*

b. By means of a triad of aphorisms he characterises, in order, Restraint, &c.†

निरोधश्छर्दिविधारणाभ्याम् ॥ ३३ ॥

Restraint of the breath.

Aph. 33.—Restraint [of the breath] is by means of expulsion and retention.

a. That it is 'of the breath' is gathered from the notoriousness‡ [of its being so].

b. He characterises Postures, which come next in order.§

स्थिरसुखमासनम् ॥ ३४ ॥

Postures.

Aph. 34.—Steady, and [promoting] ease, is a Posture.

a. That is to say,—that is a Posture, which, being steady, is a cause of pleasure;—such as the crossing of the arms.‖

b. He characterises one's Duty.¶

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* वक्ष्यमाणेन धारणादित्रयेण ध्यानं भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

† धारणादित्रयं क्रमात् सूत्रत्रयेण लक्षयति ॥

‡ प्राणस्येति प्रसिद्ध्या लभ्यते ॥

§ क्रमप्राप्तमासनं लक्षयति ॥

‖ यत् स्थिरं सत् सुखसाधनं भवति स्वस्तिकादि तदासनमित्यर्थः ॥

¶ स्वकर्म लक्षयति ॥

स्वकर्म स्वाश्रमविहितकर्मानुष्ठानम् ॥ ३५ ॥

One's duty. *Aph.* 35.—One's Duty is the performance of the actions prescribed for one's religious order.

a. Simple.*

वैराग्यादभ्यासाच्च ॥ ३६ ॥

Concentration how accomplished. *Aph.* 36.—Through Dispassion and Practice.

a. Simply through mere Practice, in the shape of Meditation, accompanied by Dispassion, Knowledge, and its instrument Concentration, takes place in the case of the best of those competent [to engage in the matter at all]:—such is the meaning. Thus has liberation, through knowledge, been expounded.†

b. After this the cause of Bondage, Misconception, declared in the assertion "Bondage is from Misconception," shall be expounded. Here first he states the nature of Misconception.‡

विपर्ययभेदाः पञ्च ॥ ३७ ॥

Misconception divided. *Aph.* 37.—The kinds of Misconception are five.

a. That is to say,—the subdivisions of Misconception, which

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* सुगमम् ॥

† केवलाभ्यासाज्ज्ञानरूपादेव वैराग्यसहिताज्ज्ञानं तत्साधनयोगश्च भवत्युत्तमाधिकारिणामित्यर्थः। तदेवं ज्ञानान्मोक्षो व्याख्यातः ॥

‡ अतः परं बन्धो विपर्ययादित्युक्तो बन्धकारणं विपर्ययो व्याख्यास्यते। तत्रादौ विपर्ययस्य स्वरूपमाह ॥

is the cause of Bondage, are Ignorance, Egoism, Desire, Aversion, and Fear of dissolution,—the five mentioned in the *Yoga*,* [see *Yoga Aphorisms*, B. II, §3].

b. Having stated the nature of Misconception, he states also the nature of its cause, viz., Disability.†

अशक्तिरष्टाविंशतिधा तु ॥ ३८ ॥

The varieties of Disability. *Aph.* 38.—But Disability is of twenty-eight sorts.

a. Simple‡—[as explained in the *Yoga*].

b. In a couple of aphorisms he mentions those two, Acquiescence and Perfection, on the prevention of which come two sorts of Disability of the understanding.§

तुष्टिर्नवधा ॥ ३९ ॥

Acquiescence. *Aph.* 39.—Acquiescence is of nine sorts.

a. He will himself explain how it is of nine sorts.‖

सिद्धिरष्टधा ॥ ४० ॥

Perfections. *Aph.* 40.—Perfection is of eight sorts.

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* अविद्यास्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः पञ्च योगोक्ता बन्धहेतुविपर्ययस्यावान्तरभेदा इत्यर्थः ॥

† विपर्ययस्य स्वरूपमुक्त्वा तत्कारणस्याशक्तेरपि स्वरूपमाह ॥

‡ सुगमम् ॥

§ यथोर्विघाते बुद्धेरशक्ती ते तुष्टिसिद्धी सूत्रद्वयेनाह ॥

‖ स्वयमेव नवधात्वं वक्ष्यति ॥

a. This also he will himself explain.*

b. Of the aforesaid, viz., Misconception, Disability, Acquiescence, and Perfection, since there may be a desire to know the particulars, there is, in order, a quaternion of aphorisms.†

अवान्तरभेदाः पूर्ववत् ॥ ४१ ॥

Their subdivisions. *Aph.* 41.—The subdivisions are as aforetime.

a. The subdivisions of Misconception, which, in a general way, have been stated as five,—are to be understood to be particularised 'as aforetime,'—i. e., just as they have been declared by preceding teachers;—they are not explained here, for fear of prolixity:—such is the meaning.‡

एवमितरस्याः ॥ ४२ ॥

Of this further. *Aph.* 42.—So of the other.

a. That is to say,—'so,'—i. e., just as aforetime [§41],—the divisions of Disability also, which are twenty-eight, are to be understood, as regards their particularities.§

आध्यात्मिकादिभेदान्नवधा तुष्टिः ॥ ४३ ॥

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* एतदपि स्वयं वक्ष्यति ॥

† उक्तानां विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्धीनां विशेषजिज्ञासायां क्रमेण सूत्रचतुष्टयं प्रवर्तते ॥

‡ विपर्ययस्यावान्तरभेदा ये सामान्यतः पञ्चोक्तास्ते पूर्ववत् पूर्वाचार्यैर्यथोक्तास्तथैव विशिष्यावधार्या विस्तरभयान्नेहोच्यन्त इत्यर्थः ॥

§ एवं पूर्ववदेवेतरस्या अशक्तेरप्यवान्तरभेदा अष्टाविंशतिर्विशेषतोऽवगन्तव्या इत्यर्थः ॥

Acquiescence divided.

Aph. 43.—Acquiescence is nine-fold, through the distinction of 'the internal' and the rest.

a. This aphorism is explained by a memorial verse,* [No. 50, which see in Professor Wilson's edition].

ऊहादिभिः सिद्धिः ॥ ४४ ॥

Perfection divided.

Aph. 44.—Through Reasoning, &c., [which are its subdivisions,] Perfection [is eight-fold.]

a. That is to say,—Perfection is of eight kinds, through its divisions, viz., Reasoning, &c. This also has been explained in a memorial verse,† [No 51, which see in Professor Wilson's edition].

b. But then,—how is it said that Perfection consists only of 'Reasoning, &c.,'—seeing that it is determined in all the Institutes that the eight Perfections, viz., [the capacity of assuming] Atomic bulk, &c., result from recitations, austerity, meditation, &c ? To this he replies.‡

नेतरादितरहानेन विना ॥ ४५ ॥

The enumeration defended.

Aph. 45.—Not from any other [does real Perfection arise;—because what does arise therefrom is] without abandonment of something else [viz., Misconception].

a. 'From any other,' i. e., from any thing different from the pentad 'Reasoning, &c.,' e. g., from Austerity, &c., there is no

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* इदं सूत्रं कारिकया व्याख्यातम् ॥

† ऊहादिभेदैः सिद्धिरष्टधा भवतीत्यर्थः। इदमपि सूत्रं कारिकया व्याख्यातम् ॥

‡ ननूहादिभिरेव कथं सिद्धिरुच्यते मन्त्रतपःसमाध्यादिभिरप्यणिमाद्यष्टसिद्धेः सर्वशास्त्रसिद्धत्वादिति तत्राह ॥

real Perfection:—why?—'without abandonment of that other,'—i e., because *that* Perfection [—which you choose to call such—] takes place positively without abandonment 'of something else,' i. e., of Misconception:—therefore *that* Perfection, since it is no antagonist to mundane existence, is only a *semblance* of a Perfection, and not a real Perfection:—such is the meaning.*

b. Now, the individuated creation, which was mentioned concisely in the assertion "The distinction of individuals arises from the difference of desert," is set forth diffusely.†

दैवादिप्रभेदा ॥ ४६ ॥

The creation viewed in its parts.

Aph. 46.—Of which the subdivisions are the demons, &c.

a. Supply—such is that creation, of which 'the subdivisions,'—the included divisions,—are the demons, &c. This is explained in a memorial verse,‡ [No. 53,—which see in Professor Wilson's edition].

b. He states that the aforesaid subdivided creation also is for the sake of Soul.§

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* इतरादूहनादिपञ्चकभिन्नात् तपआदेस्तात्त्विकी न सिद्धिः कुत इतरहानेन विना यतः सा सिद्धिरितरस्य विपर्ययस्य हानं विनैव भवत्यतः संसारापरिपन्थित्वात् सा सिद्ध्याभास एव न तु तात्त्विकी सिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥

† साम्प्रतं व्यक्तिभेदः कर्मविशेषादिति सङ्क्षेपादुक्ता व्यष्टिसृष्टिर्विस्तरतः प्रतिपाद्यते ॥

‡ दैवादिः प्रभेदोऽवान्तरभेदो यस्याः सा तथा सृष्टिरिति शेषः। तदेतत् कारिकया व्याख्यातम् ॥

§ अवान्तरसृष्टेरप्युक्तायाः पुरुषार्थत्वमाह ॥

आब्रह्मस्तम्बपर्यन्तं तत्कृते सृष्टिराविवेकात् ॥ ४७ ॥

This creation also for Soul's sake.

Aph. 47.—From Brahmá down to an insect, for its [Soul's] sake is creation, till there be discrimination [between Soul and Nature].

a. He mentions further the division of the subdivided creation, in three aphorisms.*

ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशाला ॥ ४८ ॥

The celestial world.

Aph. 48.—Aloft,—it is abundant in Purity.

a. That is to say,—'aloft'—above the world of mortals—the creation has chiefly [the Quality of] Purity.†

तमोविशाला मूलतः ॥ ४९ ॥

The infernal world.

Aph. 49.—Beneath, it is abundant in Darkness.

a. 'Beneath,'—that is to say under the world of mortals.‡

मध्ये रजोविशाला ॥ ५० ॥

The world of mortals.

Aph. 50.—In the midst, it is abundant in Passion.

a. 'In the midst,'—that is to say in the world of mortals.§

b. But then,—for what reason are there, from one single Nature, creations diverse in having, in excess, purity and the rest? With reference to this he says.‖

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* व्यष्टिसृष्टावपि विभागमाह सूत्रत्रयेण ॥

† ऊर्ध्वं भूर्लोकादुपरि सृष्टिः सत्त्वाधिका भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

‡ मूलतो भूर्लोकादध इत्यर्थः ॥

§ मध्ये भूर्लोक इत्यर्थः ॥

‖ नन्वेकस्या एव प्रकृतेः केन निमित्तेन सत्त्वादिविशालतया विचित्राः सृष्टय इत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह ॥

कर्मवैचित्र्यात् प्रधानचेष्टा गर्भदासवत् ॥ ५१ ॥

Why Nature operates diversely.

Aph. 51.—By reason of diversity of desert is Nature's behaviour,—just like a born slave.

a. Just by reason of diverse desert is the behaviour of Nature, as asserted, in the shape of diversity of operation. An illustration of the diversity is [offered in the example] 'just like a born slave:'—that is to say,—as of him who is a slave from the embryo state upwards, there is, through the cleverness arising from the habit of being a dependent, various sorts of behaviour, i. e., of service, for the sake of his master,—just so [does Nature serve Soul in various ways.]*

b. But then—if the creation aloft is abundant in Purity [—the element of joy—], then, since Soul's object is really thereby effected, what need is there of *Liberation*? To this he replies.†

आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशात् ॥ ५२ ॥

Why Heaven is to be shunned.

Aph. 52.—Even there, there is return [to miserable states of existence]; it is to be shunned by reason of the successive subjections to birth [from which the inhabitants of heaven enjoy no immunity].

a. Moreover.‡

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* विचित्रकर्मनिमित्तादेव यथोक्ता प्रधानस्य चेष्टा कार्यवैचित्र्यरूपा भवति। वैचित्र्ये दृष्टान्तो गर्भदासवदिति। यथा गर्भावस्थामारभ्य यो दासस्तस्य भृत्यवासनापाटवेन नानाप्रकारा चेष्टा परिचर्या स्वाम्यर्थं भवति तद्वदित्यर्थः ॥

† ननु चेदूर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशाला सृष्टिरस्ति तर्हि तत एव कृतार्थत्वात् पुरुषस्य किं मोक्षेणेति तत्राह ॥

‡ किञ्च ॥

समानं जरामरणादिजं दुःखम् ॥ ५३ ॥

Transitoriness of heavenly bliss.

Aph. 53.—Alike [belongs to all] the sorrow produced by decay and death.

a. Common to all alike, those that are aloft and those beneath, beginning with Brahmá and ending with a stock, is the sorrow produced by decay and death;—therefore moreover is it [heaven] to be shunned:—such is the meaning.*

b. What need of more? The end is not effected by absorption into the cause either,—as he tells us.†

न कारणलयात् कृतकृत्यता मग्नवदुत्थानात् ॥ ५४ ॥

Absorption into Nature ineffectual.

Aph. 54.—Not by absorption into the cause is there accomplishment of the end, because, as in the case of one who has dived, there is a rising again.

a. In the absence of knowledge of the distinction [between Soul and Nature], when indifference towards Mind, &c., has resulted from devotion to Nature, then absorption into Nature takes place;—for it is declared—"Through Dispassion there is absorption into Nature." Even through this, i. e., the absorption into the cause, the end is not gained, 'because there is a rising again,—as in the case of one who has dived.' As a man who has dived under water rises again, exactly so do Souls, which have been absorbed into Nature, re-appear [at the commencement of a new annus magnus], in the condition of Lords:—because it is impossible that one's Faults should be consumed without a familiarity with the distinction [between Soul and Nature], in consequence of the re-appearance of Pas-

* ऊर्ध्वाधोगतानां ब्रह्मादिस्थावरान्तानां सर्वेषामेव जरामरणादिजं दुःखं साधारणमतोऽपि हेय इत्यर्थः ॥

† किं बहुना कारणे लयादपि न कृतकृत्यतेत्याह ॥

sion through the non-destruction of habits, &c:—such is the meaning.*

b. But then,—the cause is not by any one caused to act;—being independent, then, why does she [Nature] make that grief-occasioning resurrection of her own worshipper? To this he replies.†

अकार्यत्वेऽपि तद्योगः पारवश्यात् ॥ ५५ ॥

Nature free to act, yet guided by an end.

Aph. 55. Though she be not constrained to act, yet this is fitting, because of her being devoted to another.

a. Though Nature is 'not constrained to act,' not instigated, not subject to the will of another, yet 'this is fitting,'—it is proper that he who is absorbed in her should arise again:—why?—'because of her being devoted to another,'—i. e., because she seeks Soul's end. The meaning is, that, he who is absorbed in her is again raised up by Nature for the sake of Soul's end which consists in knowledge of the distinction [between Nature and Soul]. And Soul's end, and the like, are not *constrainers* of Nature, but occasions for the energizing of her

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* विवेकज्ञानाभावे यदा महदादिषु वैराग्यं प्रकृत्युपासनया भवति तदा प्रकृतौ लयो भवति वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलय इति वचनात्। तस्मात् कारणलयादपि न कृतकृत्यताऽस्ति मग्नवदुत्थानात्। यथा जले मग्नः पुरुषः पुनरुत्तिष्ठति। एवमेव प्रकृतिलीनाः पुरुषा ईश्वरभावेन पुनराविर्भवन्ति। संस्कारादेरक्षयेण पुनारागाभिव्यक्तेर्विवेकख्यातिं विना दोषदाहानुपपत्तेरित्यर्थः॥

† ननु कारणं केनापि न कार्यतेऽतः स्वतन्त्रा कथं स्वोपासकस्य दुःखनिदानमुत्थानं पुनः करोति तत्राह॥

whose very being is to energize;—so that there is nothing detracted from her independence.*

b. He mentions further a proof that Soul rises from absorption into Nature.†

स हि सर्ववित् सर्वकर्ता ॥ ५६ ॥

The gain of absorption into Nature.

Aph, 56.—For he becomes omniscient and omnipotent.

a. For 'he,' viz., who in a previous creation was absorbed into the Cause, in a subsequent creation becomes 'omniscient and omnipotent,'—the Lord, the First Spirit.‡

b. But then,—if that be so, it is impossible to deny a *Lord* [—which, nevertheless, the *Sánkhyas* seem to do];—to this he replies.§

ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा ॥ ५७ ॥

In what sense there is a Lord.

Aph 57.—The existence of *such* a Lord is a settled point.

a. It is quite agreed by all, that there is an emergent Lord, he

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* प्रकृतेरकार्यत्वेऽप्यप्रेर्यत्वेऽप्यन्येच्छानधीनत्वेऽपि तद्योगः पुनरुत्थानौचित्यं तल्लीनस्य कुतः पारवश्यात् पुरुषार्थतन्त्रत्वात्। विवेकख्यातिरूपपुरुषार्थवशेन प्रकृत्या पुनरुत्थाप्यते स्वलीन इत्यर्थः। पुरुषार्थादृयश्च प्रकृतेर्न प्रेरकाः किन्तु प्रवृत्तिस्वभावायाः प्रवृत्तौ निमित्तानीति न स्वातन्त्र्यच्युतिः॥

† प्रकृतिलयात् पुरुषस्योत्थाने प्रमाणमप्याह॥

‡ स हि पूर्वसर्गे कारणलीनः सर्गान्तरे सर्ववित् सर्वकर्तेश्वर आदिपुरुषो भवति॥

§ नन्वेवमीश्वरप्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिस्तत्राह॥

who had been absorbed into Nature; for the ground of dispute [between the *Sánkhyas* and the rest] is altogether about an *eternal* Lord:—such is the meaning.*

b. He expounds diffusely the motive for Nature's creating, which was mentioned only indicatorily in the first aphorism of the Second Book.†

प्रधानसृष्टिः परार्थं स्वतोऽप्यभोक्तृत्वादुष्ट्रकुङ्कुमवह-
नवत् ॥ ५८ ॥

Nature's disinterestedness.

Aph. 58.—Nature's creating is for the sake of another, though it be spontaneous,—for she is not the experiencer,—just like a cart's carrying saffron [for the sake of its master].

a. But then,—it is quite impossible that Nature, being unintelligent, should be spontaneously a creator,—for we see that a cart, or the like, operates only by reason of the efforts of another. To this he replies.‡

अचेतनत्वेऽपि क्षीरवच्चेष्टितं प्रधानस्य ॥ ५९ ॥

Nature's spontaneous action illustrated.

Aph. 59.—Though she be unintelligent, yet Nature acts,—as is the case with milk.

a. That is to say,—as milk, without reference to men's efforts, quite of itself changes into the form of curd,—so Nature, al-

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* प्रकृतिलीनस्य जन्येश्वरस्य सिद्धिः सर्वसम्मतैव। नित्येश्वरस्यैव विवादास्पदत्वादित्यर्थः॥

† प्रधानसृष्टेः प्रयोजनं द्वितीयाध्यायस्यादिसूत्रे दिङ्मात्रेणोक्तं विस्तरतः प्रतिपादयति॥

‡ ननु प्रधानस्याचेतनस्य स्वतः सृष्टृत्वमेव नोपपद्यते रथादेः परप्रयत्नेनैव प्रवृत्तिदर्शनादिति तत्राह॥

though she be unintelligent, changes into the form of Mind, &c., even without the efforts of any other.*

b. This is not rendered tautological by this aphorism "As a cow—for her calf,"—because there the question was only of the operation of *instruments*, and because cows *are* intelligent.†

c. By means of the exhibition of another illustration, he mentions the cause of the thing asserted as aforesaid‡

कर्मवदृष्टेर्वा कालादेः ॥ ६० ॥

Another illustration.

Aph. 60.—Or as is the case with the acts, for we see them, of Time, &c.

a. Or, as is the case with the acts [or on-goings] of Time &c., the spontaneous action of Nature is proved from what is seen. The action of Time, for example, takes place quite spontaneously, in the shape of one season's now departing and another's coming on:—let the behaviour of Nature also be thus,—for the supposition conforms to observed facts:—such is the meaning.§

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* यथा क्षीरं पुरुषप्रयत्नैरपेक्ष्येण स्वयमेव दधिरूपेण परिणमते। एवमचेतनत्वेऽपि परप्रयत्नं विनापि महदादिरूपपरिणामः प्रधानस्य भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

† धेनुवदित्यायेत्यनेन सूत्रेणास्य न पौनरुक्त्यम्। तत्र करणप्रवृत्तेरेव विचारितत्वात्। धेनूनां चेतनत्वाच्चेति ॥

‡ दृष्टान्तान्तरप्रदर्शनपूर्वकमुक्तार्थहेतुमाह ॥

§ कालादेः कर्मवद्वा स्वतः प्रधानस्य चेष्टितं सिद्ध्यति दृष्टत्वात्। अथैको गच्छति चटतुरितरश्च प्रवर्तत इत्यादिरूपं कालादिकर्म स्वत एव भवत्येवं प्रधानस्यापि चेष्टा स्यात् कल्पनाया दृष्टानुसारित्वादित्यर्थः ॥

b. But then,—still, senseless Nature would never energize, or would energize the wrong way,—because of there being [in her case] no such communing as—"This is my means of producing experience, &c." To this he replies.*

स्वभावाच्चेष्टितमनभिसन्धानाद्भृत्यवत् ॥ ६१ ॥

Nature acts from habit.

Aph. 61.—From her own nature she acts, not from thought,—just like a servant.

a. That is to say,—as, in the case of an excellent servant, naturally, just from habit, the appointed and necessary service of the master is engaged in, and not with a view to his own enjoyment, just so does Nature energize from habit alone.†

कर्माकृष्टेर्वानादितः ॥ ६२ ॥

Or through the influence of Desert.

Aph. 62.—Or from attraction by deserts —which have been from eternity.

a. Here the word "or" is for connecting [this aphorism with the preceding one]. Since Desert has been from eternity, therefore moreover, through attraction by deserts, the energizing of Nature is necessary and rightly distributed:—such is the meaning.‡

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* ननु तथापि ममेदं भोगादिसाधनमिति प्रतिसन्धानाभावान्मूढायाः प्रकृतेः कदाचित् प्रवृत्तिरपि न स्याद्विपरीता च प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् तत्राह ॥

† यथा प्रकृष्टभृत्यस्य स्वभावात् संस्कारादेव प्रतिनियतावश्यकी च स्वामिसेवा प्रवर्तते न तु स्वभोगाभिप्रायेण तथैव प्रकृतेश्चेष्टितं संस्कारादेवेत्यर्थः ॥

‡ वाशब्दोऽत्र समुच्चये। यतः कर्मानाद्यतः कर्मभिराकर्षणादपि प्रधानस्यावश्यकी व्यवस्थिता च प्रवृत्तिरित्यर्थः ॥

b. It being thus settled, then, that Nature is creative for the sake of another, he tells us in the following section, that, on the completion of that other's purpose, Liberation takes place through Nature's quite spontaneously ceasing to act.*

विविक्तबोधात् सृष्टिनिवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य स्वदवत् पाके ॥ ६३ ॥

Nature desists when the end is gained.

Aph. 63. From discriminative knowledge is there a cessation of Nature's creating,—just as is the case with a cook when the cooking has been performed.

a. When Soul's aim has been accomplished, by means of indifference to all else, through discriminative knowledge of Soul, Nature's creating ceases,—just as, when the cooking is completed, the labour of the cook ceases:—such is the meaning.†

b. But, at that rate, since Nature's creating ceases through the production of discriminative knowledge in the case of a single Soul, we should find *all* liberated. To this he replies.‡

इतर इतरवत् तद्दोषात् ॥ ६४ ॥

Liberation of one involves not that of all.

Aph. 64.—Another is like another, through her fault.

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* तदेवं प्रधानस्य परार्थतः स्रष्टृत्वे सिद्धे परप्रयोजनसमाप्तौ स्वत एव प्रधाननिवृत्त्या मोक्षः सिद्ध्यतीत्याह प्रघट्टकेन ॥

† विविक्तपुरुषज्ञानात् परवैराग्येण पुरुषार्थसमाप्तौ प्रधानस्य सृष्टिर्निवर्तते। यथा पाके निष्पन्ने पाचकस्य व्यापारो निवर्तत इत्यर्थः

‡ नन्वेवमेकपुरुषस्योपाधौ विवेकज्ञानोत्पत्त्या प्रकृतेः सृष्टिनिवृत्तौ सर्वमुक्तिप्रसङ्ग इति तत्राह ॥

a. But 'another,' i. e., one *devoid* of discriminative knowledge, remains 'like another,' i. e., just like one bound by Nature. Why?—'through her fault,' i. e., through the fault which may be described as her not accomplishing that soul's aim:—such is the meaning.*

b. He mentions the fruit of Nature's ceasing to act.†

द्वयोरेकतरस्य वैराग्यमपवर्गः ॥ ६५ ॥

Liberation consists in what.

* *Aph.* 65.—The solitariness of both or [—which comes to the same thing—] of either, is liberation.

a. 'Of both,' i. e., of Nature and Soul,—the 'solitariness,' i. e., the being alone,—the mutual disjunction, in short,—this is liberation.‡

b. But then, how should Nature, having attained indifference, through the mood in the shape of discrimination, on the liberation of a single Soul, again engage in creation for the sake of another Soul? And you are not to say that this is no objection because Nature consists of different portions,—[it is not *another* Nature but the same,] because we see that, even out of the [mortal] constituents of the liberated person, his dust, &c., things are created for the experience of another. To this he replies.§

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* इतरस्तु विविक्तबोधरहित इतरवद्बद्धवदेव प्रकृत्या तिष्ठति। कृतत्वदोषात्। तस्य प्रधानस्यैव तत्पुरुषार्थासमापनाख्यदोषादित्यर्थः ॥

† सृष्टिनिवृत्तेः फलमाह ॥

‡ द्वयोः प्रधानपुरुषयोरेवंरूपा सौन्यमेकाकिता। परस्परवियोग इति यावत्। सैव ऽपवर्गः ॥

§ नन्वेकपुरुषमुक्तावेव विवेकाकारवृत्त्या विरक्ता प्रकृतिः

अन्यसृष्युपरागेऽपि न विरज्यते प्रबुद्धरज्जुतत्त्वस्येवोरगः ॥ ६६ ॥

How Nature affects one and not another.

Aph. 66.—Moreover she does not desist in regard to her creative influence on another,—just as is the case with the snake in respect of him who is aware of the truth in regard to the rope [which another mistakes for a snake].

a. Nature, though, in respect of one Soul, she have desisted, in consequence of discriminative knowledge, yet does not desist as regards her creative influence on another Soul, but *does* create in respect of *that* one:—just as the snake [—so to speak—] does not produce fear, &c., in the case of him who is aware of the truth in regard to the rope, but *does* produce it in respect of him who is ignorant [that what he looks upon is a rope and not a snake]:—such is the meaning. And Nature is likened to a snake, because of her disguising Soul, which is likened to a rope. Certain unintelligent persons, calling themselves *Vedántins*, having quite failed to understand that such is the drift of the examples of the rope, the snake, &c., suppose that Nature is an absolute nothing, or something merely imaginary. The matters of scripture, and of the legal institutes, are to be *understood* by means of the [illustrative] example offered by the *Sánkhyas* who assert the reality of Nature;—it is not the case only that a matter is *proved* by the fact that it has examples* [—these being often brought forward as illustrations and not as arguments.]

कथमन्यपुरुषार्थं पुनः सृष्टौ प्रवर्तताम्। न च प्रकृतेरंशभेदान्नैष दोष इति वाच्यम्। मुक्तपुरुषोपकरणैरपि पृथिव्यादिभिरन्यस्य भोग्यसृष्टिदर्शनादिति तत्राह ॥

* एकस्मिन् पुरुषे विविक्तबोधाद्विरक्तमपि प्रधानं नान्यस्मिन् पुरुषे सृष्युपरागाय विरक्तं भवति किन्तु तं प्रति

कर्मनिमित्तयोगाच्च ॥ ६७ ॥

Another consideration why Nature should act.

Aph. 67.—And from connection with Desert, which is the cause.

a. 'Desert,' which is the cause of creation,—in consequence of the conjunction of this also, she creates, for the sake of another Soul [than the emancipated one]:—such is the meaning.*

b. But then, although all Souls are alike indifferent, inasmuch as they do not desire [Nature's interference], what is it that here determines Nature to act only in regard to this one, and desist in regard to that one? And *Desert* is not the determiner, because there is here nothing to determine of which Soul what is the Desert [—Desert being only inferrible from, and therefore not cognizable antecedently to its *fruits*]. To this he replies.†

सृजत्येव। यथा प्रबुद्धरज्जुतत्त्वस्यैवारगो भयादिकं न जनयति मूढं प्रति तु जनयत्येवेत्यर्थः। उरगतुल्यत्वं च प्रधानस्य रज्जुतुल्ये पुरुषे समारोपणादिति। एवंविधं रज्जुसर्पादिदृष्टान्तानामाशयमबुद्ध्वैवाबुधाः केचिद्वेदान्तिन्नवाः प्रकृतेरत्यन्ततुच्छत्वं मनोमात्रत्वं वा तुलयन्ति। एतेन प्रकृतिसत्यतावादिसाङ्ख्योक्तदृष्टान्तेन श्रुतिस्मृत्यर्था बोधनीया न केवलं दृष्टान्तवत्त्वेनायमर्थः सिद्ध्यति ॥

* सृष्टौ निमित्तं यत् कर्म तस्य सम्बन्धादप्यन्यपुरुषार्थं सृजतीत्यर्थः ॥

† ननु सर्वेषां पुरुषाणामप्रार्थकतया नैरपेक्ष्याविशेषेऽपि कञ्चित् प्रत्येव प्रधानं प्रवर्तते कञ्चित् प्रति निवर्तत इत्यत्र किं नियामकम्। न च कर्म नियामकं कस्य पुरुषस्य किं कर्मेत्यत्र नियामकाभावादिति तत्राह ॥

नैरपेक्ष्येऽपि प्रकृत्युपकारेऽविवेको निमित्तम् ॥ ६८ ॥

Nature's selection how determined.

Aph. 68.—Though there is this indifference, yet want of discrimination is the cause of Nature's service.

a. That is to say,—although Souls *are* indifferent, yet Nature, just through non-discrimination, saying "This is my master," "This is I myself,"—serves Souls [towards their eventual emancipation] by creation, &c. And so, to what Soul, not having discriminated herself therefrom, she has the habit of showing herself, in respect just of that one does Nature energize:—and this it is that determines her:—such is the import.*

b. Since it is her *nature* to energize, how can she desist even when discrimination has taken place? To this he replies.†

नर्तकीवत् प्रवृत्तस्यापि निवृत्तिश्चरितार्थात् ॥ ६९ ॥

Nature energizes only till the end is attained.

Aph. 69.—Just like a dancer, does she, though she had been energizing, desist, because of the end's having been attained.

a. Nature's disposition to energize is only for the sake of Soul, and not universally. Therefore is it declared that Nature desists, though she had been energizing, when the end has been attained, in the shape of the effectuation of Soul's aim. Just as a dancer, who had been energizing with the view of ex-

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* पुरुषाणां नैरपेक्ष्येऽप्ययं मे स्वाम्ययमेवाहमित्यविवेकादेव प्रकृतिः सृष्ट्यादिभिः पुरुषानुपकरोतीत्यर्थः ॥ तथा च यस्मै पुरुषायात्मानमविविच्य दर्शयितुं वासना वर्तते तं प्रत्येव प्रधानं प्रवर्तत इत्येव नियामकमिति भावः ॥

† प्रवृत्तिस्वभावत्वात् कथं विवेकेऽपि निवृत्तिरुपपद्यतां तत्राह ॥

hibiting a dance to the spectators, desists on the accomplishment of this:—such is the meaning.*

b. He states another reason for the cessation.†

दोषबोधेऽपि नोपसर्पणं प्रधानस्य कुलवधूवत् ॥७०॥

This illustrated.

Aph. 70.—Moreover, when her fault is known, Nature does not approach [Soul], just like a woman of good family.

a. That is to say,—Nature, moreover, ashamed at Soul's having seen her fault,—in her transformations and her taking the shape of pain,—does not again approach Soul;—'just like a woman of good family,'—i. e.,—just as a [frail] woman of good family, ashamed at ascertaining that her fault has been seen by her husband, does not approach her husband.‡

b. But then,—if Nature's energizing be for the sake of Soul, then Soul must be *altered* by Bondage and Liberation [—and not remain the unalterable entity which you allege it to be]. To this he replies.§

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* पुरुषार्थमेव प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिस्वभावो न तु सामान्येन। अतः प्रवृत्तस्यापि प्रधानस्य पुरुषार्थसमाप्तिरूपचरितार्थत्वे सति निवृत्तिर्युक्ता। यथा परिषज्ञो दृत्यदर्शनार्थं प्रवृत्ताया नर्तक्यास्तन्निवृत्तौ निवृत्तिरित्यर्थः॥

† निवृत्तौ हेत्वन्तरमाह॥

‡ पुरुषेण परिणामित्वदुःखात्मकत्वादिदोषदर्शनादपि लज्जिताया: प्रकृतेः पुनर्न पुरुषं प्रत्युपसर्पणं कुलवधूवत्। यथा स्वामिना मे दोषो दृष्ट इत्यवधारणेन लज्जिता कुलवधूर्न स्वामिनमुपसर्पति तद्वदित्यर्थः॥

§ ननु पुरुषार्थं चेत् प्रधानप्रवृत्तिस्तर्हि बन्धमोक्षाभ्यां पुरुषस्य परिणामापत्तिरिति तत्राह॥

नैकान्ततो बन्धमोक्षौ पुरुषस्याविवेकादृते ॥ ७१ ॥

Soul's relation to Bondage.

Aph. 71.—Bondage and Liberation do not belong actually to Soul,—[and would not be] but for non-discrimination.

a. Bondage and Liberation, consisting in the conjunction of Pain and its disjunction, do not 'actually,' i. e., really, belong to Soul;—but, in the way mentioned in the fourth aphorism, they result only from non discrimination:—such is the meaning.*

b. But, in reality, Bondage and Liberation, as declared, belong to Nature alone:—so he asserts:†—

प्रकृतेराञ्जस्यात् ससङ्गत्वात् पशुवत् ॥ ७२ ॥

Bondage is really Nature's.

Aph. 72.—It really belongs to Nature, through consociation,—like a beast.

a. Bondage and Liberation, through Pain, belongs really to Nature,—'through consociation,' i. e., through her being hampered by the habits, &c., which are the causes of Pain;—just as a beast, through its being hampered by a rope, experiences Bondage and Liberation;—such is the meaning.‡

b. Here, by what causes is there Bondage, or by what is there Liberation? To this he replies.§

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* दुःखयोगवियोगरूपौ बन्धमोक्षौ पुरुषस्य नैकान्ततस्तत्त्वतः किन्तु चतुर्थसूत्रवक्ष्यमाणप्रकारेणाविवेकादेवेत्यर्थः ॥

† परमार्थतस्तु यथोक्तौ बन्धमोक्षौ प्रकृतेरेवेत्याह ॥

‡ प्रकृतेरेव तत्त्वतो दुःखेन बन्धमोक्षौ ससङ्गत्वाद्दुःखसाधनैर्धर्मादिभिर्लिप्तत्वात्। यथा पशू रज्ज्वा लिप्ततया बन्धमोक्षभागी तद्वदित्यर्थः ॥

§ तत्र कैः साधनैर्बन्धः कैर्वा मोक्ष इत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह ॥

रूपैः सप्तभिरात्मानं बध्नाति प्रधानं कोशकारवद्विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥ ७३ ॥

How Nature binds and liberates herself.

Aph. 73.—In seven ways does Nature bind herself, like the silk-worm;—in one way does she liberate herself.

a. By Merit, Dispassion, supernatural Power, Demerit, Ignorance, Non-dispassion, and Want of power,—by habits, causes of Pain, in the shape of these seven, does Nature bind herself with Pain, 'like the silk-worm,'—i. e., just as the worm that makes the cocoon binds itself by means of the dwelling which it itself constructs. And that same Nature liberates herself from Pain 'in one way,' i. e., by Knowledge alone:—such is the meaning.*

b. But then, that which you assert, viz., that Bondage and Liberation result from Non-discrimination alone, is improper,—because Non-discrimination can neither be quitted nor assumed,—and because, in the world, Pain, and its negative, Pleasure, can themselves be neither quitted nor assumed:—otherwise [—if you still insist on retaining the opinion objected to—] there is disparagement of sense-evidence. Having pondered this, he himself [—not leaving it to a commentator—] explains what was asserted in the fourth aphorism.†

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* धर्मवैराग्यैश्वर्याधर्माज्ञानावैराग्यानैश्वर्यैः सप्तभी रूपैर्धर्मैर्दुःखहेतुभिः प्रकृतिरात्मानं दुःखेन बध्नाति कोशकारवत्। कोशकारकृमिर्यथा स्वनिर्मितेनावासेनात्मानं बध्नाति तद्वत्। सैव च प्रकृतिरेकरूपेण ज्ञानेनैवात्मानं दुःखान्मोचयतीत्यर्थः ॥

† ननु बन्धमुक्ती अविवेकादिति यदुक्तं तदयुक्तम्। अविवेकस्याहेयानुपादेयत्वात्। लोके दुःखस्य तदभाव-

निमित्तत्वमविवेकस्य न दृष्टहानिः ॥ ७४ ॥

An objection met.

Aph. 74.—Non-discrimination is the cause [—not the thing itself—], so that there is no disparagement of sense-evidence.

a. What was asserted before was this, that Non-discrimination was only the *occasion* of Bondage and Liberation in souls, and not that Non-discrimination itself was these two; therefore there is no disparagement of sense-evidence [—for, though we see that Pain and Pleasure cannot be directly assumed or quitted, yet we also see that causes of them *can* be assumed or quitted—]:—such is the meaning.*

b. He mentions, among the means conducive to Discrimination, Study, which is the essence of them.†

तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नेति नेतीति त्यागाद्विवेकसिद्धिः ॥ ७५ ॥

Means of Discrimination.

Aph. 75.—Discrimination is perfected through abandonment [of everything]—expressed by "Nay—nay,"—through study of the [twenty-five] Principles.

a. Discrimination is effected through study of the Principles, in the shape of the abandoning, by a "Nay—nay," in regard to things unintelligent, ending with Nature, the conceit [that Nature, or any of her products, is Soul]. All the others [enumerated in the list of means] are only supplemental to Study:—such is the meaning.‡

सुखादेरेव च सतो हेयोपादेयत्वात्। अन्यथा दृष्टहानिरित्याशङ्क्य चतुर्थसूत्रोक्तं स्वयं विवृणोति ॥

* अविवेकस्य पुरुषेषु बन्धमोक्षनिमित्तत्वमेव पुरोक्तं न त्वविवेक एव तावति नातो दृष्टहानिरित्यर्थः ॥

† विवेकस्य निष्पत्त्युपायेषु सारभूतमभ्यासमाह ॥

‡ प्रकृतिपर्यन्तेषु जडेषु नेति नेतीत्यभिमानत्यागरूपात्

b. He states a specialty in regard to the perfecting of Discrimination.*

अधिकारिप्रभेदान्न नियमः ॥ ७६ ॥

The means not efficacious everywhere.

Aph. 76.—Through the difference of those competent [to engage in the matter at all], there is no necessity [that each and every one should at once be successful].

a. Since there is a division, of those competent, into the sluggish, &c., though study be made, there is no certainty that, in this very birth, Discrimination will be accomplished:—such is the meaning. Therefore each one should, by cleverness in study, acquire for himself the *highest* degree of competency:—such is the import.†

b. He states that Liberation takes place solely through the perfecting of Discrimination, and not otherwise.‡

बाधितानुवृत्त्या मध्यविवेकतोऽप्युपभोगः ॥ ७७ ॥

Imperfect Discrimination inefficacious.

Aph. 77.—Since what [Pain] has been repelled, returns again, there comes, even from medium [but imperfect] discrimination, experience [which it is desired to get entirely rid of].

a. But sluggish Discrimination [—lower even than the mid-

तत्त्वाभ्यासाद्विवेकनिष्पत्तिभवति। इतरत् सर्वमभ्यासस्याङ्गमात्रमित्यर्थः॥

* विवेकसिद्धौ विशेषमाह॥

† मन्दाद्यधिकारिभेदसत्त्वादभ्यासे क्रियमाणेऽप्यस्मिन्नेव जन्मनि विवेकनिष्पत्तिर्भवतीति नियमो नास्तीत्यर्थः। अत उत्तमाधिकारमभ्यासपाटवेनात्मनः सम्पादयेदिति भावः॥

‡ विवेकनिष्पत्त्यैव निस्तारो नान्यथेत्याह॥

dling variety—], antecedently to direct intuition, consists only of Hearing, Pondering, and Meditating:—such is the division* [of Discrimination].

जीवन्मुक्तश्च ॥ ७८ ॥

Of Liberation during life. *Aph.* 78.—And he who living is liberated.

a. That is to say,—he also who, while living, is liberated, is just in the condition of medium Discrimination.†

b. He states evidence for there being some one liberated though still living.‡

उपदेश्योपदेष्टृत्वात् तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ७९ ॥

Proof that this may be. *Aph.* 79.—It is proved by the fact of instructed and instructor.

a. That is to say,—it is proved that there are such as are liberated during life, by the mention, in the Institutes, on the subject of Liberation, of the relation of preceptor and pupil:—i. e., because it is only one liberated during life who can be an instructor§ [in this matter].

श्रुतिश्च ॥ ८० ॥

Further proof. *Aph.* 80.—And there is scripture.

a. There is scripture for there being persons liberated during life.‖

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* मन्दविवेकस्तु साक्षात्कारात् पूर्वं श्रवणमननध्यानमात्ररूप इति विभागः ॥

† जीवन्मुक्तोऽपि मध्यविवेकावस्थ एव भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

‡ जीवन्मुक्ते प्रमाणमाह ॥

§ शास्त्रेषु विवेकविषये गुरुशिष्यभावश्रवणाज्जीवन्मुक्तसिद्धिरित्यर्थः। जीवन्मुक्तस्यैवोपदेष्टृत्वसम्भवादिति ॥

‖ श्रुतिश्च जीवन्मुक्तेऽस्ति ॥

b. But then, merely through Hearing too, one might become [qualified to be] an instructor. To this he replies.*

इतरथान्धपरम्परा ॥ ८१ ॥

A suggestion repelled.

Aph. 81.—Otherwise there were blind tradition.

a. That is to say,—otherwise, since even one with the lowest approach to Discrimination [—but who yet had *heard*—] would be an instructor, we should have a blind handing down† [of doctrines which would speedily become corrupted or lost].

b. But then,—when, through Knowledge, one's works [—which lead to mundane existence—] have perished, how can there be life? To this he replies.‡

चक्रभ्रमणवद्धृतशरीरः ॥ ८२ ॥

How life is compatible with Liberation.

Aph. 82.—Possessed of a body,—just like the whirling of a wheel.

a. Even on the cessation of the action of the potter, the wheel of itself revolves for some time in consequence of the motal inertia resulting from the previous action; so, after knowledge, though actions do not arise, yet, through the self-continuant action of antecedent acts, possessing an energizing body, he remains living yet liberated;—such is the meaning.§

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* ननु श्रवणमात्रेणाप्युपदेष्टृत्वं स्यात् तत्राह ॥

† इतरथा मन्दविवेकस्याप्युपदेष्टृत्वेऽन्धपरम्परापत्तिरित्यर्थः ॥

‡ ननु ज्ञानेन कर्मक्षये सति कथं जीवनं स्यात् तत्राह ॥

§ कुलालकर्मनिवृत्तावपि पूर्वकर्मवेगात् स्वयमेव कियत्कालं चक्रं भ्रमति। एवं ज्ञानोत्तरं कर्मानुत्पत्तावपि प्रारब्धकर्मवेगेन चेष्टमानं शरीरं धृत्वा जीवन्मुक्तस्तिष्ठतीत्यर्थः ॥

b. But then,—on the continuance of experience, &c., being put an end to by that "Meditation with distinct recognition of the object," which [—see *Yoga* Aphorisms, B. I. §17—] is the cause of knowledge, how can one retain a body? To this he replies.*

संस्कारलेशतस्तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ८३ ॥

Difficulty of shuffling off this mortal coil.

Aph. 83.—This is occasioned by the least vestige of impression.

a. That is to say,—this retention of a body is caused by even the least access of those impressions of objects which are the causes of having a body.†

b. He recapitulates the sense of the declarations of the Institute.‡

विवेकान्निःशेषदुःखनिवृत्तौ कृतकृत्यता नेतरान्नेतरात् ॥ ८४ ॥

Recapitulation.

Aph. 84.—That which was to be done has been done, when entire cessation of Pain has resulted from Discrimination;—not otherwise—not otherwise.

a. So much for the Third Book,—on Dispassion.§

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* ननु ज्ञानहेतुसम्प्रज्ञातयोगेन भोगादिवासनाक्षये कथं शरीरधारणम् ॥

† शरीरधारणहेतवो ये विषयसंस्कारास्तेषामल्पावशेषात् तस्य शरीरधारणस्य सिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥

‡ शास्त्रवाक्यार्थमुपसंहरति ॥

§ इति वैराग्याध्यायस्तृतीयः ॥

End of Book III.

THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS.

BOOK IV.

Now, by means of a collection of narratives, recognised in the Institute, the means of discriminative knowledge are to be displayed:—so, for this purpose, the Fourth Book is commenced.*

राजपुत्रवत् तत्त्वोपदेशात् ॥ १ ॥

Soul set right by hearing the truth.

Aph. 1.—Like the king's son,—from instruction as to the truth.

a. "Discrimination" is supplied from the concluding aphorism of the preceding section. The meaning is,—as in the case of the king's son, discrimination is produced by instruction as to the truth. The story here is as follows. A certain king's son, in consequence of his being born under the star of the tenth portion [of the twenty seven portions into which the ecliptic is divided], having been expelled from his city, and reared by a certain forester, remains under the idea that "I am a forester." Having learned that he was alive, a certain minister informs him—"Thou art not a forester, thou art a king's son." Just as he immediately, having abandoned the idea of his being an outcast, rests

* शास्त्रसिद्धाख्यायिकाजातमुखेनेदानीं विवेकज्ञानसाधनानि प्रदर्शनीयानीत्येतदर्थं चतुर्थोध्याय आरभ्यते ॥

on his true royal state—saying "I am a *king*,"—so too it [—the Soul—], in consequence of the instruction of some kind person —to the effect that "Thou, who didst originate from the First Soul, which manifests itself merely as pure Thought, art thyself a portion thereof,"—having abandoned the idea of being Nature [—or of being something material or phenomenal—] rests upon its own nature,—saying—"Since I am the son of the Deity, I am myself Deity, and not something mundane different therefrom:"—such is the meaning.*

b. He exhibits another story, to prove that even women, *Śúdras*, &c., may gain the [one desirable] end, through a Bráhman, by hearing the instructions of a Bráhman.†

पिशाचवदन्यार्थोपदेशेऽपि ॥ २ ॥

Even when the instruction is not addressed to the hearer.

Aph. 2.—As in the case of the goblin,—even when the instruction was for the sake of another.

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* पूर्वपादशेषसूत्रस्थविवेकोऽनुवर्तते। राजपुत्रस्येव तत्त्वोपदेशाद्विवेको जायत इत्यर्थः। अत्रेयमाख्यायिका कश्चिद्राजपुत्रो गण्डर्क्षजन्मना पुरान्निःसारितः शबरेण केनचित् पोषितोऽहं शबर इत्यभिमन्यमान आस्ते। तं जीवन्तं ज्ञात्वा कश्चिदमात्यः प्रबोधयति न त्वं शबरो राजपुत्रोऽसीति। स यथा झटित्येव चाण्डालाभिमानं त्यक्त्वा तात्त्विकं राजभावमेवालम्बते राजाहमस्मीति। एवमेवादिपुरुषात् परिपूर्णचिन्मात्रेणाभिव्यक्तादुत्पन्नस्त्वं तस्यांश इति कारुणिकोपदेशात् प्रकृत्यभिमानं त्यक्त्वा ब्रह्मपुत्रत्वादहमपि ब्रह्मैव न तु तद्विलक्षणः संसारीत्येवं स्वस्वरूपमेवालम्बत इत्यर्थः॥

† स्त्रीशूद्रादयोऽपि ब्राह्मणेन ब्राह्मणस्योपदेशं श्रुत्वा कृतार्थाः स्युरित्येतदर्थमाख्यायिकान्तरं दर्शयति॥

a. That is to say,—though the instruction in regard to the truth was being delivered, by the venerable Krishṇa, for Arjuna's benefit, knowledge of the distinction [between Soul and Nature] was produced in the case of a goblin standing near [and overhearing the discourse]:—and so too it may happen in the case of others.*

b. And if knowledge is not produced from *once* instructing, then a repetition of the instruction is to be made,—to which effect he adduces another story.†

आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशात् ॥ ३ ॥

Necessity of inculcation.

Aph. 3.—Repetition, if not from once instructing [the end be gained].

a. That is to say,—a reiteration of instruction also is to be made,—because, in the *Chhándogya* [*Upanishad*], and the like, there is mention of Aruṇi and the like as having more than once instructed Śwetaketu and others.‡

b. With a view to the removal of desire, he sets forth, with an illustration, the fragility, &c., of Soul's accompaniments.§

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* अर्जुनार्थं श्रीकृष्णेन तत्त्वोपदेशे क्रियमाणेऽपि समीपस्थस्य पिशाचस्य विवेकज्ञानं जातमेवमन्येषामपि भवेदित्यर्थः ॥

† यदि च सकृदुपदेशाज्ज्ञानं न जायते तदोपदेशावृत्तिरपि कर्तव्येतीतिहासान्तरेणाह ॥

‡ उपदेशावृत्तिरपि कर्तव्या छान्दोग्यादौ श्वेतकेत्वादिकं प्रत्यारुणिप्रभृतीनामसकृदुपदेशेतिहासादित्यर्थः ॥

§ वैराग्यार्थं निदर्शनपूर्वकमात्मसङ्घातस्य भङ्गुरत्वादिकं प्रतिपादयति ॥

पितापुत्रवदुभयोर्दृष्टत्वात् ॥ ४ ॥

Transitoriness of mundane things.

Aph. 4.—Because both are seen,—as in the case of father and son.

a. That is to say,—Discrimination takes place, through dispassion, in consequence of its being inferred in respect of oneself also, that there are death and birth, since these are seen in the case of father and son. This has been stated as follows :—"The coming into being, and the departure, of Soul [entangled in Nature], may be inferred from the case of father and son.*

b. He next explains by illustrative stories, the subservients to the *perfecting* of knowledge in him in whom knowledge has arisen, and who is devoid of passion.†

श्येनवत् सुखदुःखी त्यागवियोगाभ्याम् ॥ ५ ॥

Voluntary distinguished from involuntary abandonment.

Aph. 5.—One experiences pleasure or pain [alternatively] from abandonment or [forcible] separation ;—as in the case of a hawk.

a. That is to say,—since people become happy by the abandonment of things,—and unhappy by [forcible] separation from them, acceptance of them ought not to be made,—as in the case of a hawk. For a hawk, when he has food before him, if he be driven away by any one, is grieved by being separated from the food; but if of his own accord he leaves it, then he is freed from grief.‡

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* स्वस्य पितापुत्रयोरिवात्मनोऽपि मरणोत्पत्त्योर्दृष्टत्वादनुमितत्वाद्वैराग्येण विवेको भवतीत्यर्थः। तदुक्तम्। आत्मनः पितृपुत्राभ्यामनुमेयौ भवाप्ययाविति ॥

† इतः परमुत्पन्नज्ञानस्य विरक्तस्य च ज्ञाननिष्पत्त्यङ्गान्याख्यायिकोक्तदृष्टान्तैर्दर्शयति ॥

‡ परिग्रहो न कर्तव्यो यतो द्रव्याणां त्यागेन लोकः सुखी

अहिनिर्ल्वयनीवत् ॥ ६ ॥

How to abandon Nature. *Aph.* 6.—As a snake and its skin.

a. That is to say,—as a snake readily abandons its old skin, from knowing that it ought to be quitted;—just so he who desires liberation should abandon Nature, experienced through a long period, and effete,—when he knows that it ought to be quitted. Thus it has been said—"As a snake its old skin," &c.*

b. And, when abandoned, he should not again accept Nature and the rest;—so, in regard to this, he says.†

छिन्नहस्तवद्वा ॥ ७ ॥

Its resumption prohibited. *Aph.* 7.—Or as an amputated hand.

a. As no one takes back again an amputated hand,—just so this [Nature], when abandoned, he should not again admit:—such is the meaning. The word "Or" is used in the sense of "moreover,"‡ [—the import of the conjunction being superadditive, not alternative].

असाधनानुचिन्तनं बन्धाय भरतवत् ॥ ८ ॥

वियोगेन च दुःखी भवति श्येनवदित्यर्थः। श्येनो हि सामिषः केनाप्यपहृत्यामिषाद्वियोज्य दुःखी क्रियते स्वयं चेत् त्यजति तदा दुःखाद्विमुच्यते ॥

* यथाहिर्जीर्णां त्वचं परित्यजत्यनायासेन हेयबुद्ध्या तथैव मुमुक्षुः प्रकृतिं बहुकालोपभुक्तां जीर्णां हेयबुद्ध्या त्यजेदित्यर्थः। तदुक्तम्। जीर्णां त्वचमिवोरग इति ॥

† त्यक्तं च प्रकृत्यादिकं पुनर्न स्वीकुर्यादित्यत्राह ॥

‡ यथा छिन्नं हस्तं पुनः कोऽपि नादत्ते तथैवैतत् त्यक्तं पुनर्नाभिमन्येतेत्यर्थः। वाशब्दोऽप्यर्थे ॥

Half measures deprecated.

Aph. 8.—What is not a means [of liberation] ought not to be thought about, [as this only conduces] to bondage,—as in the case of Bharata.

a. That which is not an immediate cause of Discrimination, even though it may be a duty, still it is 'not to be thought about,'—i. e., intention of the mind towards the performance thereof is not to be made;—since it is a cause of Bondage, from its making us forget Discrimination,—'as in the case of Bharata,'—that is to say,—as was the case with the great sage Bharata's cherishing of Dínánátha's young fawn, though this was in accordance with duty.*

बहुभिर्योगे विरोधो रागादिभिः कुमारीशङ्खवत् ॥ ९ ॥

Company to be avoided.

Aph. 9.—Through [association with] many, there is obstruction to concentration through Passion, &c.,—as in the case of a girl's shell-bracelet.

a. Association is not to be made with many,—because, when there is association with many, there is disturbance, through the development of Passion, &c., which destroys concentration,—just as a jingling is produced by the mutual contact of the shells on a girl's wrist:—such is the meaning.†

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* विवेकस्य यदन्तरङ्गसाधनं न भवति स चेद्धर्मोऽपि स्यात् तथापि तदनुचिन्तनं तदनुष्ठाने चित्तस्य तात्पर्यं न कर्तव्यं यतस्तद्बन्धाय भवति विवेकविस्मारकतया। भरतवत्। यथा भरतस्य राजर्षेर्धर्म्येमपि दीनानाथहरिणशावकस्य पोषणमित्यर्थः॥

† बहुभिः सङ्गो न कार्यः। बहुभिः सङ्गे हि रागाद्यभिव्यक्तया कलहो भवति योगभंशकः। यथा कुमारीहस्तशंखानामन्योऽन्यसङ्गेन झणात्कारो भवतीत्यर्थः॥

॥ द्वाभ्यामपि तथैव ॥ १० ॥

Even that of one.

Aph.—10. Just so also from two.

a. So in like manner even from two, there is obstruction to concentration; therefore one ought to abide *alone*:—such is the meaning.*

निराशः सुखी पिङ्गलावत् ॥ ११ ॥

Hope—an obstruction.

Aph.—11. He who is without hope, is happy, just like Pingalá.

a. Having abandoned hope, let a man become possessed of the happiness called contentment,—'just like Pingalá,'—that is to say,—just as the courtesan, called Pingalá, desiring a lover, having found no lover, being despondent, became happy when she had left off hoping.†

b. But then, granting that Pain may cease on the cessation of hope, yet how can there be *happiness* in the absence of causes thereof? It is replied. That natural happiness, resulting from the predominance of Purity in the mind, which remains obscured by hope, of itself resumes its influence on the departure of hope,—just as is the case with the coolness of water which [supposed natural coolness] had been hindered [from manifesting itself] by heat;—there is not in this case any need of *means*.

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* द्वाभ्यां योगेऽपि तथैव विरोधो भवत्यत एकाकिनैव स्थातव्यमित्यर्थः ॥

† आशां त्यक्त्वा पुरुषः सन्तोषाख्यसुखवान् भूयात् पिङ्गलावत्। यथा पिङ्गलानाम वेश्या कान्तार्थिनी कान्तमलब्ध्वा निर्विण्णा सती विहायाशां सुखिनी बभूव तद्वदित्यर्थः ॥

And *this* in reality is what is expressed by the word "happiness."*

c. Since it is an obstructor of Concentration, exertion with a view to experience is not to be made, since this will be effected otherwise,—as he states:†—

॥ अनारम्भोऽपि परगृहे सुखी सर्पवत् ॥ १२ ॥

Exertion needless.

Aph. 12.—[He may be happy] even without exertion, like a serpent—happy in another's house.

a. Supply "he may be happy." The rest is simple. So it has been said,—"The building of a house is painful, and in no way pleasant;—a serpent, having entered the dwelling made by another [e. g., a rat], does find comfort."‡

b. From Institutes, and from preceptors, only the *cream* is to be accepted, since otherwise it may be impossible to concentrate the attention, through there being, by reason of implications,

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* नन्वाशानिवृत्त्या दुःखनिवृत्तिः स्यात् सुखं तु कुतः साधनाभावादिति। उच्यते। चित्तस्य सत्त्वप्राधान्येन स्वाभाविकं यत् सुखमाशया पिहितं तिष्ठति तदेवाशाविगमे लब्धवृत्तिकं भवति तेजःप्रतिबद्धजलशैत्यवदिति न तत्र साधनापेक्षा। एतदेव चार्थे सुखमित्युच्यत इति॥

† योगप्रतिबन्धकत्वादारम्भोऽपि भोगार्थं न कर्तव्योऽन्यथैव तदुपपत्तेरित्याह॥

‡ सुखी भवेदिति शेषः। शेषं सुगमम्। तदुक्तम्। गृहारम्भो हि दुःखाय न सुखाय कथञ्चन। सर्पः परकृतं वेश्म प्रविश्य सुखमेधते॥

discussions, &c., partial discrepancies in unessential parts, and through the multiplicity of topics;—so he says.*—

बहुशास्त्रगुरूपासनेऽपि सारादानं षट्पदवत् ॥ १३ ॥

A bee-like eclecticism recommended.

Aph. 13.—Though he devote himself to many Institutes and teachers, a taking of the essence [is to be made],—as is the case with the bee.

a. Supply "is to be made." The rest is simple. Thus it has been said—"From small Institutes and from great, the intelligent man should take from all quarters the essence,—as the bee does from the flowers."†

b. Be the other means what they may, the direct possession of Discrimination is to be effected only by intentness—through maintaining Meditation,—as he tells us.‡

इषुकारवन्नैकचित्तस्य समाधिहानिः ॥ १४ ॥

Intentness on one object.

Aph. 14.—The Meditation is not interrupted of him whose mind is intent on one object,—like the maker of arrows.

a. As, in the case of a maker of arrows, with his mind intent

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* शास्त्रेभ्यो गुरुभ्यश्च सार एव ग्राह्योऽन्यथाभ्युपगमवादादिभिरंशतोऽसारभागेऽन्योऽन्यविरोधेनार्थबाहुल्येन चैकाग्रताया असम्भवादित्याह ॥

† कर्तव्यमिति शेषः। अन्यत् सुगमम्। तदुक्तम्। अणुभ्यश्च महद्भ्यश्च शास्त्रेभ्यः कुशलो नरः। सर्वतः सारमादद्यात् पुष्पेभ्य इव षट्पदः ॥

‡ साधनान्तरं यथा तथा भवत्वेकाग्रतयैव समाधिपालनद्वारा विवेकसाक्षात्कारो निष्पादनीय इत्याह ॥

solely on the making of an arrow, the exclusion of other thoughts is not interrupted even by a king's passing at his side; —so too, of him whose mind is intent on one point, there is in no way an 'interruption of meditation,' i. e., a failure to exclude other thoughts.*

कृतनियमलङ्घनादानर्थक्यं लोकवत् ॥ १५ ॥

Rules not to be transgressed with impunity.

Aph. 15.—Through transgression of the enjoined rules, there is failure in the aim,—as in the world.

a. Whatever rule, for the practisers of Concentration, has been laid down in the Institutes, if it be transgressed, then the end, viz., the perfecting of knowledge, is not effected;—'as in the world,'—that is to say, just as, in ordinary life, if the enjoined procedures, &c, in regard to a medicine, or the like, be neglected, the effect thereof will not be obtained.†

b. He states further, that if the rules be *forgotten*, the end will not be gained.‡

तद्विस्मरणेऽपि भेकीवत् ॥ १६ ॥

Rules must not be forgotten.

Aph. 16.—Moreover if they be forgotten,—as in the case of the female frog.

a. This is plain. And the story of the female frog is this. A

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* यथा शरनिर्माणायैकचित्तस्येषुकारस्य पार्श्वे राज्ञो गमनेनापि न वृत्त्यन्तरनिरोधो दीयत एवमेकाग्रचित्तस्य सर्वथापि न समाधिहानिर्वृत्त्यन्तरनिरोधच्युतिर्भवति॥

† यः शास्त्रेषु कृतो योगिनां नियमस्तस्योल्लङ्घने ज्ञाननिष्पत्त्याख्योऽर्थो न भवति लोकवत्। यथा लोके भैषज्यादौ विहितपथ्यादीनां लङ्घने तत्तत्सिद्धिर्न भवति तद्वदित्यर्थः॥

‡ नियमविस्मरणेऽप्यानर्थक्यमाह॥

certain king, having gone to hunt, saw a beautiful damsel in the forest. And she, being sought in marriage by the king, made this rule,—"When water shall be shown to me by thee, then I must depart." But on one occasion, when wearied with sport, she asked the king—"Where is water?" The king too, forgetting his agreement, showed her the water. Then she, having become the she-frog *Kámarúpiní*, daughter of the king of the frogs, entered the water; and then the king, though he sought her with nets, &c., did not regain her.*

b. He mentions a story, with reference to the necessity of reflecting on the words of the teacher, as well as hearing them.†

नोपदेशश्रवणेऽपि कृतकृत्यता परामर्शादृते विरोचनवत् ॥ १७ ॥

Reflection necessary as well as hearing.

Aph. 17.—Not even though instruction be heard, is the end gained without reflection,—as in the case of Virochana.

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* सुगमम्। भेक्याश्चेयमाख्यायिका। कस्मिद्राजा मृगयां गतो विपिने सुन्दरीं कन्यां ददर्श। सा च राज्ञा भार्याभावाय प्रार्थिता नियमं चक्रे यदा मह्यं त्वया जलं प्रदर्श्यते तदा मया गतव्यमिति। एकदा तु क्रीडया परिश्रान्ता राजानं पप्रच्छ क्व जलमिति। राजापि समयं विस्मृत्य जलमदर्शयत्। ततः सा भेकराजदुहिता कामरूपिणी भेको भूत्वा जलं विवेश ततश्च राजा जालादिभिरन्विष्यापि न तामविन्ददिति॥

† श्रवणवद्गुरुवाक्यमीमांसाया अप्यावश्यकत्व इतिहासमाह॥

a. By 'reflection' is meant such consideration as determines the import of the teacher's words. Without this, though the instruction be heard, knowledge of the truth does not necessarily follow;—for it is written that, though hearing the instructions of Prajápati,—Virochana,—out of Indra and Virochana,—erred through the want of reflection.*

दृष्टत्वयोरिन्द्रस्य ॥ १८ ॥

Of this further. *Aph.* 18.—Of those two, it was seen in the case of Indra.

a. By the word 'those,' he refers to the one mentioned [in § 17, viz., Virochana], and the one now mentioned. Of those two, viz., Indra and Virochana, reflection was seen in the case of Indra:—such is the meaning.†

b. And he tells us that, by him who desires to understand thoroughly, attendance on the teacher should be practised for a long time.‡

प्रणतिब्रह्मचर्योपसर्पणानि कृत्वा सिद्धिर्बहुकालात् तद्वत् ॥ १९ ॥

The process requires time. *Aph.* 19.—Having performed reverence, the duties of a student, and attendance, there is success after a long time,—as in *his* case.

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* परामर्शो गुरुवाक्यतात्पर्यनिर्णायको विचारस्तं विनोपदेशवाक्यश्रवणेऽपि तत्त्वज्ञाननियमो नास्ति प्रजापतेरुपदेशश्रवणे ऽपीन्द्रविरोचनयोर्मध्ये विरोचनस्य परामर्शाभावेन भ्रान्तत्वश्रुतेरित्यर्थः ॥

† तच्छब्देनोक्तोच्यमानयोः परामर्शः। तयोरिन्द्रविरोचनयोर्मध्ये परामर्श इन्द्रस्य दृष्टश्चेत्यर्थः ॥

‡ सम्यग्ज्ञानार्थिना च गुरुसेवा बहुकालं कर्तव्येत्याह ॥

a. 'As in his case';—that is to say, as in the case of Indra, so in the case of another too, only by having exhibited, towards one's preceptor, reverence, the study of the *Vedas*, service, &c., is there 'success,' i. e., the developement of truth,—not otherwise.*

न कालनियमो वामदेववत् ॥ २० ॥

The time for the process may embrace successive states of being.

Aph. 20.—There is no determination of the time,—as in the case of Vámadeva.

a. There is no necessity, as regards the time, that, in the arising of knowledge, it must be, e. g., from *present* causes alone;—'as in the case of Vámadeva,'—that is to say,—as, in consequence of causes pertaining to a previous life, knowledge arose, in the case of Vámadeva, even when in embryo, so may it in the case of another.†

b. But then,—since it is written that the means of knowledge need be no other than devotion to those [—§21, *a*—] who have Qualities,—knowledge may result from *this*. Why, then, a hard and subtle process of Concentration? To this he replies.‡

अध्यस्तरूपोपासनात् पारम्पर्येण यज्ञोपासकानामिव ॥ २१ ॥

Inferior means not altogether unprofitable.

Aph. 21.—Through devotion to something under a superinduced form, [attain-

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* तद्वदिन्द्रस्येवान्यस्यापि गुरौ प्रणतिवेदाध्ययनसेवादीन् कृत्वैवसिद्धिस्तत्त्वार्थस्फूर्तिर्भवति नान्यथेत्यर्थः ॥

† ऐहिकसाधनादेव भवतीत्यादिर्ज्ञानोदये कालनियमो नास्ति वामदेववत्। वामदेवस्य जन्मान्तरीयसाधनेभ्यो गर्भेऽपि यथा ज्ञानोदयस्तथान्यस्यापीत्यर्थः ॥

‡ ननु सगुणोपासनाया अपि ज्ञानहेतुत्वश्रवणात् तत एव ज्ञानं भविष्यति किमर्थं दुष्करस्वल्पयोगचर्येति तत्राह ॥

ment takes place] *by degrees*,—as in the case of those who devote themselves to sacrifices.

a. Supply 'there is attainment,' Through devotion to the Souls, Brahmá, Vishṇu, Śiva, &c., under the forms superinduced on them, the perfecting of knowledge takes place 'by degrees,' —i. e., by the successive attainment of the world of Brahmá, &c.,—or else through the purification of the Good principle, &c., but not *directly*;—just as is the case with sacrificers [—whose slaughter of animals, requiring to be expiated, throws them back in the road to emancipation—];—such is the meaning.*

b. He tells us, that, moreover there is no necessity that the successive rise to the world of Brahmá should perfect one's knowledge.†

इतरलाभेऽप्यावृत्तिः पञ्चाग्नियोगतो जन्मश्रुतेः ॥ २२ ॥

Scriptural proof that heaven gives not liberation.

Aph. 22.—Moreover, after the attainment of what [—like the world of Brahmá—] is other [than the state of emancipated soul], there is return [to mundane existence]; because it is written [in the 5th *Prapáthaka* of the *Chhándogya Upanishad*], "From conjunction with the five fires, there is birth."—&c.

b. He exhibits an illustration, to the effect that the perfecting of knowledge takes place only in the case of him who is free from passion.‡

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* सिद्धिरित्यनुषज्यते। अध्यस्तरूपैः पुरुषाणां ब्रह्मविष्णुहरादीनामुपासनात् पारम्पर्येण ब्रह्मादिलोकप्राप्तिक्रमेण सत्त्वशुद्धिद्वारा वा ज्ञाननिष्पत्तिर्न साक्षात्। यथा याज्ञिकानामित्यर्थः॥

† ब्रह्मादिलोकपरम्परयापि ज्ञाननिष्पत्तौ नास्ति नियम इत्याह॥

‡ ज्ञाननिष्पत्तिर्विरक्तस्यैवेत्यत्र निदर्शनमाह॥

विरक्तस्य हेयहानमुपादेयोपादानं हंसक्षीरवत् ॥ २३ ॥

Discrimination illustrated.

Aph. 23.—By him who is free from passion, what is to be left is left, and what is to be taken is taken,—as in the case of the swan and the milk.

a. That is to say,—only by him who is free from passion is there a quitting 'of what is to be left,' i. e., of Nature, &c., and a taking 'of what is to be taken,' i. e., of Soul:—as it is only the swan,—and not the crow, or the like,—which, out of milk and water mingled, by means of leaving the unimportant water, takes the valuable milk.*

b. He tells us that both of these may also take place through association with a perfect man.†

लब्धातिशययोगाद्वा तद्वत् ॥ २४ ॥

Benefit of good society.

Aph. 24.—Or through association with one who has obtained excellence,—just as in the case thereof.

a. That is to say,—moreover, from association with him by whom 'excellence,' i. e., excellence in knowledge, has been obtained, the aforesaid [discrimination] takes place,—as in the case of the swan [§23]. Just as in the case of Alarka, Discrimination manifested itself spontaneously, merely through association with Dattátreya.‡

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* विरक्तस्यैव हेयानां प्रकृत्यादीनां हानमुपादेयस्य चात्मन उपादानं भवति। यथा दुग्धजलयोरेकीभावापन्नयोर्मध्येऽसारजलत्यागेन सारभूतक्षीरोपादानं हंसस्यैव न तु काकादेरित्यर्थः ॥

† सिद्धपुरुषसङ्गादप्येतदुभयं भवतीत्याह ॥

‡ लब्धोऽतिशयो ज्ञानकाष्ठा येन तत्सङ्गादप्युक्तं भवति हंसवदेवेत्यर्थः। यथालर्कस्य दत्तात्रेयसङ्गममात्रादेव स्वयं विवेकः प्रादुरभूदिति ॥

b. He tells us that we ought not to associate with those influenced by desire.*

न कामचारित्वं रागोपहते शुकवत्॥ २५ ॥

Danger of unsuitable society.

Aph. 25.—Not of his own accord should he go near one influenced by desire,—just like the parrot.

a. Association is not to be made, voluntarily, with a person influenced by desire,—'just like the parrot:'—that is to say, just as the bird called a parrot, by reason of its being exceedingly beautiful, does not act [—by going near people—] in a self-willed manner, through fear of being imprisoned by those who covet it for its beauty.†

b. He states the harm of association with the passionate.‡

गुणयोगाद्बद्धः शुकवत्॥ २६ ॥

Of this further.

Aph. 26.—Bound, by conjunction with the cords,—as in the case of the parrot.

a. But, in the case of associating with those persons, one must become bound 'by conjunction with the cords,' i. e., by conjunction with their Desire, &c., [—the Qualities, punningly compared to cords—] just 'as in the case of the parrot,'—that is to say, just as the bird called a parrot becomes bound by the cords, i. e., the ropes, of the hunter.§

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* रागिसङ्गो न कार्य इत्याह॥

† रागोपहते पुरुषे कामतः सङ्गो न कर्तव्यः शुकवत्। यथा शुकपक्षी प्रकृष्टरूप इति ज्ञात्वा कामचारं न करोति रूपलालुपैर्बन्धनभयात् तद्वदित्यर्थः॥

‡ रागिसङ्गे तु दोषमाह॥

§ तेषां सङ्गे तु गुणयोगात् तदीयरागादियोगाद्बद्धः स्यात् शुकवदेव। यथा शुकपक्षी व्याधस्य गुणै रज्जुभिर्बद्धो भवति तद्वदित्यर्थः॥

. He determines, by two aphorisms, the means of dispassion.*

न भोगाद्रागशान्तिर्मुनिवत् ॥ २७ ॥

Means of dispassion. *Aph.* 27.—Not by enjoyment is desire appeased,—just as in the case of the saint.

a. That is to say,—as, in the case of the saint, Saubhari, desire was not appeased by enjoyment, so also in the case of others is it not.†

b. But further.—‡

दोषदर्शनादुभयोः ॥ २८ ॥

Of this further. *Aph.* 28.—From seeing the fault of both.

a. That is to say,—only from seeing the fault, e. g., of being changeable, of consisting of pain, &c., 'of both,' i. e., of Nature and her productions, does the assuaging of Desire take place,—just as in the case of the saint [§27]. For it is written that Saubhari became indifferent to society, just through seeing the evil of society.§

b. He tells us that incapacity even to accept instruction attaches to him who is affected by the fault of Desire, &c.‖

न मलिनचेतस्युपदेशबीजप्ररोहोऽजवत् ॥ २९ ॥

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* वैराग्यस्याप्युपायमवधारयति द्वाभ्याम् ॥

† यथा मुनेः सौभरेर्भोगान्न रागशान्तिरभूत्। एवमन्येषामपि न भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

‡ अपितु ॥

§ उभयोः प्रकृतितत्कार्ययोः परिणामित्वदुःखात्मकत्वादिदोषदर्शनादेव रागशान्तिर्भवति मुनिवदेवेत्यर्थः। सौभरेर्हि सङ्गदोषदर्शनादेव सङ्गे वैराग्यं श्रूयते।

‖ रागादिदोषोपहतस्योपदेशग्रहणेऽप्यनधिकारमाह ॥

Agitation excludes instruction.

Aph. 29.—Not in the case of him whose mind is impure does the seed of instruction sprout,—as in the case of Aja.

a. In him whose mind is rendered impure by Passion, &c., not even does a sprout spring up from that seed of the tree of knowledge which is in the shape of instruction;—'as in the case of Aja,'—that is to say, as not a sprout from the seed of instruction, though offered to him by Vasishṭha, sprang up in the king named Aja, whose mind was disturbed by grief for his wife.*

b. What need of more?†—

नाभासमात्रमपि मलिनदर्पणवत् ॥ ३० ॥

Of this further.

Aph. 30.—Not even a semblance of it,—as in the case of a rusty mirror.

a. Even superficial knowledge does not arise, from instruction, in one whose mind is impure, through the obstruction caused by its wandering away, e. g., to other objects,—just as an object is not reflected in a foul mirror, through the obstruction caused by the impurities:—such is the meaning.‡

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* उपदेशरूपं यज्ज्ञानवृक्षस्य बीजं तस्याङ्कुरोऽपि रागादिमलिनचित्ते नोत्पद्यते। अजवत्। यथाजनाम्नि नृपे भार्याशोकमलिनचित्ते वसिष्ठेनोक्तस्याप्युपदेशबीजस्य नाङ्कुर उत्पन्न इत्यर्थः ॥

† किं बहुना ॥

‡ आपातज्ञानमपि मलिनचेतस्युपदेशान्न जायते विषयान्तरसञ्चारादिभिः प्रतिबध्नात्। यथा मलैः प्रतिबध्नान्मलिनदर्पणेऽर्थो न प्रतिबिम्बति तद्वदित्यर्थः ॥

b. Or if knowledge should spring up in any kind of way, still it may not, he tells us, be in accordance with the instruction.*

न तज्जस्यापि तद्रूपता पङ्कजवत् ॥ ३१ ॥

Knowledge not necessarily perfect knowledge.

Aph. 31.—Nor, even though sprung therefrom, is it [necessarily] in accordance therewith,—just like the lotus.

a. Though sprung 'therefrom,' i. e., from instruction, knowledge is not [necessarily] in accordance with the instruction, from this not having been entirely understood;—'just like the lotus,'—that is to say, just as the lotus, though the seed be of the best, is not in accordance with the seed when the swamp is faulty. The mind of the student is compared to the swamp,† [in which the lotus-seed was sown].

b. But then,—since Soul's end is gained by the attainment of supernatural power in the worlds [§21, *a*,] of Brahmá, &c., to what purpose is the production of knowledge, with so much toil, for liberation? To this he replies.‡

न भूतियोगेऽपि कृतकृत्यतोपास्यसिद्धिवदुपास्यसिद्धिवत् ॥ ३२ ॥

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* यदि वा यथाकथञ्चिज्ज्ञानं जायेत तथाप्युपदेशानुरूपं न भवेदित्याह ॥

† तस्मादुपदेशाज्जातस्यापि ज्ञानस्योपदेशानुरूपता न भवति सामर्थ्येनानवबोधात्। पङ्कजवत्। यथा बीजस्योत्तमत्वेऽपि पङ्कदोषाद्बीजानुरूपता पङ्कजस्य न भवति तद्वदित्यर्थः। पङ्कस्थानीयं शिष्यचित्तम् ॥

‡ ननु ब्रह्मलोकादिष्वैश्वर्येणैव पुरुषार्थतासिद्धा किमर्थमेतावता प्रयासेन मोक्षाय ज्ञाननिष्पादनं तत्राह ॥

Heaven not perfect bliss.

Aph. 32.—Not, even on the attainment of glorification, has that been done which was to be done,—as is the case with the perfection of the objects worshipped,—as is the case with the perfection of the objects worshipped.

a. Even though one attain to supernatural power, 'that has not been done which was to be done,'—i. e., the end has not been gained,—because it is attended by the grief of deficiency and excess:—'as is the case with the perfection of the object worshipped,'—that is to say, as, though the possession of perfection [so-called] belongs to 'the objects worshipped,' i. e., to Brahmá, &c., still that has not been done which was to be done,—since it is written that even *these*, while in the sleep of Concentration, &c., still *practice* Concentration [—from fear of losing what they have attained to—]:—just in like manner is the case with him who, by the worship of these, has attained to glorification:—such is the meaning.†

b. So much for the Fourth Book, that of Tales, in the Commentary composed by Vijnánabhikshu, on Kapila's exposition of the Sánkhya.‡

† ऐश्वर्ययोगेऽपि कृतकृत्यता कृतार्थता नास्ति क्षयातिशयदुःखैरनुगमात्। उपास्यसिद्धिवत्। यथोपास्यानां ब्रह्मादीनां सिद्धियोगेऽपि न कृतकृत्यता तेषामपि योगनिद्रादौ योगाभ्यासश्रवणात् तथैव तदुपासनया प्राप्तदैश्वर्यस्यापीत्यर्थः॥

‡ इति विज्ञानभिक्षुनिर्मिते कापिलसाङ्ख्यप्रवचनस्य भाष्ये आख्यायिकाध्यायश्चतुर्थः॥

End of Book IV.

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11.	Ditto Ditto, " 3, ...	8 do.	Ditto Ditto.
12.	Ditto Ditto, " 1, ...	8 do.	Sanskrit & Hindí.
13.	Lectures on the Subdivisions of Knowledge, Parts 1, 2, 3, & 4, ...	each 4 annas	Sanskrit & English.
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25.	Ditto of the Sánkhya, ...	12 do.	Ditto Ditto.
26.	Ditto of the Yoga, Parts 1 & 2, ..	each 8 as.	Ditto Ditto.
27.	Ditto of the Vedánta, ...	7 annas	Ditto Ditto.
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33.	Elements of Logic, ...	1: 2: 0	English.
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36.	Metaphysics and Mental Philosophy, No. 4,	2: 0: 0	English.
37.	Chapters on Political Economy, No. 8,	12 annas	Ditto.
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39.	Aphorisms of the Sánkhya, Book II, III & IV,	12 as.	Sanskrit & English.

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

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